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ABSTRACT
The Heart of Everything in the Middle of Nowhere:
The Role of Rural Identity in the Formation and Deployment of Political Attitudes in
Pennsylvania

Mikaela G Zimmerman

The world of American politics continues to infiltrate households across the United States as
technological advancement extends the reach of breaking news and government action. With this
expanding reach, communities all over the country are digesting and contemplating their place in national
politics more fervently than ever. At the crux of this discussion is the backbone of political engagement
and action—identity and its resulting political attitudes. For decades, partisanship has been a point of
contention amongst American citizens. Cities across the nation showcase protests, demonstrations, town
hall meetings, and more illustrating citizens’ care for their democratized input in government affairs. But
what about those in the quieter parts of America? Until recently, rural America has been overlooked (and
underseen) by the social and political sciences. This study illuminates the rural perspective on attitudes
toward politics and peers as well as the role of rural identity in attitude formation. As a state with multiple
kinds of rurality (suburbia, exurbia, rural farmland, small towns, and Appalachia), Pennsylvania proves
worthy of its own analysis—particularly as it finds itself at the heart of political action as a battleground
and swing state since the 2016 presidential election. Utilizing in-depth interviews from rural and smalltown Pennsylvanians and observational data from the areas in which they live, this study explores rural
Americans’ input on their individual contributions to government affairs as well as rural political attitudes
and community needs/expectations from their elected officials— ultimately offering a renewed and
under-considered perspective on rural identity and rural political attitudes.
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INTRODUCTION
“Things just aren’t like they used to be anymore; it’s a real shame.” While especially
spotlighted since the 2016 presidential election, politics and partisan priorities have been a point
of contention amongst American citizens for many years—particularly between the rural and
non-rural parts of the United States. From illuminating and attempting to tackle various
economic and social inequalities to defining the moral backbone of a nation, politics are a way
for Americans to involve themselves in the broad and complex process of large-scale decision
making that affects us all in ways both significant and more minor. Following historical patterns
well into modern day, cities and urban hubs across the nation showcase protests, demonstrations,
town hall meetings, and more demonstrating citizens’ care for their democratized input in
government affairs. But what about those in the quieter parts of America? The parts of America
that make the world go round with its fruitful industrial, agricultural, and political influence? In
many ways, rural and small-town America provide significant foundational support and impact
for the modern workings of both national and international industry, culture, and politics—the
heart of everything in the middle of nowhere. Until the recent interest spike fueled by the 2016
presidential election, rural America has been largely overlooked (and, therefore, underseen) by
the social and political sciences.
Studies show that 85.3 percent of persistent poverty counties—counties where 20 percent
or more of the population has lived in poverty for the last 30 years—are rural (Economic
Research Service 2017); but “rural” is a multifaceted title. The US Census (2017) defines “rural”
as all population, housing, and territory not included within an urban area—essentially, any area
with less than 50,000 people. However, rurality also encompasses unique aspects of adverse
identity that factor into political consciousness and attitudes. Specifically, the adoption of an
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identity that encompasses deprivation, struggle, misrepresentation, and steadfast conservative
cultural values act as catalysts for rural political attitudes. Further complicating this process is
these political attitudes’ contribution to specific voting behaviors that perpetuate a cycle of rural
adversity and resulting beliefs and worldviews that actively marginalize and stigmatize
conservative rural folks.
According to the United States 2017 Census report, 19.3 percent of American citizens
reside in rural areas—nearly one fifth of the entire population. However, the current structure of
American political institutions demonstrates a unique rural bias and disproportionate electoral
strength. Through systems of urban clustering and strategic land/population delegation
throughout history, rural America pulls more weight in US elections than those areas with over
80 percent of American citizens—and these rural areas tend to lean more conservative both in
fiscal and social issues (GSS). Because of strategic clustering of more liberal Black and brown
Americans in inner cities, conservative Republican voters are more efficiently distributed across
the country than Democrats, who are concentrated in more tightly packed urban areas (about 3
percent of US land mass, according to the 2017 US Census). Broken down, this means that even
if Democrats were to win 50 percent of voters nationwide for an election, they consistently hold
fewer than 50 percent of seats in the House of Representatives, regardless of partisan
gerrymandering. As a result, the will of rural America ends up with disproportionate political
strength; however, they often do not reap the benefits. Urban populations— making up the vast
majority— still tend to receive most of the attention in research, political programming, and
calls-to-action efforts while rural America continues to “fly under the radar” in many ways. This
covertness then allows for the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes often depicted in the media
and further skewing understandings of rural people and places.
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This cycle of misrepresentation and deprivation of resources acts as springboard for the
rural mindset of mistrust and resentment of high-status politicians and Democrats who have
become synonymized with the urban “other.” Rural politics is about rural consciousness (Cramer
2016): (1) perceptions of power or who discusses what/who decides what to discuss, (2) respect
to perceptions of values and lifestyles, and (3) perceptions of resources or who gets what. It is
the term used to describe a strong sense of identity as a rural person combined with a strong
sense that rural areas are the victims of injustice: the sense that rural areas do not get their fair
share of power, respect, or resources and that rural folks prefer lifestyles and ethical standards
that differ fundamentally from those of city people and breeding an “us versus them” mentality.
This stark divide between the perception of rural Republicans and urban/suburban Democrats
creates differing expectations for residents’ attitudes toward government and public spending. As
with any differing circumstances, expectations for allocation of government-issued funds
change; in the case of the rural and the urban specifically, these areas have higher concentrations
of different social problems which influence residents’ expectations for public policy, spending,
and outreach from their elected officials.
Plagued by geographic isolation, economic privatization of natural resources, and low
population density, rural areas face unique adversity that informs much of the identity and
consciousness that influences rural political attitudes. This is exacerbated in Appalachia—a
region beset with higher concentrations of low income, minimal resource allocation, and harmful
stereotypes than the average rural area. As a state exhibiting multiple levels of rurality
(agricultural industry, small towns, Appalachian post-industrial settlement, and
Pittsburgh/Philadelphia exurbs), rural Pennsylvania offers a unique and important perspective on
rural identity and its influence on the political process. Pennsylvania, known both as the
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Keystone State due to its pivotal role in holding together the newly-formed Union at our
country’s birth and the Unavoidable State with its significant geographic presence in the
northeastern US, Pennsylvania positions itself as an excellent candidate for political research. As
a state with varying levels of rural adversity and unique political power held by a swing state,
Pennsylvania is worthy of analysis on its own; but by studying Appalachian Pennsylvania, we
get a look at how rurality, rural identity, and adversity are operationalized in a state with such
diverse population. Even a look into more extreme cases of adversity will aid in the
understanding of places plagued by lesser hardships, as it may serve to construct logical and
empathic bridges when considering better-off rural areas that still face financial and social
difficulty. This analysis has potential to produce useful political insight, as Pennsylvania and its
assorted population act together as a political swing state. Regarded even as a “battleground
state” (Lamis 2009) in recent years, it is especially important for political research to understand
the population of the non-urban parts of the state—particularly Appalachian areas, which harbor
such a unique perspective and influence. Oftentimes, politicians “fight” for votes in Pennsylvania
by rallying in big cities—denser population infers more voters. However, it is this exact mindset
that begets an attitude of distrust and abandonment in the middle, less densely populated areas.
Political figures end up making promises to people they do not make a recognized attempt to
understand, and then move into office with potentially skewed perceptions of what
Pennsylvanians need and expect from them as their leader. By entering parts of Appalachian
Pennsylvania and speaking directly to folks who live there, this research aims to produce a body
of work that will help illuminate the rural Pennsylvanian perspective and encourage further
political research in areas similarly plighted in the United States.
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This study seeks to explore the role of rural identity in the formation and holding of
political attitudes regarding issues of both fiscal and social delineation in rural central
Pennsylvania. What, exactly, does this area want and need? How do their opinions and
expectations of American government line up with its actions? How does the experience of
living in rural Pennsylvania influence political attitudes and expectations? Paying closer
attention to rural residents’ expectations and opinions of government and public spending are
important to understanding the United States as a more holistic entity, especially when those in
rural areas dictate such significant government power. By beginning in rural Pennsylvania, this
research will provide insight into the importance of more regionally-based analyses of the United
States—especially for purposes of policy-based research. To continue treating rural Americans
as an afterthought would be detrimental to the progress of American government and, therefore,
American society. This study will not only explore and highlight rural political perspectives in
central Pennsylvania, but also beckon further research efforts to better understand and serve rural
American communities in both the social and political sciences.
Research Questions
The objective of this research is to explore the nuances and connections between rural
life/identity and rural political attitudes in rural Pennsylvania while also exploring how these
nuanced attitudes inform political behavior and its effects in the rural places that allow policy
advancements. The purpose of this study is to use ethnographic observational data and in-depth
interviews to better understand political attitudes and expectations of rural Pennsylvanians and to
make a case for future policy-driven research initiatives to include similarly executed rural
analysis in public spending plans. Additionally, this study will add to the existing literature on
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rural politics and rural disparities by exploring perspectives generally left out of larger national
analyses.
Chapter Overviews
Findings are mapped out in three substantive chapters following similar thematic layouts
so as to allow for comparison between groups. The first results chapter will analyze responses
from democratic and/or more left leaning interviewees; the second will follow the same
structure, analyzing conservative and/or more right leaning interviewees. These chapters address
the questions: (1) how is rural identity deployed in the formation and holding of political
attitudes in rural Pennsylvania? (2) what do rural Pennsylvanians value politically, and how do
they assess the current political system in the United States? (3) how do rural Pennsylvanians
receive information that influences their political attitudes, and what are the effects of receiving
information from these sources? and (4), how does the disconnect between rural political
priorities and government action contribute to the cyclicality of rural adversity?
The third and final results chapter reiterates the commonalities between each group and
find cohesions within political attitudes and expectations of rural Pennsylvanians. The purpose of
this chapter is to compound and prioritize the unifying pieces that the previous two chapters
overlook and discuss the common ground where United States politics could meet rural
Pennsylvanians for their betterment. It addresses the questions: (1) what do rural Pennsylvanians
have in common, regardless of their political affiliations? (2) what role does rural identity play in
producing political commonalities, and (3), how can these commonalities be used to unify
political goals of rural Pennsylvanians?
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Finally, the conclusion chapter serves as a reiteration of the most important themes and
research findings while also calling for similar research agendas in other parts of the United
States. Conducting similar research allows for a deeper, more holistic understanding of the
American political process and experience by delving into the nuances of various identities and
the political attitudes and expectations that are influenced by the titles one holds and one’s
understanding of themselves, their community, and their life’s circumstances. Specifically in the
realm of politics, policy-based research would significantly benefit from further rural analysis
such as this because of rural Americans’ disproportionate political power and the notable
disconnect between many rural folks and the governmental elite.

LITERATURE REVIEW
As with any research, it is important to find guidance within existing bodies of reviewed
literature. Further illustrating rurality’s absence from the academic scope, significant gaps exist
between literature grounded in legitimate explorative science and regional reflections—a
discrepancy integral to understanding the need for further study of rural areas as researchers
attempt to draw connections between narrative/reflective data and empirical foundations of rural
adversity and identity. Additionally, the representation and complexity of political affiliation is a
concept understood with great care to nuance and dynamic change, as even whole pockets of
affiliation data are made up from many differing individual processes. Parties’ definitions change
and evolve over time, ultimately leaving an intricate trail of historical influence and,
unavoidably, lagging individuals as one’s concept of party and self adjust to accommodate
developing definitions and circumstances. Utilizing a collaboration of both scientific and
reflective literature, this review attempts to draw attention to such gaps and transparently address
the advantages and drawbacks of each when piecing together understandings of modern rurality.
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Rural places tend to have higher concentrations of older residents and those with lower
educational attainment than suburban or urban areas (Parker et al 2018). And although research
suggests gradual diversification, rural populations are primarily white (Parker et al 2018).
Demographics are crucial to understanding any region and its adversity, but rural America has
become defined by so much more. The rural lifestyle is rich with tradition, hospitality, hard
work, and more that all play a part in informing the formation of rural identity political attitudes.
However, there are significant deep-rooted hardships that drive the mechanisms dictating what it
means to be “rural” in the United States.
There are many bodies of sociological and political literature both regionally reflective
and more empirical illustrating that rural populations tend to have more politically conservative
ideals and priorities, resulting in part from consequences of rural adversity—inadequate
educational funding, for example, has been observed to correlate with cultural isolation and
fixation on explosive cultural ideals in politics (Frank 2005). Accompanying conditioned
mistrust in academic and political elites (Frank 2005; Larson and Porpora 2011; Hochschild
2016), the stark division between identities and ideals of rural and urban Americans (Belanche,
Casaló, and Rubio 2021; Bell 1992; Glenn and Alston 1967; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) often
translates to divergent political priorities. But how did this happen? What are the mechanisms
behind rural politics?
Historical Exploitation of Rurality and Resulting Government Priorities
As globalization expanded in the United States in 1800, local American markets suffered.
Quickly, rural Americans saw their livelihoods disappear with the companies, plants, and small
businesses forced out of small-town America to survive while others shut down completely. This
left the rural folks disproportionately out of work, and poverty rates shot up across virtually all
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racial groups; any budding social mobility for residents of rural America came to a stop, and the
market continually failed to return adequate employment to small towns. People were
experiencing economic strain at bigger rates than ever before and social safety net programs
responded, yet conditions for rural America continued to worsen. The economy never quite
bounced back to its previous booming state and the population fell as people sought economic
stability in more urban places while the rural ones got poorer. As a result, the percentage of rural
Americans reliant on social programs increased. A market delivering growth in new sectors and
lauded by conservative politicians failed to provide security for most Americans (Scott 1998)
and, as a result, inequality soared.
America’s postwar economy flourished under new public policy; prior to the New Deal,
Americans had few workers’ rights due to unsanctioned labor unions and a lack of protective
labor laws (Mettler 2018). When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
unions gained the right to organize and bargain—the Fair Labor Standards Act followed with a
guaranteed minimum wage and new maximum hour laws (Mettler 2018) illustrating a change of
direction from a previously more-conservative Supreme Court. Continuing this trend, labor
unions thrived with growing memberships and success in their efforts to raise wages (Mettler
2018; Domhoff 1995). Additionally, the growth of labor rights provided workers with employerissued healthcare and retirement benefits.
Paradoxically, at this time of great economic uncertainty emerging for so many as the
rural-urban divide widened in the 1930s and Great Depression era, a new public philosophy
arose centering an acclaimed ideal of the market. This new philosophy eschewed government
intervention and featured a faith that the market would naturally maximize the will of individuals
and generate positive outcomes if left to its own devices for long enough. For conservatives who
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had been wanting to overcome their marginalized status, the economic crisis awarded a political
opportunity with a newly lauded market that offered an experimental opportunity for a more
hands-off style of government. Contrary to the doctrines of modern conservativism, the market
has since receded from its role of delivering well-paying jobs with respectable benefits,
particularly for those who are less well-off (Mettler 2018; Harriss-White 2006; Freeman 1998).
Employers have rescinded their role in the social contract, and the government has loosened
regulations that held employers to their obligations of providing adequate working environments
and benefits for employees. Currently, typically only those in the upper tiers of the labor market
still enjoy the favorable working conditions reminiscent of those more widely accessible decades
ago.
Additionally, the state has imposed certain policies that hurt the American middle- and
lower-class. Specifically, certain tax expenditures and assistance programs issue awards based on
investment rather than earned income which benefits primarily the top one percent, who amass
the majority of these provisions (Mettler 2018; Kapoor 2016; Harriss-White 2006). The grossly
wealthy end up paying proportionately less in taxes than the average American, granting them
significant economic advantage (Kapoor 2016). In short, while rhetoric of tying one’s
deservingness of social benefits for low- and middle-class people to their work efforts exploded
in the United States, it also granted substantial tax benefits to those who benefited less from their
work efforts and more from their good fortune (Kapoor 2016).
To add onto these disparities, America’s social programming has major holes. Both
unemployment insurance (UI) and access to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) remain targeted in ways that exclude many from qualifying for coverage (PGPF 2021;
Aaron 2020; Mettler 2018; Damme 2010), and they remain underutilized even by those who are
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eligible. To qualify for unemployment insurance, workers must meet three requirements: (1) a
minimum earnings threshold, which disadvantages part-time, low-paid, and young workers; (2) a
qualifying reason or “good cause” for job loss, which, depending on how states define it, is
problematic for those who leave a job because of their own health or that of a family member, or
because they lack adequate transportation or care for their children; and (3) evidence that they
are actively and continuously seeking employment, which they may be unable to provide if they
left a job to care for a family member (US Department of Labor 2021; Mettler 2018). And as we
recall, these disparities tend to congregate more in rural areas. Additionally, these eligibility
requirements and benefits vary by state, and conservative states tend to have stricter eligibility
(Gilman 2019; Mettler 2018). Moreover, as a result of recent migration to parts of the country
featuring lower pay and lower rates of unionization, unemployment insurance receipt is strongly
related to previous hours of work, level of education, and prior wages (Mettler 2018)—all things
felt more negatively and intensely in rural areas, thus widening geospatial social inequality.
Additionally, eligibility for food stamps is limited to families whose gross income falls
below 130 percent of the poverty level (PGPF 2021; Aaron 2020), and benefits vary depending
on income and expenses for a family’s basic needs. Also informative of one’s eligibility status
are their assets—the value of a home, cars, savings accounts, and so forth (PGPF 2021; US
Department of Labor); again, we see values of such things decreasing in rural areas and poorer
residents unable to acquire better ones. Even after the United States Department of Agriculture
Food and Nutrition Service pushed for the dropping of asset-based restrictions, food stamps
remained underutilized with 25 percent of eligible individuals opting out of participation—
among them were 35 percent of the working poor (Aaron 2020; Mettler 2018), likely abstaining
in the interest of pride and an identity touting self-sufficiency. Another federal system targeting
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the working poor is the Earned Income Tax Credit program (EITC); the EITC omits unemployed
poor people—typically those who also fail to qualify for unemployment insurance or for welfare
(Urban-Brookings TPC 2020; Mettler 2018). Additionally, for those working poor people with
no independents to claim, the EITC provides extremely mediocre benefits. And, like all meanstested benefits, EITC eligibility gradually decreases as one’s income increases—in effect, taxing
individuals at a much higher rate as they fulfill the purpose of the policy, which is paid
employment (Urban-Brookings TPC 2020; Mettler 2018). This is a big contributor to the attitude
found in rural politics that people feel punished for working hard while others receive
(sometimes) better benefits via government “handout” programs—even though this belief that
only a minority of Americans benefit from such programs is unfounded (Mettler 2018).
Interestingly, as the government responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with expanded financial
relief and benefits, some scholars found that some rural attitudes may have shifted a bit, favoring
stronger government interference in the form of aid paid out directly to individuals while
reducing financial aid to large businesses and oil/gas companies (Farrell et al 2020). This might
suggest agreement with the idea of the deserving poor (Gilens 2000), as folks from all corners of
partisanship experienced a direct impact of some kind from the pandemic—perhaps impacts
more direct than other financial hardship viewed from an outside perspective. Or, perhaps these
impacts were felt more personally as people in many industries suffered consequences of global
shutdown like unemployment, furlough/outsourcing due to remote work capabilities,
overcrowded healthcare facilities, and more. While these issues may not be unique to the
pandemic’s impact on American citizens, it is possible that their exacerbation forced pieces of
rural identity/attitudes that demand self-sufficiency and pride to take a back seat in order to
survive. Still, authors wonder how permanent these changing attitudes are and if historical
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patterns of rural political attitudes toward social safety net programs will persist as life adjusts to
a new normal following COVID-19’s initial outbreak (Farrell et al 2020).
As it is, the United States government operates within a system of cyclical economic and
social hierarchies. Those with the most money and power (the superrich or corporations, for
example) often utilize their resources to influence those with authority to make decisions acting
in their favor. This can take the form of funding political campaigns or super PACs, funding or
representing certain cultural issues, and even lobbying (investing money and influence into
favorable policy). Wealth gives spenders leverage to restructure the economy in their favor via
things like low tax rates and underinvestment in policy and programming aimed at promoting
social and economic equity. These investments perpetuate the structural constraints that work to
reduce the likelihood that those with state power will act in opposition to the will of the elite
capitalist; this sheds light on why, so often, politicians tend to pursue policies and rhetoric that
act primarily in favor of capital rather than of humanity.
Necessary to accomplish this agenda is the evaluation of society in terms of its overall
stability and whether or not the working class is subdued enough to allow for their continued
oppression. These things inform business decisions and investments, which contribute to
business confidence. Business confidence considers only politics that may interfere with the
economic market (Mettler 2018). Businesses will rise and fall with various levels of political
mobilization and only take real interest in short-term interests of capital. Links between reformist
politics (higher levels of unemployment, redistribution of wealth to the poor, improved social
services) and business inflation directly or indirectly lead to a shift in income and profits toward
the working class. Businesses attempt to prevent this by price inflation, keeping goods and
service still equally out-of-reach for poor people as they were before. In response, the working

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 14

class has two options—reassure the business community both domestic and international by
making clear its intention to pursue orthodox economic policy; or forge ahead with its reform
program (Block 1987:17-18). If the government follows suit in political reform, it poses a threat
to business confidence; why should businesses continue to invest in a market that does not
support their best economic interest? This, in turn, results in parallel economic disparity, pairing
high rates of unemployment with commodity shortages (similar to what is happening amidst the
current Coronavirus pandemic). If the government decides to stand with the working-class
proletariat and reform, familiar structures will undoubtedly crumble. If not, and the workingclass rises up, either the repressive government will be voted out or removed militarily at the
state’s command. All of this helps significantly to explain why governments are so hesitant and
unlikely to pursue anti-business/capitalist policy (Block 1987), thereby maintaining stark social
inequalities that favor the upper-class over the average American (and in effect, demographics
like older white men who are not as intensely affected by these inequalities as racial minorities,
immigrants, young people, and the poor—all tending to swing in favor of Democratic policy).
Further reflecting the government’s unfavorable reach to these groups is their party’s
representation. Democratic representation in the United States government suffers because big
democratic states have the same number of senators as small conservative ones. Even though
California sends more representatives to Congress than states like Wyoming, they end up having
the same number of senators. Many explain this inequality with partisan gerrymandering;
Republicans gained control of many state legislatures in time for the most recent round of
redistricting in the early 2010s, then drew odd-shaped boundaries that packed as many
Democrats as possible into a handful of districts that they easily won, leaving the remaining
districts with Republican majorities. Armed with sophisticated geospatial software and a large
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budget, Republican operatives carefully drew maps that distributed Republicans as efficiently as
possible across districts so as to win the maximum number of seats (Kang 2020; Rodden 2019).
This is widely accepted, yet it is not wholly truthful. Democrats’ problem with votes and seats
goes much deeper and is far more intricate. It is all in the polarized partisan geography; we must
first understand why cities and Democrats came to be synonymous. Democrats are gaining
support not only in big knowledge-hubs (like Seattle and San Francisco) but also in poor
postindustrial cities like Detroit and Akron that are losing population. People displaced by the
Industrial Revolution (often to cities, which moved much of America’s sustainability work out of
the rural parts) faced a basic problem with the system of winner-take-all districts.
Since industrial workers were concentrated in urban working-class neighborhoods
clustered around railways, warehouses, and factories, even if these parties performed very well
and earned the support of vast majorities of workers, their votes would inevitably be
concentrated in well under half of the winner-take-all legislative districts. Workers’ parties ended
up “wasting” too many votes in their core districts; that is, winning by very large margins in
some districts when those votes would have been more helpful elsewhere (illustrating inefficient
geographic distribution of support). The party developed a coterie of incumbents who won their
seats with a class-based appeal. In a lot of cases, the party’s most successful urban appointees
then came to have a significant influence over its platform and reputation (Rodden 2019). Those
leaders organized strikes that turned violent and earned their legislative seats in unification with
efforts for organized labor by using the language of class conflict; the task of broadening the
party’s class appeal became difficult while rigorous efforts to form alliances, blue-collar “skill”
workers, small business owners, and farmers often lacked credibility.
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In this way, Democrats gradually adopted the mission of expanding urban interests in the
globalized knowledge economy while Republicans claimed the causes of exurban and rural
manufacturing, agriculture, and natural resource extraction (Mettler 2018). Democrats were
influenced by their urban base to adopt progressive positions on racial and social issues and
Republicans assumed the conservative positions of the rural base. Each party became associated
with clear positions on these issues, a new set of educated urban and suburban dwellers became
Democrats, and a new set of exurban and rural traditionalists became Republicans.
Starting in the 1980s, American cities have become increasingly defined by their
residents’ level of education (Mettler 2018; Anyon 2014). While manufacturing has become
increasingly geographically dispersed in nonmetropolitan areas, where costs tend to be lower
than in cities, the knowledge economy—along with new college graduates, specialized high-end
service jobs, and ultimately wealth and prosperity—has become increasingly concentrated in
high-education urban centers (Betz, Partridge, and Fallah 2016; Berry and Glaeser 2005). This
happened because new knowledge hubs (big cities with strong manufacturing histories) already
had a strong Democratic base. Democrats have traditionally supported science funding and
financial market deregulation as well as capital gains taxes. They also embraced free trade deals
that seemed explicitly geared toward helping technology firms in the urban knowledge hubs,
perhaps at the expense of increasingly low-skill manufacturing outside urban centers. The
growing political cleavage based in economic sectors—pitting the urban/suburban knowledge
economy against the exurban/rural manufacturing and natural resource sectors—crystallized with
the Trump nomination. As a result, the already strong relationship between education,
knowledge-economy employment, and Democratic voting grew even stronger in 2016 (Mettler
2018; Drutman 2017). Republicans gained support in exurban and rural areas struggling to
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maintain manufacturing employment and the Democrats gained support in higher-density areas
with significant knowledge-economy employment. The growing industry and education divide
have contributed to the increasing geographic concentration of Democrats (Mettler 2018; Anyon
2014). Democrats are clustered not only in impoverished post-manufacturing city centers, but
increasingly in growing, affluent city centers as well as in small knowledge-economy hubs.
Democrats continued to grow their urban support by associating themselves with a variety of
new urban issues such as race—the realignment of which laid the foundation for the
politicization of virtually any human rights issue and even religion.
With racial minorities now “othered” from rural and small-town whites even further with
the geographic divide, cultural and religious differences became more about ethical
misalignment than a variance in lifestyles. These politicized moral judgements flamed feelings of
ethnocentrism as cultural divides became synonymized with personal, cultural, and moral failure
on the parts of non-white, non-rural, and non-Christian enclaves. And as a result, the world of
politics began to take the shape of larger, more explosive cultural issues that asserted the
difference between “us” and “them” for every participant of the political process. Along with the
various personal and cultural consequences of such developing mindsets, this political shift
presented some significant issues for Democrats that have persevered into modern-day politics.
When winner-take-all districts are drawn on top of highly concentrated geography (urban
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia vs. rural everything else), Democrats end up with a highly inefficient
distribution of support across districts (Rodden 2019; Mettler 2018; Anyon 2014). Where they
win, they win by excessive margins; where they lose, the margin is relatively narrow. As a result,
their seat share falls well below their vote share—sometimes even when they win statewide
majorities. Because of the scale and geographic arrangement of Pennsylvania’s cities, the
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Democrats’ problem is severe when districts are very small—as in the state house of
representatives—and even worse when they are medium-sized, as in the state senate. But small
cities string together in such a way that the Democrats’ geography problem is less pronounced at
the larger scale of US congressional districts (Rodden 2019; Mettler 2018). This issue can be
blamed, in part, on partisan gerrymandering. Rural and exurban areas are also far more
heterogenous than urban areas, which means cross-cultural exposure suffers greatly. But is this
poor Democratic distribution across districts due so much to intentional gerrymandering by
commissioners, or because of their residential geography? When the demand for housing near
manufacturing and industrialization grew, urban areas became more densely populated, creating
densely packed housing units. When manufacturing base shrank and economic activity died
down, population loss proved much slower than expected. Even as cities deindustrialized and the
manufacturing-oriented urban proletariat (described by Engels) faded away, the affordable
working-class housing from an earlier era has continued to attract poor migrants from other
cities, regions, or countries, and the spatial distribution of income described by Engels remains.
It is no longer necessary to live so close to factory jobs, as employment in the service sector is
spread throughout the city and surrounding suburbs, and many manufacturing jobs have moved
to the sub/exurban periphery. Yet the poor tend to be quite geographically clustered, often in the
old working-class neighborhoods; the wealthiest residents often live in suburbs. This is explained
in part by “flight from blight” (Rodden 2019) which argues that poor people had little choice but
to live in the city center initially and the wealthy chose to flee the social problems associated
with the urban poor. Additionally, wealthy individuals often move to suburbs because they have
a preference for more land and larger houses. Even further, transportation technology is
important in that cars are often too expensive for the poor, who are better off in residential
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settings near public transportation. This results in post-manufacturing cities being characterized
by a remarkably similar economic and political geography; the city center is dominated by some
mix of poor people, immigrants, and minorities—and they vote overwhelmingly for the
party/parties of the Left. This creates districts with either Democratic supermajorities or just
smaller Republican minorities. However, those in the urban core neighborhoods of postmanufacturing cities (minorities, young people, renters, and the poor) are far less likely to vote.
But no matter how district plans are drawn up, Democrats almost always end up with poor
geographic support distribution which affects how traditionally-liberal groups and
demographics—racial/ethnic minorities, the young, and the poor, for example—are represented
in government priorities. These things, of course, are felt in more concentration for low-income
and minority communities. Communities that are subjugated by race and class are governed less
through the provision of rights and benefits and representation but rather through “coercion,
containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation, discipline and violence” (Mettler
2018).
The reasons that the United State government’s priorities have come to favor certain
locations and demographics can be traced back to pre-industrial rural exodus where folks
previously earning a living doing skill-based labor not requiring higher education fled to
developing urban areas where the need for college degrees increased with the knowledge-sector.
Geospatial inequality increased, creating a significant wealth gap and allowing the superrich to
influence the economy (and therefore social systems as well) in their favor. Narratives of rural
identity championing self-sufficiency and a resentment toward those who utilize government
safety net programs perpetuated a deep divide in American politics while the Democratic and
Republican parties continued to align themselves with the poles of contentious policy—all while

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 20

the wealthy elites in the state continue to manipulate the United States government in their favor
in order to maintain social inequality that awards them their status.

Resulting Rural Adversity and its Consequences
Rurality and adversities of the rural lifestyle can be understood through the lenses of
various social inequalities plaguing these areas. All intricately intertwined with one another,
issues may be better understood broken down by their individual problems and then tied together
following separate problem analysis. Issues afflicting rural America can be traced back to the
following main systemic inequalities: a glaring lack of public transportation and infrastructure;
various health disparities; lack of education; and poverty, which infiltrates and influences
virtually every other adversity associated with rural places. However, this is an area glaringly
lacking in empirical evidence even though adversity’s presence in rural areas is widely
understood by scholars and those who live there. It is here that understanding rural spaces relies
more on reflective literature in conjunction with more scientific observation as researchers
attempt to contextualize rural hardship and its place in identity formation.
Among these understood adversities is the issue of geographic spread and its effects on
areas with notoriously poor systems of public transportation. Spatial inequalities between rural
and urban areas illustrate unique challenge for residents of rural places when needing to get from
one place to another (Logan 2012). It is often the case that people must rely on personal vehicles
for transportation in rural America. Systems like trains, subways, buses, taxis, ride share services
(such as Uber, Lyft, or bike shares) are not typically as prevalent or available in many rural
spaces. In fact, there are several places where pedestrian-friendly accommodations are difficult
to come by as well—things like bike lanes, bike racks, and kept-up sidewalks are resources
forfeited due to a lack of infrastructural funding in rural America (Cramer 2016; Logan 2012 ).
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How, then, are rural residents supposed to get where they need to go? Assuming one can afford
all the expenses necessary for vehicle ownership, driving everywhere is still inevitable. If not,
people may either become reliant on someone else who does own a vehicle (and therefore be at
the mercy of their schedule and generosity) or their options for everything—including food,
employment, and medical care—are constrained by what facilities are within walking distance
from their residence, which often is not many. Many rural places have such facilities miles and
miles apart, likely with no walkable space other than the side of a country road. Issues of rural
poverty are exacerbated by poor infrastructure because employees are penalized if they succumb
to the risks of unreliable transportation (tardiness, absence, or an inability to travel for work),
which may result in employment termination and the reliance on unemployment benefits as well
as other social safety net programs. Those in extreme poverty, perhaps facing homelessness, are
also further disadvantaged by spatial inequality. Urban centers often have more resources
available to transient folks, including food drives and walkable shelters; in rural areas, these
things are harder to find (Murdoch and Pratt 1997). This is likely in part, not only to a lack of
sufficient social program funding, but also to the invisibility of homelessness perpetuated by
habits of “couch surfing” in lieu of living on busy urban streets.
Consequently, then, many rural residents are confined to convenience for their food
consumption (Morton and Blanchard 2007). While grocery stores do, of course, exist in rural
spaces, they are often located either in small urban hubs (sharing zip codes with more spread-out
rural residences), allowing for more walkability for those living in town but still miles away from
those living farther in the outskirts; or they are located miles away from both nearby urban hubs
and the more isolated residents. Either way, convenience becomes not only a commodity, but a
necessity for some rural people. Things like Dollar Stores and gas stations that are more scattered
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throughout such communities offer geographically closer options for food and drink—and they
are more affordable for those dealing with poverty and food insecurity. People can qualify for
social safety net programs like food stamps (the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program
and Women, Infants, and Children programs, for example) and Medicaid (a joint federal and
state program providing healthcare to low-income recipients); but those who live just above the
federal poverty line often find themselves missing out on such eligibility and struggling to get by
without them. Both camps of folks often find themselves turning to these more affordable
options for nourishment, but these places stock food with high concentrations of preservatives,
sugars, and sodium; fresher options like produce and organic selections are not available here.
As a result, rural Americans face a slew of health disparities disproportionately to their
urban counterparts. According to the Center for Disease Control (2015), rural Americans are
more likely to die from heart disease, cancer, chronic lower respiratory disease, opioid overdose,
and stroke than their urban counterparts. Additionally, geographic spatial inequality affects
emergent medical transport to spread-out hospitals from too few ambulance services stationed
many miles away from the residents in their coverage areas, putting rural residents at higher risk
of death and subjection to various environmental hazards (such as driving longer distances in
inclement weather). But even when people can obtain the medical care they need, many find
themselves struggling to pay for it. Rural places have higher concentrations of people in poverty
and without health insurance (Ziller 2014). It is partially due to this that people often do not seek
appropriate mental health care either. Instead, it is not uncommon in poor rural areas with
limitations of geography, career opportunity, and resource availability for community members
to seek coping mechanisms like drugs and alcohol in order to live with things like the trauma of
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uncertainty, despair, overwhelming medical issues, and domestic abuse resulting from poor
management of these prevalent stressors (Jackson 2019; Vance 2016).
Another significant adversity plaguing rural areas in the United States is educational
inequity. “Rural schools, as institutions that prepare youth for the challenges they will face in
adulthood, play a fundamental role—perhaps, the fundamental role—in fostering this resilience
and securing a sustainable future for rural America” (Tieken, Casey, and San Antonio 2016:
132). While research shows trends of increasing educational attainment in rural areas, the
number of residents with at least a bachelor’s degree is still less than those living in urban spaces
(USDA). Several factors could be responsible for the urban-rural college completion gap.
Education is often associated with higher levels of wealth regardless of one’s geographic region
(though there are still slight variations within regions themselves, particularly among different
racial groups), and rural household income trails urban household income by roughly 20 to 25
percent (USDA), making higher education following high school a more significant economic
obstacle for those living in rural areas with lower income. Poverty comes into play here, too; not
finishing school (or even pursuing higher education at all) may lead to lower paying jobs with
little to no potential for upward mobility, which then continues the cycle of generational poverty
and will stunt opportunities for educational growth for one’s children in the future. Those who do
obtain their college degree often decide to migrate to urban areas that offer higher wages, more
jobs with opportunities to utilize their education and skills, and more open-mindedness. Carr and
Kefalas (2011) refer to this as “the rural brain drain,” which illustrates the youth exodus to more
urban places in the interest of social and financial opportunities, leaving their rural homes
missing out on the economic fruits of their higher educational status (such as adding more
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higher-paying employment sectors requiring college degrees and the wealthier people who
follow such sectors).
Another challenge faced by rural education is representation in crucial policy and its
informative research efforts. Rural schools are often left out of policy, and when they are
included, they are often prescribed a narrative of “backwoods,” “backwards,” and stupid (Tieken,
Casey, and San Antonio 2016:133) that is most accurately and consistently reported within
pragmatic reflective literature rather than reports generated by empirical testing. However,
without such observation, researchers would have even less to contextualize beliefs and
behaviors of rural youth and their lifepaths as identity and aspirations develop. Through
reflective literature, researchers may familiarize themselves with the issue of conceptual
misalignment when discussing and measuring rural youth aspiration, which is often
problematically and inaccurately conceived. Approaches to any youth’s educational development
is almost always exclusively centered around three main aspects: career goals, choices about
further education, and decisions about where they might want to live (Tieken, Casey, and San
Antonio 2016). Along with the constraints that accompany only focusing on these aspirations—
particularly educational and residential aspirations—they tend to be evaluated too narrowly
anyway. Binaries of “high (i.e., college or beyond) or low (i.e., any plans aside from college),
here (i.e., in this rural community) or away (i.e., anywhere else)” congest any in-between
aspirations and contribute ultimately to a stark “us versus them” mentality which will be
discussed in further detail later. Absent from this narrow understanding of rural youth aspirations
are more personal ethical questions that influence a person’s life choices, consideration of
broader civic and community needs, and the acknowledgement of relational and spiritual desires
that come with a life of purpose and meaning (Tieken, Casey, and San Antonio 2016). Also
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absent from youth education mentoring and empirical rural research are the complex dimensions
that the rural context found in more reflective literature adds to youth aspirations both in and out
of school, further perpetuating a one-dimensional version of rural America and sabotaging its
potential for better policy recipience.
The Role of Misinformation Spread in Political Communication and the Deployment of Rural
Identity
Integral to current political discourse is political communication. Especially in the age of
modern technology, political communication takes a wide variety of forms. Regardless of which
form, political communication is highly influenced by one’s partisan alignment (KnoblochWesterwick, Mothes, and Polavin 2017), which we have already established is greatly influenced
by one’s sense of identity and associated ethical standing—especially in rural communities. As
with any identity, there emerges a “deployment of ‘the rural’” in modern political
communication which influences both larger-scale discourse and individual affirmations of one’s
belief system.
For example, rural spaces are disproportionately affected by educational adversity (Pew
Research Center; Mettler 2018; Frank 2005). Oftentimes, critical thinking skills are encouraged
more rigorously in higher educational institutes than those of high school or some technical
training programs. As a result, lack of access to educational resources leaves people unable to
assess the information they consume as critically as they should, especially regarding difficult
and complex political issues. Additionally, studies show that people generally prefer to consume
information that affirms one’s existing biases (Ribeiro et al 2017). This added component makes
fact-checking even more difficult in the face of modern technology and social media which
utilizes algorithmic targeting to engage its audience using “filter bubbles” whose objective is to
show users things (not just political news—videos, photos, ads, etc.) to which they have already,
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and are therefore are predicted to, respond positively (Ribeiro et al 2017). More simply put, the
more a person uses social media (platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter) and any kind
of searches tracked by technological algorithms, the more targeted and affirming media they are
likely to consume. Rural identity and educational adversity are pieces of how “the rural” is
deployed in modern political communication. Also, at play are the targeted “filter bubbles”
generated by technological algorithms that feed impoverished rural consumers reaffirming media
that further reinforces beliefs about deeply divisive and explosive cultural issues. This kind of
filtered consumption is even further perpetuated by joining certain social media groups,
particularly those with messages of nationalism, pride, and strong opinions on cultural issues
(such as anti-abortion support pages, All/Blue Lives Matter support pages, or religion-based
groups, for example). This phenomenon, of course, is not unique to rural folks nor conservatives;
however, when examining the deployment of “the rural” in political communication, it is
important to note not only the role of the process at work, but also the role of the information
being consumed by rural Americans as a result of such a process. To be further examined in the
deployment of “the rural” in political communication is the inevitable spread of misinformation
and its implications on the current political climate—particularly that of rural America.
“Fake news” is defined as fabricated information that mimics news media content in form
but not in organizational process or intent; it lacks editorial norms and rigorous processes
ensuring accuracy and credibility of information (Lazer et al 2018). It exists alongside other
inaccurate news mediums such as misinformation (false or misleading) and disinformation
(information made purposely to deceive people and spread quickly). When assessing the political
and societal impact of fake news, it is important to note its uniquely pervasive and pernicious
characteristics of both benefiting from and undermining credibility of legitimate news sources. It
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is noted that several outlets and their followers (Facebook, for example) prefer the term “false
news” because “fake news” is often associated with political warfare (Lazer et al 2018); it is
important to consider the avoidance behavior at work here, actively disregarding the political
implications and avoiding critical thought. Technological advancement and the rise of the
Internet has made the spread of fake news and misinformation much easier, as false outlets have
easier/free entry to their platform and the general public has greater access to its spread. The
Internet has also allowed for a lot of discourse regarding distrust of the media, which is a large
proprietor of the spread of misinformation and offers a sense of solidarity with its believers
(Lazer et al 2018). This media distrust skyrocketed to an all-time high during the 2016
presidential election (even further exacerbated by the global coronavirus pandemic in 2020),
particularly among the rural political right and focused on the “misrepresentation” of Republican
candidate Donald Trump. This fueled his rise to the top of the rural American working class, as it
targeted individuals with fewer educational resources and who had been significantly politically
underserved. Vance (2016) describes a true and tangible distrust in the media (192) that helped
contribute to ignorance and its resulting belief systems. He says specifically, “With little trust in
the press, there’s no check on the Internet conspiracy theories that rule the digital world…
Everything the media tells us is a lie—” except those sources which confirm one’s alreadyskewed understandings of social and economic issues that then inform political opinions with
real societal consequences. “This isn’t some libertarian mistrust of government policy, which is
healthy in any democracy. This is a deep skepticism of the very institutions of our society. …We
can’t trust the evening news. We can’t trust our politicians. Our universities, the gateway to a
better life, are rigged and against us” (193).
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Due to this parallel geo- and sociopolitical evolution, the divides between political parties
and networks have expanded and, as a result, created more homogenous networks that reduce
acceptance of alternative views and boost the likelihood of accepting ideologically compatible
news (Lazer et al 2018) and creating “news deserts—” a community, either rural or urban, with
limited access to credible and comprehensive news and information (Abernathy 2020). These
can easily become political echo chambers. Polarized “echo chamber communities” are more
susceptible to the spread of misinformation, fueling both desirability bias (assigning more weight
to agreeable information) and confirmation bias (seeking out favorable information) (Tappin et al
2017). On the other hand, misinformation plays a key role in creating polarized groups (Ribeiro
et al 2017). People have justifications for what they think, and these justifications make sense to
them and are steeped in their personal sense of who they are in the world. Identities people use to
make sense of politics are constantly evolving and change salience in response to the context. In
this view of public opinion, bottom-up and top-down processes are occurring at the same time
and influence one another; elites mobilize public opinion and benefit from the divisiveness they
create—they tap into preexisting sentiments and values they find it advantageous to activate, and
market research/campaign consultants try to figure out what will successfully resonate and ignite
dormant opinions (Lazer et al 2018).
Another interaction of these phenomena is when consumers mistakenly classify real news
as sources of misinformation simply due to ideological divergence, not because it contains actual
false or imprecise facts. This creates alternative and divisive narratives of what is actually fake,
which changes with one’s political ideology and makes it harder to distinguish between biased
and false information. Social media bots (intelligent adaptational technology often used for
generating automatic responses, advocating ideas, and inflating follower counts) posing as active
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human users also propagate specific ideology, perpetuating the spread of this misinformation and
therefore increasing total view counts as well as the integration of misinformation into the
general algorithm that shows users relevant content. This filters into a cycle of desirability bias in
one’s media consumption which has large political implications, especially when considering
this finding alongside discussions of “fake news” and evidence showing an unwillingness among
the public to research information inconsistent with their worldview and instead, publicly label it
as misinformation. As seen in notes regarding fake news, pieces specifically tagged as “fake
news” often showcase a great deal of political polarization in comments and sharers as well as
significant circulation throughout mediums like social media (Tappin et al 2017).
Rural Identity and Political Attitudes
Peter Berger’s theory of reality construction states that habitualization—repeated
behaviors and interactions in society—is responsible for humans recognizing social patterns as
objective, correct, and worthy of internalizing (Berger and Luckmann 1996). In other words,
society and its influence are largely habit. Drawing from this perspective, the development of
rural identity likely results in part from the repeated patterns of adversity faced by rural areas for
many years in addition to rural folks’ repeated patterns of perception and consciousness of such
hardship and similarly plagued “communities” who habitually respond in certain ways. These
patterns may contribute to patterns of conceptualization regarding one’s identity and place in
society that become passed down through generations and infiltrate communities of similar or
relational identity. For example, those in rural spaces learn from each other by being socialized
by each other—such socialization and habitualization is not isolated only within relational units.
Therefore, patterns of adversity in rural spaces serve to reinforce identities held by rural folks as
victims of inequality, hardship, and elitist ignorance.
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These systemic and spatial inequalities of rural life factor into rural political attitudes in
significant and complex ways. Part of the rural lifestyle and mindset is a narrative of identity
(Falk and Pinhey 1978)—stark individualism and self-sufficiency, partially stemming from
traditions of hunting and/or ideas of simplicity and minimalism—found consistently within
bodies of more reflective literature as researchers document their own experiences and
observations from extended time spent in various rural areas. There exists a pride in rebellious
roots, partially spilling over from the United States’ secession from Europe, therefore breeding
ethics and identity tied strongly to independence and freedom, that often may translate into
nationalism (Ashwood 2018). The pride associated with the ability to “pull oneself up by their
bootstraps,” live independently, and overcome the adversity dealt to them can have negative
effects on those rural folks too proud to ask for or utilize the assistance they may need—
especially if it comes in the form of government-funded safety net programs that require no
qualification prerequisites other than a certain income threshold (unlike funding such as farming
subsidies, which necessitate action and labor). This plays directly into the idea of the deserving
poor and the undeserving poor (Levine 2002; Gilens 2000). Part of identity politics means a
transcendence from merely political ideology into core personal principles with much stronger
roots and implications that end up surfacing as habitual beliefs and behaviors after generations of
passed down knowledge and socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1996). Politics under threat is
not just politics—it is often one’s core sense of self and being. This goes hand-in-hand with
poverty and its traumatizing effects on those who grew up with food or housing insecurity and
the belief that their personal worth was dependent on what they could contribute to society (i.e.,
hardworking, tax paying citizenship).
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Another significant part of rural identity politics is the acute awareness of how they are
perceived in other parts of the country and even the world (Ashwood 2018; Cramer 2016). Many
rural people are aware of the stereotypes assigned to them by non-rurals and, as some may
conceptualize them, liberal elites (Ashwood 2018)—ignorant, ugly, poor, unhealthy, radical, gun
toting, and even bigoted in certain instances. Part of this identity, then, becomes an acceptance
and/or reclamation of these titles and oftentimes a desire to “stick it” to their persecutors; such
rebellion becomes a necessary reality constructed from many years of repeated marginalization
and degradation that has resulted in habitualized identity (Berger and Luckmann 1996). But what
are the major aspects of such rural identity?
According to Cramer’s (2016) thorough reflective analysis of rural space, rural politics is
about rural consciousness: (1) perceptions of power or who discusses what/who decides what to
discuss, (2) respect to perceptions of values and lifestyles, and (3) perceptions of resources or
who gets what. It is the term used to describe a strong sense of identity as a rural person
combined with a strong sense that rural areas are the victims of injustice: the sense that rural
areas do not get their fair share of power, respect, or resources and that rural folks prefer
lifestyles and ethical standards that differ fundamentally from those of city people and breeding
an “us versus them” mentality. Such a mentality even infiltrates the identity of those with
minimal contact of such perceived “outsiders”—further illustrating Berger’s (1996) theory of
habitualization and reality construction.
Also heavily observed through important reflective literature, American politics is
becoming increasingly polarized due to “arbitrary” explosive cultural issues such as abortion,
same-sex marriage, and gun control rather than its past swaying issues of economic and social
policy (Frank 2005; Hunter 1991); instead of political opinions focusing on fiscal and social
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issues, the political pendulum now swings most dramatically in favor of opposition to these
explosive cultural issues, redirecting anger toward “liberal elites.” Rather than a spectrum of
liberal and conservative, there seems to be more of a spectrum of moderates and conservatives
that dominate the political discourse of rural Republicans (sure, there are rural liberals, but not in
such numbers with such force as the moderates and conservatives). Frank (2005) and Hunter
(1991) suggest that this may be the new direction of American politics—with fiscal
conservativism as a fulcrum and hot-button cultural issues as swaying points in either direction
in this explosive political warfare.
The Democratic party systematically failed the rural working class by directing their
efforts to socio-cultural wedge issues— electing elite and educated socially liberal people to
government positions in an effort to neglect the blue-collar working class. Frank (2005) suggests
that the conservative coalition is the most prominent in American politics—one side of which
focuses on social and cultural issues, and the other on economic and fiscal regulation. The
economic part of this coalition has been fiscally rewarding for them only, while simultaneously
economically hurting the social coalition. This helps explain the conservativism of the rural poor
who are primarily radicalized by hot-button cultural issues that never pick up speed after the
election anyway, conceptualized by Frank (2005) as cultural battles that are nearly impossible to
win. Perhaps the staunch commitment to these impossible cultural battles are why cultural rural
conservatives continue to vote Republican even though it is economically not in their best
interest to do so. This, coupled with a lack of resources and education, contributes to the poor
Republican (particularly rural) downfall where Republican elects capitalize off of these cultural
conservatives’ agenda to get into office and then turn their attention to more mundane economic
issues that often go over the heads of those who propelled them into power in the first place. In
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this vein, the rise of Donald Trump in 2016 excited many rural conservative Americans, as his
emotionally charged and persuasive style resonated with a group of conservative folks who felt
left behind by the liberal wave of “political correctness—” the avoidance of expression perceived
as exclusive, marginalizing, or insulting to socially disadvantaged groups. Trump appealed to
people’s emotional self-interest, which may be the reason for paradoxical voting.
There is little evidence supporting that rural areas are receiving fewer resources, but it is
widely “known” and understood, and you can find examples in real-world application where it
may be more difficult to measure resources empirically. Again, the importance of more reflective
literature can be found here as empiricism falls short; without authorship of personal reflections
of considerable time spent in rural spaces, much of the rural adversity stemming from
disproportionate resource allocation would remain largely unseen and, therefore, unaddressed.
Rural areas have been dying a slow painful death for decades and their attempts to adjust to
changing expectations of them and protecting themselves from changing macro environments.
Rural consciousness also finds itself with attitudes of distance from universities (Jaschik 2018;
Frank 2005)—ideas of social class and attitudes toward education are intertwined—liberal elites
who are overpaid and challenging their way of life. People feel like they are being punished for
working hard because the more money they make, the more they must pay in taxes; because of
this, they feel like they can’t reach the same milestones or resources as people who “get
government handouts.” In other words, they get rewarded for being lazy, which is something
viewed as highly disrespected (Gilens 2000). Support for small/limited government is also very
important; but rather than findings this in arguments supporting small government, it is found in
arguments against big government (Gilens 2000; Frank 2005). Race is tied in with the idea of
hard work and the deserving/undeserving poor (Gilens 2000). Small towns exercise a sort of
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ownership over blaming the government for their and the nation’s problems (Hummon 1990).
That creates a certain disdain for public employees, painting them as undeserving because their
work does not fall in the same sector of respected work that blue-collar workers or non-public
employees do. People who have struggled to get by their whole lives associate their economic
circumstances as inseparable from their identification as people of a certain type of place. They
screen out the idea that public workers could be like them, but rather as an out-group of urban,
wealthier people. Given this view, it is not difficult to see where a disdain and distrust of
government and public officials stems. Anti-government (anti-state) leaders can emerge from
this (Scott Walker and Donald Trump types), gaining power and notoriety on the basis of being
non-politicians and therefore “of and for” the people rather than supporting the agenda of “liberal
elites” that make up the public service sector of government.
Within this mentality, there emerges a sense of a duty to “take care of your own—”
whether that be your family, your local community, or some earned network of the two—and to
all outsiders, good luck. This loyalty is seen in other rural communities as well; though there
seems to be some bit of cognitive dissonance in understanding exactly how far the notion of
“one’s own” extends. For example, many rural people would be (and have been) far more willing
to donate their time, money, and supplies to neighbors, close friends, and those with whom they
identify in some way than to contribute their tax dollars to social programs helping these same
groups of vulnerable people (Carlson-Thies 1997)—community members on welfare, homeless
locals wandering the streets so frequently they’ve earned themselves nicknames, and local
children launched into foster care systems due to the many covert effects of generational poverty.
How Rural Adversity Shows Up and Operates in Rural and Small-Town Central Pennsylvania
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Issues of rural adversity show up in unique ways across the country and especially so in
small towns and rural parts of central Pennsylvania. As of 2020, central Pennsylvania counties
reported slight population decline with racial distribution of over 90 percent white; Black, mixed
race, Asian, and all other racial categories each make up only 4 percent of current residents
(FocusCentralPA 2020). Of this population, only 40 percent of residents have educational
credentials exceeding a high school diploma and the median household income is just over
$58,000 (FocusCentralPA 2020). At first glance, these numbers do not appear terribly
uncommon nor even concerning; however, several things crucial to understanding adversity in
central Pennsylvania are missing from this report.
Included in this county-level analysis are four counties (Appendix 1) that house major
hospitals and universities (two of which are privatized and therefore very expensive to attend)—
institutions that may skew central Pennsylvania data in the direction of higher educational
attainment, higher household income, more financial assets, and number of white-collar versus
blue-collar workers. For example, the median household income for all central Pennsylvania
counties (Mifflin, Centre, Snyder, Union, Northumberland, Montour and Columbia) combined is
reported as $58,232. However, Centre, Snyder, Union, and Montour Counties all have median
household incomes nearing $60,000 while counties like Northumberland and Mifflin who lack
such community assets have median household incomes of less than $50,000 (US Census 2020).
Illustrative of this discrepancy, data from the US Census (2019) shows Northumberland
County’s median household income as nearly 40 percent less than the national median and 21
percent less than the state of Pennsylvania while counties housing universities and hospitals
come in at 25 percent less than the national numbers and 3-5 percent less than the state’s. In this
same vein, central Pennsylvania counties show higher rates of poverty than the state as a whole

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 36

as well as exceeding the national poverty rate by several percentage points (US Census 2020)
(Appendix 2). Federal funding to the few public universities in central Pennsylvania deters
adequate funding for more locally based community colleges (Kahlenburg 2015), making it more
difficult for those students to get a competing education with other university students who live
and invest only temporarily in the area. Additionally, all the rental properties utilized by
temporary student tenants end up generating less revenue in property taxes as landlords receive
tax breaks that non-renting homeowners do not (US News and World Report 2010).
So, while central Pennsylvania looks more well-off on the surface, institutions like
hospitals and universities tend to draw pockets of residents that are not necessarily as
representative of the regional population as such surface-level reports would lead on. Among the
more common workers of these institutions such as administrative, sanitation, and other general
staff, hospitals and universities also draw doctors, surgeons, professors, and other high-ranking
positions that generate annual incomes much higher than that of the average central Pennsylvania
resident. Higher incomes mean more financial freedom and ability to invest in the futures of
younger generations than others in the area with lower incomes. Major issues of rural adversity
probably would not affect this population as significantly as the average central Pennsylvanian,
therefore potentially skewing the area’s need for government aid for various programs and
initiatives like Medicaid, education, and transportation (PA State Budget and Finances 2016).
Further indicative of discrepancies in socioeconomic status are reports of homeowners
perhaps somewhat influenced by these wealthier pockets of academic and medical professionals
as well as a myriad of other factors. As of 2019, Northumberland and Union Counties showed a
homeownership rate of roughly 71 percent; Snyder County showed 73 percent; and Columbia
County showed 68 percent (US Census). Comparative to the Pennsylvania-wide homeownership
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rate of only 69 percent (US Census), these counties appear fairly well off. But again, such
numbers must be considered in proper context. While homeownership rates appear to align, or
even compete, with statewide numbers, the median value of occupied households fell
significantly below that of the state (Data USA 2019) and even lower compared to national
numbers. Combined with other adversity factors that affect one’s ability to buy property or own a
home (or multiple and draw passive income by renting), it is important to recognize that rental
opportunities are not as abundant in rural areas, and rural counties are beset with higher
concentrations of older residents in which rates of homeownership are higher due to a much
healthier housing market several decades ago. Recalling the phenomenon of the “rural brain
drain” (Carr and Kefalas 2011) in which younger generations are migrating to more densely
populated areas in search of opportunities absent from their rural roots, higher concentrations of
elderly folks, along with pockets of more highly-paid and highly-educated professionals, create
depictions of rural Pennsylvania’s socioeconomic standing that are not entirely accurate next to
larger statewide or national numbers.
Understanding Larger Trends of Sampled Counties
The sampled counties represent part of the northern Appalachian region (Appalachian
Regional Commission 2020). As such, it is important to understand certain demographic,
economic, and political trends throughout recent years in order to further contextualize the
importance of these areas in sociopolitical research.
As previously noted, Appalachia struggles with more adversity and fewer resources than
other rural areas and America as a nation. According to the Appalachian Regional Commission,
per capita income in Appalachia was 18 percent lower in 2009 than that of the national average.
Appalachia receives 31 percent fewer federal expenditures per capita, topping barely more than
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$11,000 in 2010. That same year, salaries and wages in these areas were only 51 percent of the
national average, and the allotment of loans and insurance made up only 34 percent of national
numbers. Further contributing to understanding Appalachian regional demographics are the
various industry shifts in the last 20 years; notably, Appalachia saw the biggest growth from
industries with the lowest employment concentrations (finance/insurance/real estate,
technological services, and health/social services) and, conversely, the biggest declines from
industries with higher employment concentration (manufacturing, farming, and utilities work).
Although, one industry seems to be the exception; across the region, the mining industry has
grown approximately 40 percent despite the lagging employment growth and resulting harderhitting economic recessions since 2000 (Appalachian Regional Commission 2020; Data USA
2019; American Community Survey 2020). Perhaps explaining some population shifts in the
observed counties discussed later, mining may be one of the primary draws to northern
Appalachia even as the area struggles to reach economic parity with the rest of the nation while
public and private financial investments do not keep pace with regional levels of need. All this
helps to contextualize more detailed demographic information of the four sampled counties.
In addition to income, data outlining housing demographics, broadband Internet access
(which, in these areas, falls below national non-Appalachian rural areas by nearly 5 percent,
according to the Appalachian Regional Commission and the American Community Survey), and
changes in population all help to paint clearer pictures of observation sites and therefore, better
understand rural partisanship in these areas. According to the US Census Bureau, all observed
counties except Northumberland showed population growth over the last 40 years.
Northumberland County is the only observed area whose population declined in this time—by
nearly 10 thousand residents, in fact (US Census). This was particularly interesting because
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larger trend data suggests that the net migration responsible for rural population growth happens
primarily in more densely populated rural areas; of the four observed counties, Northumberland
is the more densely populated county, but experienced the least amount of growth in this time
frame. One could speculate that this is due to the notable growth in the mining industry and the
educational institutions in the other three counties. Recall that Union, Snyder, and Columbia
Counties are home to multiple accredited universities while also housing some of the area’s coal
region. So, while net migration to these areas has decreased a bit since 2013 due to job loss in the
oil and gas industries (Appalachian Regional Commission 2020; Data USA 2019), perhaps the
population growth in Union, Columbia, and Snyder Counties can be attributed in part to such
industry shift and influxes of less permanent student residents as home ownership is more
localized farther from university student housing. Lacking relocation resources and changing
birth/mortality rates may also be considered in this phenomenon.
All this is important to understand when grasping the operationalization of rural and
small-town adversity in central Pennsylvania counties—institutionally-skewed or not. Without
an accurate portrayal of the region’s need for social programs and government funding, central
Pennsylvania suffers unique hardships that make it nearly impossible for the average resident to
overcome. Made largely of small towns and pockets of rurality, central Pennsylvania clearly
demonstrates the literature’s claims of rural adversity—educational inequity,
inaccessible/underutilized infrastructure, and various health disparities that result from effects of
generational poverty, “rural brain drain” (Carr and Kefalas 2011), and inadequate government
aid.
Such context proves important to better understand the various political affiliation trends
over the years. While each observed county has a prolonged history of conservative preference,
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data from the Federal Election Commission suggests trends of changing party affiliation that
largely mirror one another (Data USA 2019). Since 2000, Republican affiliation has seen a 14
percent increase in Northumberland County, a 3 percent increase in Snyder County, and a 9
percent increase in Columbia County (Data USA 2019; Best Places). Following inversely with
the dip in Republican affiliation in 2008 (Obama’s first presidential win) and the spike in 2016
(Trump’s emergence), these counties saw declines in their Democratic party affiliation while
conservativism continued to dominate these areas (Data USA 2019). Union County broke this
mold slightly by showing slight decreases in Republican affiliation over the 20-year span (about
4 percent) and a slight increase in Democratic affiliation (about 5 percent) (Data USA 2019; Best
Places); however, the dips and spikes found in affiliation trend data remain similar to those found
in the other counties. The major difference is that, instead of the increase of Republican support
and decrease in Democratic support changing so much that the numbers surpass their starting
points in 2000, they level off more than numbers in Northumberland, Snyder, and Columbia
Counties (Data USA 2019), creating a less drastic partisan split. Since Snyder County—home to
a major private university and more healthcare facilities just like Union County—has the least
notable party affiliation change, it could be speculated that these puzzling trends may be
attributed to the uptick in liberalism associated with educational institutions and highly education
populations. However, despite this partisan leveling, the sampled counties have held onto their
conservative representation over the last several years. Northumberland and Columbia Counties
are housed in Pennsylvania’s 9th Congressional District, which have elected Republican
representatives consistently since 2008 despite the uptick of individual Democratic support
around that time. The more liberal of the sampled counties—Snyder and Union, housed in the
10th Congressional District—have fluctuated only marginally more, switching from blue to red in
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2010 and maintaining Republican representation ever since (Data USA 2019). And in cases
where Democrats do claim small victories, they are often short lived and highly contested in
rural counties; for example, Democratic Pennsylvania Senator Bob Casey Jr. elected in 2007 has
notable negative presence in the sampled counties as both public and private affiliative signage
(found in businesses and backyards) tout support, instead, for Republican Senator Pat Toomey.
Even further, data from federal election results and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Election Lab (2022) show, as understood by discrepancies between rural-urban electorate
representation, a large majority of Republican support in all popular votes since at least 2000 in
each of the observed counties as well as other, less densely populated areas (Data USA 2019).
Regardless, the four observed counties reflect a significant conservative majority that has held
steadfast over the last few decades and continues to inform much of the areas’ ideological
presentation and, therefore, identity formation.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Multiple kinds of “rurality”—Appalachia, small towns, exurbs, and agricultural
settlements—exist in Pennsylvania, making this state a worthy subject of sociopolitical
investigation. This study’s sample will be drawn from residents of rural Appalachian
Pennsylvania counties: Northumberland, Union, Snyder, and Columbia. Home to the various
kinds of aforementioned rurality within Appalachia and located between two major urban areas
(Philadelphia and Pittsburgh), these counties will provide a broad look into the rural lifestyle and
offer insight into rural political attitudes throughout less densely populated parts of this political
swing state. In this study, I will be utilizing ethnographic methodology to better understand the
nuances of rural political attitudes in central Pennsylvania.
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Blending In
Such research entails integrating networks in rural communities. An important, and
sometimes overlooked, part of a thorough research design is the way in which the researcher may
present themselves to the area and sample from which they are gathering data. Naturally, people
begin forming opinions on others based off their presentation (Mullings 1999), and this is
certainly something I had to consider when attempting to represent a group already perceived
somewhat negatively by my research subjects. For this reason, “blending in” is an integral part of
this research project’s design. Knowing one’s audience helps a researcher gain access to insider
perspectives by gaining the trust of community and organizational gatekeepers—in this case, a
person or people who control(s) access to information regarding others in their represented group
(Mullings 1999; Weiss 1995). In areas with significant skepticism of the academic institution, it
is important for a researcher to prove trustworthiness quickly and honestly to their research
subjects. This can be done in a variety of ways, but notably through appearance and familiarity
with colloquialisms (McGrath et al 2019; Le Dantec and Fox 2015; Mullings 1999). For
example, showing up to a rural dive bar or café with intentions of interviewing staff about the
area and the institutions “regular” customers may prove rather difficult should the researcher be
dressed in clothing more suited for a formal business seminar or academic conference. To dress
appropriately and blend in is to demonstrate understanding of local mores and folkways as well
as narrow perceived gaps between one’s represented “elitist” institution and skeptical rural
spaces. In this way, researchers can gain “temporary insider” status and gain respondents’ trust
by presenting themselves as intellectual and cultural equals (Mullings 1999). However, in rural
Pennsylvania, I am not a “temporary insider;” I grew up here and am very much in tune with the
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cultural norms of the area which allowed me to build trusting relationships quickly with
residents.
As the primary investigator, I presented myself in clothing appropriate for the
establishment in which I conducted my research; for example, when I met with interviewees at a
local diner or bar, I dressed more casually (i.e., not in suits or other formal attire) and when I met
with subjects at a community meeting (such as a school board meeting), I dressed similarly to the
attire I observed by others in attendance. These attires were one in the same— jeans, a t-shirt,
sneakers, and sometimes a sweatshirt or jacket. Additionally, I followed conversational suit with
my interviewees; for example, certain slang/colloquialisms (i.e., something being “all” to
indicate that there is none left, phrases like “yeah well” and “in the road,” or “up/down the way”)
or profanity served as a means for dialogic connection, and matching such language allowed me
to communicate honestly and thoroughly with my subjects. Such conversational adaptation
served as a way for my subjects to feel comfortable being genuine in their responses and
organically engaging with me; I was careful not to explain any more than my research initiatives
and not to communicate in a way where I may present as “teaching” the things we discuss.
Specifically, I explained my intentions very plainly in conducting interviews and attending
certain meetings and was careful to be as transparent as possible with my participants so as to
appear relatable, honest, and worthy of their time. I did not, however, correct my subjects if they
made an inaccurate statement or expressed interest in my personal expertise. Instead, I either
continued listening and searching for the mechanisms behind such beliefs or reiterated that my
purpose in speaking with people was to hear their perspective as wholly and deeply as possible—
not to presume that my niche background knowledge made me any more qualified to speak about
any subject more than they were. This was done extremely casually, meaning that I did not
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present any official documentation explaining my research or subjects’ role within it; I simply
explained briefly and informally while taking special care to answer any questions they had and
providing adequate space for them to ask. Matching my subjects’ conversational style in this way
served to build rapport between us and allow for a meaningful conversation about topics often
considered controversial or uncomfortable, especially since I never revealed my own political
attitudes. By taking extra care to build this kind of rapport with my interviewees, I presented
myself as an interested peer rather than an academic elite of which rural folks are often skeptical.
Recruiting
Obtaining my sample required multiple efforts. One way I recruited interviewees was by
reaching out to community figures found through various searches for neighborhood groups
(school boards, girl/boy scout troops, neighborhood watch forums, local churches and associated
outreach/study groups, owners of local small businesses, etc.). Making contact with
organizations and their gatekeepers helped award the time and connections necessary to sell the
reputation of the research objective and make its goals—ultimately, to help rural communities—
relatable and important to my desired recruits. Another way I was able to recruit interview
participants was by sitting in hangouts like diners, coffee shops, or bars and making connections
with employees who are engaged and friendly with the “regular” patrons that go there. For
example, there is a local “bar and grille” that hosts a regular early-morning breakfast crew who
all ended up interviewing with me over a meal; the staff of this bar and grille served as a
connection between patrons of the establishment and myself, as they are extremely friendly with
one another and helped to facilitate my addition to their familiar network. Building rapport and
interviewing the wait staff and bar tenders in this establishment and others like it helped
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demonstrate my trustworthiness and my project’s worthiness to regular patrons who already have
stronger relationships with these gatekeepers.
To thoroughly communicate my trustworthiness as a researcher, I also volunteered my
time in these communities by working with organizations and asking them how I can best serve
them. Volunteering with local organizations encompassed a variety of duties— setting up and
tearing down meeting spaces, hanging fliers, sorting through (clothing and food) donations,
providing water and supplies, and even attending protests. In total, I attended 20 meetings and
events throughout the summer months of 2021; I was able to offer my services at some, while
others served strictly as observational opportunities. Along with attending meetings and helping
with events, I also engaged in multiple meaningful dialogues with members of goal-oriented
organizations (i.e. labor unions and politically-motivated groups) regarding their reasoning for
engaging and volunteering with such organizations. Dialogues like these encompassed things
like commiseration with participants when their jobs were furloughed, when state and federal
politics had a direct impact on their livelihoods or on those they loved, and even the undesirable
state of people’s homes due to the exhaustion that accompanies everyday responsibilities for the
average person. At times, people cried. Some yelled in anger. Some shook their heads and
apologized to me for their home environment or for emotionally unloading on me while others
were more composed and private. At some point in every interview, my participants were able to
laugh with me. Regardless, folks were much more likely to open up in an otherwise
uncomfortable political dialogue when we were able to engage in conversation more casually as
people first and researcher-participant second.
My engagement with groups in this way demonstrated genuine care for the area and its
residents as well as communicated sincerity in my motives for my research; it also helped to
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make my efforts worthwhile to my subjects, ultimately building relationships and fostering trust
between my subjects and me. And while this step was important in recruiting interviewees, it
also helped to provide insight into the priorities of these communities and, therefore, afforded
observational data and context to their political attitudes. Finally, as a way of more passive
recruitment, I posted fliers and business cards around local businesses (with owners’ permission)
with a streamlined pitch for my study (Appendix 3) and my contact information for local patrons
to reach out of their own accord should they wish to be interviewed.
Interviews and Observational Data
This project’s goal is to analyze rural Pennsylvania’s political attitudes and the role of
rural identity in such attitudes’ formation and sustenance. Although there is a large body of
evidence exploring connections between socioeconomic status and political affiliation (Gramsci
1990; Hummon 1990; Mettler 2018), this research further investigates the effects of these
interacting factors on real-life political policy in rural Pennsylvania as well as how cognitive
biases and the spreading of misinformation influence political attitudes of the people that live
there. The sample of this project includes residents of rural Pennsylvania— specifically from
Northumberland, Union, Snyder, and Columbia Counties— over the legal voting age of 18 years.
This study’s data comes from in-depth interviews with residents of rural Pennsylvania—
20 interviews total—drawn primarily from network multiplicity and snowball samples of
connections made through relationships with various gatekeepers and word-of-mouth
recruitment from my interviewees. Only 3 of my 20 participants were recruited completely
randomly with the help of the flyers and business cards I left at various local businesses. No
matter a participant’s age, all subjects in the sample share one crucial characteristic; they are
“lifers”— people who have either grown up in central Pennsylvania and been here all their lives,
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people who left the area and then returned, or people who have been here for the majority of
their lives. By interviewing lifers exclusively, I was able to eliminate data from people with
weaker ties to the area of interest. Lifers have a unique investment in the area that outsiders do
not; many of my interviewees have families, raised children, have peers, work, recreate, and
more in central Pennsylvania. Lifers also have paid local taxes into the area, and many have
participated in local elections. Lifers are able to offer a perspective unique to them and only
them; they have watched their home change, develop, and serve (or not serve) the community in
which they are personally and professionally invested.
In addition to in-depth qualitative interviews, data was also collected by participating in
and observing meetings and events held by local organizations. I attended 10 meetings—several
of which I attended on multiple occasions—and 10 events facilitated by a variety of groups.
From school board meetings to protests, local political activism, public outreach initiatives, and
even independent militia organizing, I volunteered my time to groups located in central
Pennsylvania whose purpose was to engage in some way with the community in which they
operate. While attending these meetings and events, I collected observational data focusing on
the way rural residents operationalized their political attitudes and priorities within their
communities. This helped provide context to any interviews recruited from these groups as well
as how political information is communicated between formal and informal parties in rural
groups. And while non-political proceedings provided a breadth of contextual data, most of my
interview participants were recruited at politically focused meetings/events. Only 6 of my
interviewees were recruited utilizing snowball sampling methods outside of events I attended.
Contact with these people was facilitated using social media platforms Facebook and Twitter as
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well as personal cell phone numbers or email addresses either given to me by shared contacts in
my network or obtained on folks’ public profiles.
Part of the process of getting to know lifers and their political attitudes included speaking
to them about their existing knowledge base on certain political processes and policies, exploring
interactions of misinformation consumption, confirmation bias, and cognitive dissonance by
getting insight into their opinions of their perceived understanding of public spending and
political issues. Interviews allow for more personal responses with well thought-out narrative
data that would otherwise be filtered or constrained in surveys or questionnaires (Weiss 1995;
Glaser 1992). Interviewing research subjects, especially on multiple occasions, encourages more
detailed or holistic descriptions of various attitudes or perspectives, thought process descriptions,
integration of multiple complex perspectives, event interpretation, the bridging of
intersubjectivities, and the identification of additional variables for tweaking hypotheses for
analysis (Weiss 1995). While I did not conduct any multiple-meeting interviews, I was able to
attend multiple meetings for various local organizations and gather contextual observational data.
Interviews garnered primarily generalized and issue-focused conversation, drawing from
responses regarding aspects of one’s rural identity and how spending most of their lives in
central Pennsylvania has informed the things they value and find important.
Data Collection Logistics
This project gained the approval of the West Virginia University Institutional Review
Board (protocol number 2104300970) under the Flexibility Review Model on May 26, 2021. A
letter of informed consent was approved by the IRB; however, I was granted permission to
obtain oral consent rather than a formal signature due to concern of jeopardizing my rapport with
my subjects.
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Due to the ongoing pandemic and maximum adaptability of interviewee schedules, nearly
50 percent of interviews were conducted virtually or over the phone, though most did take place
in-person. For those who preferred a virtual interview, I met with subjects using free video
chatting software such as Facebook Messenger, Google Hangouts, and my university-issued
Zoom license; these applications allowed subjects to meet with me with no time restriction and at
no cost to them. Interviews were recorded on a private recording device and transcribed via Trint
transcription software purchased with department-issued funds.
Some meetings and volunteering sessions were recorded, while others were either notated
in real time and/or recounted shortly thereafter to optimize maximum recall of events. All
observational data was used in conjunction with interview data in a method known as the “talkin-interaction” approach often seen in conversation analysis (Oliver, Serovich, and Mason 2005),
where both verbal and nonverbal data are considered to appropriately showcase the nuances of
contention or discomfort often found in political conversation as well as the operationalization of
rural identity in the deployment and interaction of political priorities and attitudes. Participants
were sorted into partisan categories based off of their self-identification and the values they
expressed.
Of the 20 interviews conducted, 8 came from Northumberland County, 6 from Union
County, 3 from Snyder County, and 3 from Columbia County. Only 4 interviewees were under
age 35 and the majority of participants exceeded age 50. Some were retired while others were in
the process of retiring, some were in school, and 18 had at least one source of full-time
employment. 11 of the 20 interviewees were women, 8 were men, and 1 identified as gender
nonbinary.
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Along with in-depth personal interviews, observational data was collected over the span
of four months (May 2021-August 2021); depending on the space, I spent anywhere between two
and five hours observing various spaces. Places that served only as observational spaces (i.e., not
volunteer/rapport building spaces) were bars, diners, coffee shops, and parking lots. These spaces
were chosen because of their capacity to capture the mundane, everyday aspects of the area—
people going about their normal routines, getting coffee, running errands, getting drinks, having
a meal, etc. Also observed were local fairs/carnivals and certain organizational meetings;
oppositely from the aforementioned, these spaces were chosen due to their depiction of the
special, more purposeful presentation of what the area has to offer. For example, fairs are a big
part of central Pennsylvania culture; they showcase local harvests, local businesses, and special
events like tractor pulls and livestock auctions that draw significant crowds for days on end. At
these fairs and carnivals, there are game stands with various prizes that often breach political
territory (signs, flags, shirts, bumper stickers that endorse specific causes and/or candidates) even
though the game stand has no official political affiliation. Other things are decorated with
political agitprop as well—independently owned food stands, merchandise tents, vehicles, and
more. Rather than promote any official affiliation, these displays illustrate aspects of the stand
owner’s identity and beliefs—a common and telling observation of those who financially and
socially contribute to the area.
Other areas observed, however, included rapport building efforts such as volunteering my
time and networking with others in the space. In total, I spent approximately 30 hours total
volunteering with various groups and organizations—canvassing for reproductive rights
advocates, setting up and tearing down tents for political rallies, phone banking for two local
political candidates, and picketing/protesting for a striking labor union. I gained access to these
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organizations by reaching out via their social media platforms, making phone calls to numbers
found on public databases like Facebook or personal websites, and by showing up to publicized
events and introducing myself to folks who seemed to be in leadership positions. My affiliation
with each group was largely unofficial and short-lived—I was known only as a volunteer or
partaker among several other participants, and my affiliation lasted only for the duration of my
time volunteered or attending preparatory meetings. I used these volunteer opportunities to build
rapport with members of the groups and fellow volunteers/participants; I handed out business
cards to the people with whom I connected and later followed up with those who wished to be
interviewed.
Coding and Data Analysis
The coding process for this project required compilation of interview transcription data as
well as integration of interviewer observations of relevant nonverbal cues (such as pauses, looks,
different facial expressions, body language, tone, etc.) (Weston et al 2001). Aiding in the coding
process along with rigorously kept interview notes was the qualitative analysis software Atlas.ti
which, along with transcription records to retain participant confidentiality, were kept on a
private password-protected computer to which only the primary investigator has access.
Political attitudes and aspects of rural identity were coded thematically using the Atlas.ti
software and thoroughly notated interview records remarking informative nonverbal cues and/or
important shifts in interviewees’ tonality. Themes that emerged the most clearly and consistently
throughout the interview process were noted in a running document with examples and
quotations that were later revisited with coding software. Because the emerging themes were in
alignment with literature on rural identity and rural politics, the coding process was a
conglomeration of literary expectations and presently evolving patterns coming directly from
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interview notes and transcriptions. Specifically, transcriptions and notes were searched with
coding software to identify indicators (iterations of certain words, phrases, and/or sentiment
expression) of important themes and then collected in coded groups to keep track of thematic
recurrence. Additionally, supportive quotes and notated indicators of nonverbal cues were
gathered and organized into appropriate code groups so they could be retrieved during the
writing process. Observational data was coded similarly, except specific detected details and
sentiments were organized into code groups instead of direct participant quotations.
Once identified and gathered, themes were organized in order of importance by noting
which themes had the strongest and most frequent emergence—specifically, those themes
exhibited by both rural liberals and rural conservatives were deemed most poignant because they
showed up more frequently and bridged significant ideological gaps. Despite the potential
differences in trivial details or approach within these bridging themes, their significant
recurrence on both sides of the political aisle indicated great importance in analyzing rural
liberals and conservatives separately as well as one unit who largely wants the same things.
These bridging themes were used to explain the similarities in political goals and values between
rural liberals and conservatives but were also used to better understand liberal and conservative
viewpoints separately using more literary context and interview-based/observational nuance.
Other themes more specific to either side of the political aisle were organized by importance
within their respective “liberal” or “conservative” categories in the same way—more frequently
emerging themes with strongly supportive quotations and sentiments were considered more
important and then examined alongside other findings in order to gauge their places in the
discussion of rural identity and political attitudes.
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RESULTS
Familiar with hardship and adaptation, rural Americans face stigma from many avenues
of society and politics—stigma that carries societal implications that actively marginalize the
people in these areas in several crucial ways. Central Pennsylvania encompasses the
consequences that accompany systemic disenfranchisement of both Appalachian and nonAppalachian rurality. More specifically, Pennsylvania has areas of suburbia, small towns of
varying industry, and rural farmlands. Even in a state with such diversity, the less populated parts
of Pennsylvania still face consequences of rural stigma and marginalization both in the political
process and in residents’ senses of identity as rural Americans.
As a general stigmatic assumption, rural Americans are regarded by many as bumpkins
and backwards—those left behind in an advancing society due to their lack of education,
dwindling resources, and closed mindedness. Rural America has also been synonymized with
political conservativism, though of course, this is less than representative in many areas.
Especially as a political swing state, even conservative-dominated parts of rural and small-town
Pennsylvania are home to folks with diverse political opinions. And while there are distinct
differences in stances on certain issues, interviewees with different political affiliations showed
similar themes of what they value in political candidates and hopes for their community as well
as how they conceptualize and operationalize their identities as rural Pennsylvanians.
The following chapters will discuss themes found in conversations with more liberalleaning folks, more conservative-leaning folks, and the middle ground they share. Some themes
to be discoursed in these chapters are the conceptualization and operationalization of rural/small-
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town identity, various political attitudes and expectations, and hopes for community betterment
and political direction.
Rural Identity Conceptualization/Deployment and Political Attitudes of Central
Pennsylvania Liberals
Even though rurality has largely become synonymized with political conservativism, the
rural identity does not evade the more liberal leaning groups that also live out in the country.
One’s understanding of their identity as a rural or small-town citizen is just as influential for
Pennsylvania liberals as it is for anyone else. Nearly all the liberal leaning interviewees with
whom I spoke indicated that, overall, they liked the area, enjoyed raising children here, and had
no intention of leaving should the opportunity ever arise. Specifically, this emerged within
middle aged and older liberal interviewees; younger participants expressed the desire to leave the
area eventually, though they did not feel disdain for having been raised in central Pennsylvania.
They liked it well enough and the idea of leaving appealed more to a yearning for newness and
better employment opportunities than an aversion to the area.
Community Value
Within my sample of rural/small-town liberals there were several young college students
who had grown up in the area and stayed local for their schooling; these people, while having
mentioned no overt dislike for their hometowns, were more excited to leave central Pennsylvania
in search of new opportunities than their older peers. More formally recited as the “rural brain
drain” by Kafalas and Carr (2011), those happy to stay are not strangers to this phenomenon, yet
seem to hold no animosity toward those eager to migrate. In several interviews, there was an air
of pride and understanding exhibited by middle-aged and older liberals when discussing why
younger, more educated folks might aim to leave their hometowns in search of something better.
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“I get it, you know? I’m not saying our little town couldn’t benefit from young, educated adults
staying here and investing [in the community in some way—small businesses, entrepreneurship,
etc.], but I get it. There aren’t exactly a ton of opportunities around here, especially if you have a
degree that prepares you for something other than industry [factories and plants] and technical
skills [HVAC, electrical, plumbing, etc.]. Hell, even teachers are running for the hills because
our schools are taking a hit with all the budget cuts and downsizing. You can’t take a job at any
school anymore without worrying about being furloughed.” While spoken by a high school
support staff member recently laid off, this sentiment was echoed several times by several
people, including the small group of ladies I visited in late May.
Three women and I sat around a Tuscan-style kitchen in the outskirts of one small town
nearby; the house was decorated with antique heirloom crystal, collectible wines and spirits, and
ornate wooden furniture meant less for sitting and more for admiring as we left our shoes by the
door. The property itself spanned a generous two or three acres, accommodating for an in-ground
swimming pool, hot tub patio, bonfire ring, outdoor garage, and custom-designed “she shed” (a
small bungalow designed for the women of the family to escape the everyday routines lying
inside the main house—conceptually similar to a “man cave,” but with “far more class”
according to its owner). Surrounding the property on all sides were dense wooded areas and corn
fields—Lizzie’s little patch of paradise among the wide-open spaces preferred to the more
cramped dwellings in town. Inside, Lizzie and her two friends Fern and Darlene very kindly
prepared some snacks and wine for the four of us as I set up my interview equipment. Darlene
brought her young grandson who played in the next room; throughout the interview, the women
took turns checking in on him.
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Lizzie, Fern, and Darlene all grew up in the areas where they currently reside with
families of their own. They, along with other liberal interviewees, expressed great care and
concern for their local communities. “Moving to an urban area…it would sacrifice the closeness
I feel with the community here… the closeness we all feel together,” said Lizzie. “I love the city,
but I want to know who my neighbors are. I like knowing I can be there for somebody, and
somebody can be there for me.” A key component of rural identity, these women found
fulfillment and joy in taking responsibility for “their own”—contributing to the communal good
however possible. “I live here, I’ve always lived here; I love it here! This used to be such a great
little area. Just because some aspects of it have changed doesn’t mean it’s unsalvageable. I like to
participate and give back when I can!” said Fern, referring to her involvement in community
aspects like small business support and volunteering her time and resources to help her children’s
clubs at the local high school. Exhibiting another key component of rural identity, the
responsibility felt for one’s community translated to an individual duty to get involved and offer
time when needed. As mothers and members of their kids’ groups in school, they felt a shared
partnership and responsibility to contribute as a group for the good of their community (in this
case, a community of mothers and children—in others, the local community that benefits from
their kids’ volunteer service, arts organization, or athletics). In every way, patterns emerged with
this group and other liberals that the obligation to contribute to and help one’s community fell on
that of the collective more than any one individual.
This theme also arose within other liberal leaning meetings. One recurring meeting I
attended virtually over the course of one month was for Planned Parenthood Pennsylvania
(PPPA); the main purpose of these meetings was to discuss action plans for community
distribution of health services fliers and brainstorming initiatives for future policy-based
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partnerships with governmental figureheads. Volunteers were split into their respective regions
of Pennsylvania; being located in central PA, I was assigned to the small group representing
PPPA’s northeastern branch (or NEPA). As we all introduced each other, everyone presented
reasons for the dedication of their time and energy. “I feel that accurate information about
women’s health is severely lacking in our area, and I think people need to know that PPPA has
so much more to offer than just abortion services,” one volunteer said. Another chimed in, “I
want to help get information and resources out there [into the community] that I needed and
wished I would have had when I was younger.” These volunteers felt a draw to contribute
collectively to their community in the interest of communal public health and resource outreach.
PPPA’s initiatives were understood as less of an individual’s contribution to a cause, but more of
a collective group’s contribution to a larger community. Discussed in these meetings was the
responsibility of society to better educate young people on the sexual health resource available to
them, and work was always divvied out among group members to achieve a collective goal (in
the case of my group, number of informative fliers and pamphlets distributed in assigned areas).
Attitudes Toward Elites and Media
Also contributing to the rural identity development and deployment among rural
Pennsylvania liberals is the level of trust toward elitist figures and institutions; though this had
interesting variation within the liberal sample. While all ages expressed trust in major medical
institutions like the Center for Disease Control, the National Institute of Health, and the World
Health Organization (particularly regarding information on the coronavirus pandemic), only
those aged over 30 years felt as though they could trust the government and its current elected
officials. Lizzie and Fern both reported trusting President Biden and his administration to carry
the United States to a better place than previously held in the Trump presidency while also doing
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their best to fulfill promises made during Biden’s presidential campaigning. However, younger
interviewees were more protective of their high hopes and did not feel as though the government
has yet given them reasons justifying the surrender of their confidence. Some even laughed when
I asked if they trusted the current administration. “Trust Joe Biden and Cop-ala [a jab at Kamala
Harris and her past record of policing policies] Harris? Probably not,” said Marlena, a university
junior and member of a local climate action council. Marlena and the other members of the
climate action council whom I interviewed virtually one afternoon articulated dissatisfaction
with Biden and his history with climate impact policy, previous affiliations with Big Oil, and
inconsistent promises regarding student debt forgiveness. “He’s already gone back on promises
he made campaigning—exactly what I expected.” Marlena and her peers in the climate action
council agreed that, like other politicians, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris incorporated as much
mass appeal as possible into their campaign in order to secure their spots in office with little to
no intention of following through on the grand gestures they spouted. Relatively well informed
and clued into current political discourse, each of the council members remained unimpressed
with the more progressive direction Biden and Harris have taken since their election. However,
some remained (though, not necessarily enthusiastically so) hopeful with this shift. When asked
how support was weighed without trust in any government officials, Marlena researches
politicians’ track records, weighs pros and cons, and pledges her support accordingly; though she
reported never getting to a point where she felt she could trust any candidate entirely. “In the
case of politics, I look for consistency,” another member said. “That’s why I like [Vermont
Senator Bernie] Sanders; he’s been in politics his whole life and hasn’t wavered. He’s been
campaigning with the same message and goals since he started.” Others shook their heads in
agreement. Unfortunately for these progressives, Bernie Sanders did not advance to the final
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ballot in the 2020 presidential election. Marlena took over once more; “once the only candidate I
believed in fell off, I had to do what I’ve always done—decide who’s the best option of two that
I don’t particularly like.” Like any other voter, these students selected the available candidate
that best represented their personal values; in this case, progressive climate action, racial justice,
police reform, universal healthcare, and student debt forgiveness were prioritized—all things
where Biden fell short in their eyes, but still far exceeded his opponent in progressivism. These
young social justice advocates, while disheartened and a bit more jaded, followed suit of their
older liberal peers—choose “the lesser of two evils” and hope for the best, but with relatively
low expectations.
Of course, there are many ways in which people gather information and develop opinions
on world affairs and political candidates; a major one is media consumption. Central
Pennsylvania liberals overall reported a general sense of trust in the media so long as the
intentions of the source seemed consistently informative rather than mongering or purposefully
deceptive or “just for clicks,” as a young, liberal-leaning independent put it. Sitting across from
me in an off-campus coffee shop, Matthew looked inquisitively at the table. “Some sites just put
out blatant clickbait, and it’s so obvious,” he said. “How can you tell?” I replied. He thought a
moment, letting the mundane sounds of a small business at the lunch rush—the clinking of mugs,
the whistle of milk steamers, receipts printing, and the polite chatter between patrons and
employees. He backpedaled a little. “Well, sometimes it’s blatantly obvious. You’ll see some
wild headline that just screams clickbait, and you’ll know to look more into that one. Or just a
quick glance at the [web]site itself will tell you. You know, maybe don’t trust the Being Liberal
page on Facebook or TrueTrumpers.com to put out the most accurate information you could find.
But sometimes there are other headlines or sites that look more convincing, and you don’t always
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think to fact check every single thing you see. That would be exhausting, right? So, it almost
seems better to pick like…three or four sources you know you can trust and only stick with them.
So many random sources pop up on social media—especially Facebook—that have no merit
whatsoever and people circulate it because they don’t know any better. There’s so much
incentive out there now for people to mislead others that sometimes it feels impossible to know
who to trust to get their news.”
As a college educated individual and communications major, Matthew knew a thing or
two about vetting sources, and he had a point. Multiple interviewees reported apprehension
regarding sources they saw online that negated sources they had previously deemed trustworthy.
Mentioned also was the seemingly growing number of unvetted source material popping up
amidst the 2016 presidential race and even still, years later in its afterglow. But even amongst
this perceived inundation of irreputable new sources, folks found their way to ones those that
made sense to them and were confident in their choices. In addition to a source’s perceived
intentions and consistency, those who reported more in-depth research processes also mentioned
the importance of the references cited in whatever outlet they were consuming, whether that be
videos, news channels that verbally reference sources, or written pieces. As previously noted,
major medical institutions like the CDC, NIH, and WHO were viewed as legitimate and
trustworthy by every liberal interviewee, and therefore, sources that echoed and supported them
in their reporting were also deemed reliable. These organizations became particularly prominent
in conversation due to the ongoing global pandemic and conflicting views in central
Pennsylvania about vaccination—whether or not one should get vaccinated, how much
precaution should one be taking on an individual level, mask and vaccination mandates,
mandated business closures, and how much responsibility we as a community and society bear
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for rising case numbers were among frequently mentioned topics. Though, non-pandemic news
worked the same; sources were largely assessed by their references, intentions, and consistency.
Among those deemed most trustworthy were the National Public Radio and the Wall Street
Journal—both sources typically associated with more centrist reporting according to All Sides’
(2021) media bias analysis. However, also popular were more left-leaning sources like the Cable
News Network and the New York Times (Ribeiro et al 2018).
While faith in media outlets is not the best indicator of educational background,
interviews demonstrated that rural liberals’ willingness to trust certain outlets is based off of
whether their trusted sources report with consistency the statements issued by other reliable
institutions. For example, NPR and the CDC may issue the same statement on a recent public
health finding or suggestion while more media outlets with more conservative bias may question
the CDC’s judgement or blatantly oppose it. Recall that liberal-leaning folks tended to trust
major medical institutions (Reinhardt, Findley, and Countryman 2021); this is because they are
operated by those in the academic elite—specialized field professionals rigorously trained by
elite academic institutions. Trust in the academic elite did not end with medical organizations,
though they were the most referenced as the global pandemic dictated much of our conversations
and, often, the very nature of our meetings. Also highly trusted were academically trained
experts of other fields such as race scholars, climate scientists, sociologists, and economists.
These fields were specifically mentioned among discussion around hot-button cultural issues like
the Black Lives Matter movement, national student debt, and the climate crisis. Liberal
interviewees seemed to have an adequate understanding of the issues of their highest concern,
and they trusted their knowledge gaps to the experts. For example, while the average liberal
participant had less to say about the effects of capitalism on many social issues than the group of
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young progressives from the climate action council, they trusted that those whose job was to
understand complex social indicators lying beyond their understanding would do so and believed
that their expertise should be called upon in large-scale social decision making.
While there are several contended explanations for the liberal academic bias, the most
popular seems to be that political liberalism is associated with higher educational attainment
(Pew Research Center 2016). According to Pew’s 2016 report, those with more education are
consistently more liberal, and liberalism increases with level of education. While this
phenomenon can be speculated, its effects in the deployment of rural identity among small town
Pennsylvania liberals are evident. Even for those liberals who do not have college degrees, they
are largely supportive of their peers, family, and community members who fall in the highly
educated liberal trend; this is particularly worth noting here because, as will be discussed further
in following chapters, this was not found within the conservative sample. “I’m just so proud of
all you kids nowadays, getting college degrees and having the courage to get out of here and do
important things,” said Lizzie. Fern continued, “It’s nice to see you kids out there learning for
yourselves instead of just whatever you’re taught in this tiny little town.” Even those liberals
with fewer years of formal education like these two women who only have high school diplomas
and a couple semesters of college aligned themselves with more educated fellow liberals,
participating in the prominent “us versus them” mentality that is so integral to understanding
rural identity. Even an ex-high school teacher with a master’s degree, Danielle, echoed the
sentiment; “you kids, I’m so proud of you kids—the ones that got out and got educated. More
and more of you are getting degrees even past college, and I think that’s awesome. Some of us
weren’t so lucky. There are people I went to school with back in the [19]80s who never went to
school or learned anything after high school, never left, and surprise surprise—they’re
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Republicans.” This sentiment, while perhaps flattering to some, illustrates a divide between those
believed to be “properly” educated (and therefore, liberal) and those who are not (and therefore,
conservative). While less educated folks were not inherently understood as conservative or
immoral by the liberals in my sample, conservatives were inherently understood as uneducated;
this painted a picture of moral superiority among those more-educated liberals and those with
less formal education who were, in a way, able to overcome this intellectual “deficit.”
While not as strongly portrayed as in rural conservatives, rural Pennsylvania liberals had
prominent senses of “us,” or ingroups, that directly conflicted with “them,” or outgroups. For
left-leaning folks, this mentality was less about geography, status, or nationalism the way it
(partially) was for conservatives; instead, it arose more within the drawing of ethical guidelines.
Largely, “us” was conceptualized as those whose education exceeded high school (even for those
that did not fit this category themselves, so long as they had viewpoints that aligned with the
liberal academy), those who exercised social and self-awareness, and those who touted
politically correct, non-racist, tolerant worldviews. Of course, these labels are completely
subjective and would likely be found contentious in dialogue with any of the liberals’ outgroups.
But all of this to say kindlier what was most often meant—in many ways, liberals saw
themselves as the direct antithesis to Trump supporters. In the most rudimentary of senses,
Trump supporters were seen by liberals as the opposition of all the things most vital to their own
rigorous ethical code—ignorant, immature, racist, prejudiced, nationalistic, intolerant, and even
cruel. “There’s no getting through to these people [Trump supporters]; I’ve tried, and there’s just
no reasoning with them,” said Lizzie, who is a proud Trump opponent and vehement
conservative adversary on Facebook both on her own page and in the comments of others’ posts.
Her friends nodded and laughed in agreement. This was a mindset found commonly among
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liberal interviewees; “we” are smarter, more open-minded, kinder, and more evolved than
“them,” the political (and sometimes, personal) enemy. This mentality takes special care to call
into question each group’s morals and ethical codes which, naturally, translate into various
political attitudes, values, and priorities.
Political Attitudes, Values, and Priorities
One question I made sure to ask participants no matter the direction of our conversation
was this: if, hypothetically, you could continue to pay the same amount in taxes that you
currently pay, but you had total control in how exactly they were allocated, where would you
want your tax dollars to go? Regardless of how we arrived at this question, asking this helped me
to understand where each respondent found their most influential political priorities. Their
answers allowed me to better situate the rest of the conversation within meaningful political
context, providing insight into how the complex nuances of rural identity influence personal
values, political engagement, and one’s expectations of their elected officials. While each person
did not have identical responses, a few distinguishable patterns emerged within rural
Pennsylvania liberals. Notably, liberals as a group tended to focus their political priorities toward
major systemic issues and their roots; their areas of concern often were the origins of the
problems they saw, and the hypothetical allocation of tax dollars were more proactive in nature
than reactive. For example, the topic of education was popular among both more progressive and
more centrist liberals. When discussing the issues with the American educational system, there
was some talk about the subpar resources given to local public schools, but only among deeper
discussion about how the current curriculums in place exacerbate other disturbing systemic
issues like structural racism and American nationalism. Of even deeper concern than school
resources were things like teacher/staff compensation and total curricular rehauls. Gabby,
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another member of the climate action council and local university student said, “I would want
my tax money invested in really digging up some main issues. Restructuring the education
system could really help overturn some serious nastiness in this country. In our area, even.
Educational restructuring would…I mean, granted, it would take a long time…we wouldn’t see it
in our lifetimes. But it would change mindsets and other systems. Housing crises. Poverty.
Policing. Religious persecution. A whole mess of stuff that stems from the fact that we teach
inaccurate, white-centric history in schools from the jump [young age; elementary school and
before]. It feels like the place where it all needs to start. So, I think that’s where I’d want my
money to go.”
I pressed her a little; “it all—what does that mean? Where what needs to start?”
“Everything!” she said. “If we ever want to see any meaningful systemic changes in this country,
I feel like it needs to start with education. How we teach our children and shape their minds.”
Even the less progressive folks agreed. “I would want my tax dollars to go toward our
education system,” said Darlene. “Kids aren’t coming out of school as well equipped for the real
world as they should be, and that’s not necessarily their fault. We should be changing the way
we teach kids and making sure they know what they’re going to be up against out of school.”
She went on to elaborate on how students graduate high school not knowing how to maneuver
some of the most basic processes of adult life—buying a car, taking out loans, negotiating
employment benefits, looking for insurance, and more. “All that stuff is so important, not only
because everyone has to do it, but because those things [processes] are pretty much designed to
take advantage of the average person. If you don’t know what to look out for, you get boned.”
Also discussed around the kitchen island with Darlene, Fern, and Lizzie were the implications of
white- and Christian-centric curriculums. “These kids leave [school] thinking that all this fake
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stuff [referring to certain history lessons] is how it actually was, and that shapes a whole
worldview that just feeds into itself. It’s a cycle that only hurts people, particularly people of
color and small towns like ours that have segregated low-income housing and major drug
problems,” said Fern. “Folks in the area see these problems and don’t actually know how or why
they happen this way. They only know that there are people different from them that make their
lives harder by being part of the problems they see. And then they become bitter and resentful.
It’s a cycle.”
Fern had noted an observation I also noticed as I continued interview conduction. As will
be discussed in later chapters, there is a notable stigma around her hometown that the lowincome housing was where all the Black and Hispanic people lived, and because of that, the
neighboring grocery store is plagued with “welfare queens” and buyers of “government cheese.”
It is common knowledge around this area to avoid the store during “food stamp days,” or the first
week of each month when food stamps are distributed if one wishes to avoid crowds and long
checkout lines. It is also common knowledge to avoid these few blocks in general, as they are
associated with criminal activity and dangerous individuals, and it all traces back to the learned
stigma of the low-income housing units nearby. Regardless, the desire to invest personal tax
dollars into the roots of major systemic issues was a persevering trend among the liberal sample.
In addition to funding educational reform, many liberals wanted their tax dollars invested
into more accessible public infrastructure—particularly public transportation systems in rural
areas and better road conditions. Food deserts and walkability are major hurdles of navigating
life in rural areas, especially when one lives outside town centers and/or does not have access to
a reliable vehicle. Recounting her experience working in elder care, Lizzie says, “some of these
older folks…they’re all alone and need to rely on public programs to get their groceries. We [the
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area] just now got things like Instacart (grocery delivery systems/apps), but these people aren’t
using that. They don’t know how! And it’s expensive. They rely on [the rapid transit system that
takes scheduled riders to and from stores and appointments], but it’s so slow and inconsistent
that it makes it impossible for people to get any last-minute things they need, or anything they
need without scheduling a week in advance. And these aren’t always people who are
incapacitated! These are people who are more or less self-sufficient—they just either don’t have
cars or don’t drive anymore. And lots of them don’t have family that can help. If we had a more
comprehensive transportation system other than the shitty roads around here, it would make their
lives so much easier.” Fern continued, “kids could also take themselves to school that way. Not
as much congestion in the morning, not so much extra time needed in the morning. The [school]
buses are great and all, but there are even some circumstances where addresses are so out there
(secluded/isolated) that you have to drive your kid to the bus stop! I don’t know how exactly to
fix that problem, but I have to believe that a better public transportation system would help.”
Another benefit of investing in public infrastructure was brought up by Riley, a local
candidate for county office. He said, “if we invest money into fixing the roads, fixing the
buildings, and making things overall just look nicer, more people might want to stay.” Riley
grew up in a small coal town in central Pennsylvania, left to pursue a college education, and
returned upon his degree’s completion. With the new tools he gained in school, his eyes opened
up to a slew of social issues faced by his hometown. His voice sounded saddened over the phone
as we talked on his way to a meeting with state representatives in Harrisburg. “All the houses in
[his hometown] look…well, pretty terrible, honestly. And it’s not fair because this vision is so
pervasive. Everyone knows [his hometown] as a dump—a washed up coal town eaten up by
poverty and drugs and apathy. We’re [the people of his hometown] seen as slobs. But, at least
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with the houses, so many people just don’t have a reason to fix up their porches and busted
windows. When money is already tight, and people already see you as a loser slob, what’s the
point of wasting money on home improvement? Porch value? Property here is dirt cheap because
no one wants to move here with the way it looks. But I think that would change if people felt
more incentivized. For instance, if we invested money into fixing the sidewalks, the roads, all the
potholes and crumbling buildings—people might see that and think, ‘oh, maybe [the town] isn’t
so bad after all. My house looks pretty bad next to these new changes. Maybe I should do
something about that.’ And then people would have more incentive to stay in the area, fix up
their properties, and ultimately raise the property values and living incentives in town. People
would want to stay, open businesses, maybe a community college. And we’d get a nice cycle
going.”
In a similar vein, liberals also highly valued healthcare and opted to invest their personal
tax dollars in a more universal healthcare system, including rebuilding a deserted hospital in the
area. J.R., who works as an emergency medical technician for a local ambulance company
reflected on his time with patients during the pandemic while we sat at a smoky bar, noisy with
regular patrons milling around and making small talk with the familiar bartenders. “With the old
hospital there, we used to be able to take people in less than ten minutes no matter where we
were. Now, it can sometimes take more than twenty. That’s too long for a lot of people. People
have died in the back of my truck because the hospital was so far away, and we were the closest
option to respond [to the call].” Whether he realized it or not, J.R. was explaining another
significant barrier faced by rural Americans—the effects of infrastructure on healthcare are
plentiful, but the geographic isolation was of particular concern to him as an EMT. “Sometimes
it takes us more than twenty minutes to even reach an address, which is bad enough. But then to
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rush patients as fast as we can and still not make it in time? It’s very sad.” He went on to
postulate about the benefits of reopening the old hospital or expanding physical healthcare
infrastructure as he recalled all he has seen as a pandemic first responder. Within the four
counties studied, there are two major hospitals located approximately thirty minutes from each
other by car. But some addresses within these counties are more than forty-five minutes away.
There are smaller, more regional hospitals located throughout this region, but they are not as well
equipped for more serious conditions or high-level trauma, so ambulances take higher-risk
individuals (including COVID patients) to the main trauma centers to avoid unnecessary patient
transfers that would further prolong proper care. “It’s dystopian,” J.R. mused; “they’re [hospital
staff] putting people in beds in the hallway. Sick people are waiting to be seen in the emergency
room for hours. Like four, sometimes even six hours or more. People sick with COVID, just
sitting there, potentially exposing everyone else. COVID patients are in beds in the hallway
because there just aren’t enough rooms.” Hospital overcrowding has been an issue for central
Pennsylvania since the pandemic first took off in 2020. Even as vaccination rollouts expanded in
the US, many rural Pennsylvanians chose to remain unvaccinated (PA Office of Rural Health
2021). Coronavirus variants ripped their way through these areas and took hospital resources,
triage space, and patient lives with them. “I feel like every time I end up back at the ED
[emergency department] and check in about a patient I took early in the week, sometimes even
hours before, I find out they’re either on ventilators or they’ve passed away. Almost every
person I take anymore is a COVID patient. We gear up [with personal protective equipment] for
almost every call, and we’ve run out multiple times. It’s exhausting. Compartmentalizing is a big
part of this job, and I’ve gotten pretty good at it. But I’m so tired and I’m running out of
empathy.”
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Another popular healthcare issue was that of insurance coverage. J.R. expressed to me
that he is essentially unable to treat someone without health insurance, and that many people are
assuming the risk of being uninsured due to rising insurance premiums and inadequate coverage
packages offered by individual employers. Even with insurance, many people face significant
financial burden following emergent medical care—especially when this care includes multipleday hospital stays and equipment like ventilators and oxygen masks. But for many liberal folks,
the desire for investment in systemic healthcare issues preceded the barriers exacerbated by the
pandemic. Karla, a former employee of a local newspaper, spoke to me on the phone on her way
home from an appointment across town and recounted her insurance plan at her old job. “It was
awful,” she said. “I had the family plan of course, or I could have chosen a cheaper one. But I
needed the family plan. But the packages offered by [the newspaper] have just gotten so bad. I
mean, with the insurance plan I could afford on that salary, I was paying a six-thousand-dollar
deductible…each. Six-thousand-dollar deductibles for each of us on my insurance plan. In
addition to forty-dollar copays every time we need to go the doctor. And that was just for general
practice visits. Specialists—so allergists for my kids, dermatology for me, and any other
specialist—was fifty. We had next to no emergency room coverage, no ambulance coverage, and
a few of our normal prescriptions weren’t covered. I think I had to write two different appeal
letters to my insurance company to ask them to reconsider covering things we had been filling
for years. I could have picked a better plan, but at that point, I would have been giving up half of
my paycheck to pay for the plan. And I just couldn’t do that. It felt smarter to take the risk, and
I’m not really a risk taker.” Karla was more than relieved to find a different job with better
insurance before the pandemic layoffs began in the spring of 2020. She and other liberal
interviewees expressed interest, if not explicitly for universal healthcare, for more standardized
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care that would cut down on facility-insurance contract negotiations that can unjustly burden
single-payer plan holders. While there was a theme of concern expressed over scarcer resources
under a more universal system, many liberals were comfortable with one major contention—the
idea of healthy people essentially paying for sick people. In fact, most liberals expressed feeling
that being a part of a more accessible system was their civic and ethical duty. They would rather
contribute to a system that helps others and trust that the system would be there for them should
they need it someday than gamble on single-payer plans that not only fell short of their needs but
helped no one else either.
In this same vein, rural liberals wanted their tax dollars invested in the development of
the local communities. Most everyone spoke of the devolution of their communities in the last
few years, mostly referencing the growing presence of drugs and the dilapidation of property and
storefronts. The two most popular responses to these concerns were the funding and development
of after-school programs and addiction rehabilitation centers. Folks believed that students may
be less likely to wander the streets after school, getting in trouble by offering more generalized
after-school programs that did not necessarily have any qualifiers or goals other than giving
students a safe and controlled space to socialize, study, and even exercise. Additionally, folks
brought up the idea of repurposing abandoned spaces in local towns as addiction treatment
centers; the most progressive participants even suggested supervised injection sites wherein the
administration of intravenous drugs are monitored by medical professionals in hygienic
environments. This provides users with a safe setting in which to consume illicit substance,
thereby decreasing rates of overdose mortality (CFP 2017). Multiple people with multiple titles
and perspectives elaborated on how addiction recovery centers would help community health and
growth, therefore making them a worthy recipient of their personal tax dollars. J.R. pointed out

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 72

that, in addition to COVID patients, many people he takes in his ambulance are drug users who
either require brief medical supervision following a Narcan (an emergency opioid overdose
reversal medication) revival or folks whose struggles with addiction send them to the hospital
with medical complications from excessive drug and alcohol usage; either way, these folks, he
says, would be better off in treatment centers than contributing to the already-congested hospital
waiting rooms. Others mentioned fewer unnecessary arrests resulting in a decrease of prison
overcrowding. But the essence of this ethical responsibility illustrates another important aspect
of rural identity deployment in Pennsylvania—prioritizing one’s community.
Discussed further in chapter three, participants expressed the desire to support local
businesses and organizations as much as possible, often choosing to patron these smaller entities
over larger corporations if possible. This included supporting church sales (baked goods, soup,
and holiday candy), donating to local charities that specifically aided county citizens rather than
larger goodwill stores. This theme was not unique to left leaners, but particularly among rural
liberals, the prioritization of one’s community demonstrated the theme of valuing individual
sacrifice in the interest of the collective good found in many leftist ideologies and viewpoints.
This theme interwove itself through several other major political attitudes among rural
Pennsylvania liberals. Among these attitudes were those expected of typical liberal voters—prowomen’s rights healthcare policy/pro-abortion, pro-gun control and stricter regulation, and provaccination. In particular, pro-vaccination stances demonstrate the idea of valuing individual
sacrifice for the best interest of the collective. All liberal participants reported either receiving
both doses of the COVID-19 vaccine or had plans to receive it soon following our interview.
Some were excited to get their shots while others were more apprehensive and saw the hasty
rollout as a bit risky. However, even those more hesitant trusted the medical advice to the
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medical professionals and got their vaccines in the interest of protecting themselves and their
communities. And while many mentioned potential valid reasons for not getting the vaccine and
even empathizing with others who were afraid, most viewed the decision to remain unvaccinated
while participating normally in community life as selfish, needlessly putting others at risk for a
potentially life-threatening illness. Known more satirically as “social justice warriors,” altruism
emerged among rural Pennsylvania liberals as it often does in larger scales—so much so that it
plays into one’s sense of identity as the antithesis to their conservative counterparts. The idea of
altruism, particularly in politics, was found also in another major social issue discussed at length
among liberal interviewees: Black Lives Matter (BLM) and the call for racial justice in American
policing.
Predominantly among white participants (most of the sample), supporting initiatives for
racial justice and systemic justice reform were seen as a duty of their privilege. Younger, more
progressive participants reported attending various Black Lives Matter protests in 2020 and 2021
locally, at the Pennsylvania capitol building, and in Washington D.C. I decided to attend several
myself in the area organized by two separate (yet collaborative) groups. These groups were both
founded and run by people under age 25 and arranged legal, non-violent protests around central
Pennsylvania. The first one I attended took place in a public park located in the middle of town;
surrounded by busy streets on all sides of the park, protestors lined the perimeter holding signs
(Appendix 4), clad in masks and casual clothing. In the center of the park were coolers with
water, a table with snacks, and two bottles of sunscreen to combat the unrelenting summer heat.
These were donations from fellow protestors and supportive community members. Passing a
megaphone around, the organizers of the protest thanked everyone for their support and led
various chants to be followed by the (mostly) young activists at attention. As people drove by,
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we got a range of responses; from approving honks, waves, and thumbs-up to beratement,
disapproving gestures, and violent threats, passersby were not shy toward the commotion in the
park. I will discuss these protests further in following chapters, as much of the discourse
observed suggested a more conservative reaction to the cause. But among the more supportive
things said to me personally and those within earshot around me were “you kids rock,” “Black
lives matter,” and “thank you.” Observations like these proved consistent throughout the three
BLM protests I attended around the observed counties. Liberal views of the BLM movement
were consistent with the values portrayed on the organization’s website: liberation and justice for
Black folks. Younger, more progressive participants rattled off well-informed social commentary
explaining their contempt for opposers of the movement which primarily settled on their
ignorance and closed-mindedness. Older and more centrist liberals seemed to lack the same
language to describe their positions as thoroughly, but ultimately saw the BLM movement as a
noble organization trying to elicit positive systemic change. Even those liberals who uttered the
ever contentious “all lives matter” demonstrated understanding the difference between the two
phrases; they just did not recognize that the phrases occupied opposing viewpoints on the issue.
For example, Fern recounted on the protests that happened in 2020 right after the death of
George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN. “I was so proud to see so many young people out in the
streets fighting for that poor man. Surprised, but so proud to see that there are people around
here who are paying attention. I believe that all lives matter, of course. All lives matter! But all
lives are not affected the same way in this case [the case of policing and the American justice
system]. And I just can’t believe that people won’t see that.” She, Darlene, Lizzie, and other
liberal participants used this issue to further explain their hopes and expectations for America’s
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political future. However, this and other liberal superiority mentality has implications for
America’s political present as well.
Cognitive Dissonance and Dissonance Avoidance among Rural Liberals
It is part of the moralistic process to engage with various levels of ideological dissonance
(Rabin 1994); without these challenges, perspectives cannot grow or evolve. Cognitive
dissonance is understood as the perception of contradictory information. Essentially, it is state of
having thoughts and perspectives inconsistent with one another and, often, one’s corresponding
actions. It is known that people have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their
worldviews and political beliefs, including things widely regarded by professionals as facts
based on substantive scientific evidence (Rekker 2021). To properly regard new and inconsistent
information requires a willingness to challenge one’s existing worldview and, by extension,
one’s sense or understanding of themselves. One would need to be willing to engage with this
dissension and potentially admit error or poor ethical judgement—for obvious reasons, this is not
easy for most people to do. At its most extreme, this process can entail reevaluation of one’s
identity and the titles with which they most closely identify. For example, someone growing up
poor may not realize their family’s status relative to their peers if they grew up around a
community of similarly situated individuals. This person may consider their circumstances pretty
normal and may understand their family to be middle-class while, in reality, they fall either close
to or beneath federal poverty lines. To receive information contradictory to this understanding
would offer its recipient an ultimatum—reject the confines of the national poverty line in an
effort to retain their identity as a middle-class American, or adjust their understanding of their
societal status, thereby altering their identity to better fit the new information. Put more simply,
when faced with conflict between one’s attitudes and their mindset or behavior, people tend to
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change their attitudes to make their cognition consistent with their current behavior rather than
adjust behavior or mindset to be consistent with their attitudes. Granted, this particular example
is rich with nuance and oversimplicity; more examples will be discussed in further chapters. For
the sake of understanding the presence and role of cognitive dissonance in rural Pennsylvania
liberals, it is important to define and contextualize such processes.
It is documented that, in context of political ideology, liberals are less likely to avoid
dissonance-arousing situations than their conservative peers and feel less need to reach epistemic
certainty and closure in their views (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, and Robbins 2020; Nam, Jost, and Van
Bavel 2013). This translates to more open-ended views on religion (for example, being satisfied
with theological uncertainty), willingness to trust science (for example, being content with
novice understanding), and openness to engage in critical thought regarding one’s perspective.
By and large, the liberal sample from rural and small-town Pennsylvania fell in line with these
expectations. Liberal participants were more willing to engage in bipartisan discussion of issues
while considering their opposing perspectives; while no one’s views actually changed, it was
evident that empathy played a significant role alongside the logic necessary to execute such an
exercise. Many people said things like, “I can understand where they’re [opposers] are coming
from, but…” and, “I get it, I really do.” Statements like these were often followed by legitimate,
respectful reflections of opposing views on an issue; folks empathized with visceral reactions
like fear and anger before explaining their stance despite such intuitions—something
conservatives did not do with the same consistency. Additionally, liberals seemed to feel more
comfortable questioning their own beliefs and admitting that they do not necessarily have any
definitive answers to remedy their political concerns. They were not as determined to identify a
distinct mechanism of control over their circumstances or beliefs by inventing justification for
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their uncertainties; liberals in this sample were okay with not knowing and seemed more open to
learning new information that could potentially alter their worldviews. However, that is not to
say that liberals did not exhibit some instances of cognitive dissonance.
One theme found among liberals in my sample was a certain hypocrisy; liberal folks
showed concern over wealthy donors’ excessive political impact and the influence of the
superrich—an ideology which aligns with liberal attitudes toward wealth inequality and people
power among more average Americans. However, some liberals expressed this sentiment quite
strongly while simultaneously advocating for politicians who they claim to be beneficiaries of
wealthy, self-interested sponsors. Perhaps an example of dissonance avoidance in this case, this
ethical inconsistency was a theme unaddressed by my liberal sample; instead, it was merely
observed. Fern and Lizzie, for example, enthusiastically supported Joe Biden’s campaign from
the beginning of the presidential race, stating that, “I do trust Biden to take care of us. He cares
about the little guy! He puts average Americans first and doesn’t bend to big business like Trump
did.” However, while Biden’s policy pitches have grown more progressive over the last several
years of his political career (Tindera 2021), much of Biden’s financial campaign support came
from super-PACS—independent political action committees with limitless fundraising potential
from various sources, often including large corporations (Tindera 2021). In fact, some of Biden’s
most generous donors hailed their fortunes from gas/oil moguls and corporate retail beneficiaries
(Tindera 2021)—both industries often under fire for their exploitive business practices, wage
inequality, and environmental damages. Also among the Biden campaign’s most significant
contributors were risky hedge funders (Forbes 2020) whose potential failures could cost
American industry greatly and cost working folks their jobs. Sampled liberals expressed disdain
for these snags; they supported the idea of shrinking America’s wealth gap, felt that those who
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had exorbitant amounts of money had too much, and articulated the desire for more “people
power” in the US political process. “No one should have that much money [billionaires]; it’s
unethical. It should be redistributed,” said Josie, a self-identified Democrat and Biden supporter.
So, while Joe Biden may have appealed to their ideology on many important issues, his donor
history was less than consistent with what my liberal sample seemed particularly concerned with,
making their enthusiastic support of his campaign dissonant with many of their ethical assertions.
Interestingly, this theme was most evident among older, more centrist liberals whose top
presidential pick was Joe Biden even before the official Democratic nomination; younger, more
progressive liberals preferred candidates like Bernie Sanders, whose primary campaign
donations were much less significant because they came from smaller sources and did not
include collaborative super-PACs (Open Secrets 2020). Sanders supporters in my sample liked
this fact; “he says he doesn’t like when mega rich people try to buy political power, and he
means it,” said a college aged member of the climate action council. “He doesn’t take money
from super PACS and he rightfully criticizes people who do. I just like that he seems really
consistently on our [average Americans rather than the superrich—further illustration of in-group
versus out-group mentality] side. He even hated when his staff made one. They had to change the
name!” Sure enough, some of Sanders’ top staff founded a super PAC called “Future to Believe
In” with intentions to endorse Biden after Sanders abandoned the presidential race and push his
policies farther left (America’s Promise 2020). Expressing disapproval of the PAC’s formation
and usage of his campaign slogan, they changed the name to “America’s Promise” and formally
declared no affiliation with the senator (America’s Promise 2020). Despite feeling disappointed
with the official Democratic nomination, young progressives in my sample felt as though they
“had no choice” (Marlena, of the climate action council) but to relinquish their support for
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candidates more aligned with their personal ethics in the interest of America’s collective best
interest, thereby settling for Biden. They did this begrudgingly, fully aware of the dissonance
between their political attitudes and corresponding behaviors. Choosing what they believed to be
the best collective choice, they cast votes for Biden/Harris with the hopes of being able to return
their support to more progressive candidates and causes in future election cycles. Older liberals
in my sample, however, were less concerned with such dissonance.
Also found among older, more centrist liberals was cognitive dissonance regarding
wealth and housing. While most younger, more progressive liberals found themselves in various
states of transition (college, graduate school, and early stages of career building) and therefore in
less permanent housing situations like renting or temporarily living at home, older liberals were
more established and seemed to occupy fairly well-off properties. Despite rural housing being
cheaper than urban and suburban spots (newhomesource), properties occupied by centrist liberals
in my sample were not cutting any corners. Not only were these folks homeowners, but they also
lived outside of town away from excessive disturbance, had ample space for multiple vehicles,
had lawns and furnished outdoor seating areas, and even had storage sheds. Some had swimming
pools. They had heirlooms and dishes reserved for special occasions as well as rooms in their
houses dedicated to guests and leisure. One had two individually owned business establishments
occupying the property and had an entire guest house attached. Some of these houses were
purchased and thoroughly renovated while others were built from the ground up with idealized
and personalized blueprints in mind. In short, older, more centrist liberals appeared comfortably
middle-class. Those with more progressive ideologies occupied less-desirable places like college
town apartments, compact rental units in town with unguaranteed street parking, and small
borrowed spaces intrusive to parents or other family. And while conservatives, of course, also
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owned homes with backyards and storage spaces outside of town, they do not find themselves at
as significantly at odds with their beliefs on wealth and housing equity. For example, older, more
centrist liberals reported valuing equitable housing policy and efforts to reduce local
homelessness—a growing issue in central Pennsylvania (PA DCED 2021)—in ways that
conservatives did not. Whether they realize it or not, liberal middle-class/upper-middle-class
homeowners benefit from local zoning regulations that help protect property values at the
expense of more accessible housing in less-appealing areas. One way zoning regulations affects
community is the prohibition of business operation in residential areas; less affluent
entrepreneurs who are often already taking on significant financial risks must choose between
living farther away from opportunistic centers or moving into cheaper, more densely populated
areas with fewer zoning regulations at the expense of economic fertility. Ultimately, regulations
like these end up hurting communities and those forced into these struggling areas—the lowerclass, young people, and oftentimes, people of color. So, these more affluent liberal homeowners
end up benefiting from the systemic oppression of those they claim to uplift; at some point, selfinterest takes precedence. This self-interest is found in quotes from older, more centrist liberals
regarding their community; “the wide-open space is my favorite part of living out here,” said
Margaret, a member of the local high school support staff union. “I like not being right on top of
my neighbors.” Fern, Lizzie, and Darlene built off this thought. “I wouldn’t want to raise kids in
town. It’s more dangerous there. I can’t keep an eye on them. You can’t live how you want to
because you have to rent or buy houses that have been there and been dilapidated for decades. I
like being able to have my own space that’s just mine that works perfectly for me.” So, while,
advocating for more equitable housing action in their communities and across the United States,
liberals in my study still preferred the dissonant, self-interested dwelling that ultimately hurt their
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own cause. While not explicitly admitted, the indulgence and comfort of this self-interest seemed
worth the cognitive disagreement, if it was even realized at all.
The degree to which this dissonance is conscious and deliberate is a focus for a different
study. However, it is important to note in this study that central Pennsylvania liberals are not
immune to the cognitive dissonance they so often identify and berate in conservatives. My
interviews revealed far less cognitive dissonance among liberal participants than conservatives
but can likely be explained by mechanisms of rural identity rooted both in American
conservativism and rural adversity that will be further discussed in the following chapter as well
as the review of relevant literature.
Looking Forward: Hopes and Expectations for America’s Political Future
Overall, this sample of rural Pennsylvania liberals believe that the United States is
heading in a more positive and hopeful direction relative to Donald Trump’s presidency. Both
Biden supporters and those who settled for him agreed that, despite Biden’s promises potentially
being kept or not, he was bound to do far less damage to the United States domestically and
internationally than Trump would have should he have been reelected for a second term in office.
Their hopes and expectations for America’s political future all fell together in a consensus of
progressive social change as well as candidates who exemplify consistency and integrity in their
policy advocacy. Most liberals also felt that Joe Biden and Kamala Harris have the country’s best
interest at heart; those who did not feel this way were the more progressive left leaners who were
disappointed by Biden’s democratic nomination but saw him as a far more responsible choice in
the polls than a Republican candidate. These folks figured that Biden’s main loyalties lie in
donor profits and the upper class but were pleased to observe that his campaign appeared more
progressive than in the past. They did not express much hope or faith in this observation, as they
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posited that much of this platform change was an attempt at pandering toward younger voters,
but they liked that the campaign brought more attention to social causes about which they were
so passionate. Regardless, they hoped (even if not trusted) that their elected administration would
carry out decisions in the best interest of average American citizens—an important bipartisan
commonality often forgotten amidst explosive political interface.
Rural Identity Conceptualization/Deployment and Political Attitudes of Central
Pennsylvania Conservatives
In the 2016 presidential election, Republican candidate Donald Trump won
Pennsylvania’s popular vote by less than a single percentage point with counts reporting 48.2
percent of voters in his favor; in 2020, the state flipped blue, but not by a very large margin
(Ballotpedia 2020). Unsurprisingly, the less densely populated counties overwhelmingly showed
up for the conservative candidates—including Northumberland, Union, Columbia, and Snyder
counties. But why? Rural conservativism is a complexly nuanced phenomenon characterized by
the historical unfolding of American identity and class development. The development of
American rurality rooted itself in ideas of rebellious nationalism and stark individualism
wavering only in devotion to one’s own ingroup—all ideas that translate into conservative
politics.
Valuing One’s Community
One prominent finding within the conservative sample was a significant value for one’s
local community. This group showed profound respect and care for the idea of supporting local
businesses and neighbors; many mentioned donating to churches who financially aid
congregation members in need, local charitable organizations that provide clothing or temporary
housing, and even acquaintances grieving various losses (of loved ones and employment, for
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example). One instance of strong community support from conservative folks that stood out was
the rebuilding of a bar and grille in Union County called Bar and Grille. In the summer of 2018,
Bar and Grille—a beloved regular hangout for a group of old Union County lifers who I
affectionately refer to as “the breakfast crew”—suffered a devastating fire that destroyed so
much of the establishment, they had to close their doors. In an issued statement to the local
newspaper, the reporting fire chief deemed the blaze “a total loss” (The Daily Item 2018) and
Bar and Grille officially closed. Heartache echoed through the valley as people throughout Union
and surrounding counties felt the aftershocks of the fire; whether they knew an owner, employee,
or regular patron, everyone seemed to be connected to this loss. Shortly thereafter, community
members came together to donate money, time, and materials to help rebuild the bar; and in a
spectacular display of care and collaboration, it was able to reopen despite the harrowing
damage. Now, it resumes business as usual—hosting groups of regulars from 7am to 2am,
holding special events that draw crowds of locals, and organizing fundraisers for resident
chapters of various charitable organizations.
Throughout my collection period, I spent many early morning hours at Bar and Grille
observing the regular clientele and staff. In particular, I became familiar with a group of senior
Union County lifers whose morning routines begins with breakfast together at the bar. Of them,
there were five; Dewey, Bill, Ken, Howie, and Bobby. They sat at the same high wooden table
every morning and ordered black coffee appetizers before their regular plates before flipping the
bar television to Fox News. Each morning, they carried on with their familiar banter about
friends and neighbors, community gossip, post-retirement hobbies—particularly hunting, as this
group often meets at one member’s hunting cabin located on a nearby mountain where they hunt
together every fall—and politics. The members of the breakfast crew were all strong-willed

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 84

conservative Republicans and Trump supporters; they spoke often of their gripes with President
Joe Biden and how their community is changing at the hands of illegal immigrants, “lazy liberals
coming in [to the town or the surrounding areas],” and the “liberal agenda.” They were not often
boisterous or overly assertive, however they had developed such comfort with the establishment
and its staff that they felt no shyness acting overly friendly. They all playfully negged the
waitresses and staff who responded with equal bite; “here’s your coffee—extra spit in there for
ya,” was a common exchange. “Hey look, asshole’s here!” the head line cook would greet one of
the breakfast crew regulars each morning. “Where’s asshole junior (his son, who would show up
a few minutes later like clockwork)?” After five separate observations of these dynamics, I
decided to more formally introduce myself to the waitstaff; this prior connection, I hoped, would
help establish some credibility for when I approached the breakfast crew for interviews. My
waitress was kind yet doubtful of their willingness to participate but introduced me to the group
anyway. At first, the men were very skeptical of my intentions; I was asked about my political
beliefs immediately, what exactly I was studying, and why I wanted their input specifically.
Navigating this dynamic as best I could, I assured the crew that my only intention was to learn
from them and to give them an opportunity to speak freely on things often discouraged in daily
conversation with strangers. While they unfortunately did not warm up to the idea of being
explicitly interviewed—a demonstrated aspect of rural identity I will further discuss in the next
section—they did invite me to sit and have breakfast with them a few times. So, for the next four
days, I joined the crew at their high table and listened intently to their regular conversation,
inserting some casual questions when appropriate.
The breakfast crew exhibited strong community ties; not only did each of them grow up
in the area, they each raised families there too. Among the sometimes gossip-like talk of friends
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and neighbors was a theme of responsibility for “their own” that they spoke of quite casually
despite its recurring importance. Talk of church donations, donations to neighbors’ medical bills,
neighbors’ lawn upkeep, and personal vehicle loaning were not communicated with airs of pride
or persuasion; they were simply normal everyday responsibilities that needed attending.
Sometimes these tasks were even spoken of with annoyance, as if they were just some mundane
expectancies of which everyone claimed a part—a real “well, what are you gonna do” attitude,
not unlike paying taxes or gassing up a car.
Another impressive display of community value within rural Pennsylvania conservatives
came from two local advocates, Vic and Cory. Vic and Cory are members of a local chapter of
Pennsylvania Righteous Bikers—a non-profit organization of motorcyclists dedicated to fighting
injustice and helping those in need. Some of their efforts include fundraiser rides, kids’ toys and
coats drives, and supporting bullied children by showing displays of strength to their terrorizers.
These displays usually consist of bikers making an effort to look “extra tough and scary,”
(according to Cory) as they make appearances and high-five victims in locations requested by a
parent or guardian that reached out to the organization asking for their services. Usually, these
locations are the ones where much of the bullying takes place—outside of their school, at the
skate park, or on the street near their homes. The idea behind this display is to show force to
someone’s bullies that they have trouble showing themselves. Pennsylvania Righteous Bikers
support the whole community, but primarily focus on aiding local children in whatever ways
they can. The organization also does not accept monetary donations, and membership requires
only an interview to ensure proper alignment of values; there are no fees or necessary
contributions otherwise. Vic, president of the local chapter, sat with me at a corner booth in
Burger King; he brought his wife, Cory, who is also a member of the organization. Vic and Cory
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both talked substantially about the importance of their community and the duty they feel to
contribute toward its betterment. Cory had grown up one county over while Vic moved to the
area and stayed for the past twenty-some years (he could not recall exactly how many). They
talked mostly about their anti-bullying efforts; “it’s all about the kids,” said Vic.
“These kids that get bullied…they’re all pretty young. Most of the time, all the kid needs
is some backup. Some show of support from some people who are bigger and scarier
than the kid who’s giving them a hard time. Even the bullies probably feel bullied at
home or something, so they compensate by picking on other kids at school or wherever.
Parents reach out to us, we gather the troops, put on our toughest getup, and go give the
kid high-fives or fist bumps…you know, we make friends with them. The bully usually
finds out about it somehow if they don’t see it for themselves, and they usually back off.”
Cory cut in, “yeah, Vic here can be real scary…what with the long beard and tattoos and all.”
She laughed and patted his arm. “Mostly, we’re just concerned with helping our community.”
Vic and Cory went on to describe care for their community outside of Pennsylvania Righteous
Bikers as well. They make an effort to order from local restaurants instead of chains, follow and
promote local businesses on social media, and even refrain from much travel to keep their money
recycling into their own community and country; in fact, they refuse to travel abroad and
contribute to foreign economies in this way.
The idea of valuing one’s community and “one’s own” extends past locale, especially
within conservative ideology. Community, in many cases, appeared ethically selective, and
“one’s own” can refer to any in-group, reaching as far as one’s national identity. Vic
demonstrated this by prioritizing the United States economy over those abroad. In addition to to
travel overseas, Vic and Cory also commented that their main issue with immigrants entering the
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US is that they send their earnings to their families back in their home countries. This, of course,
is mostly speculation; however, the idea that it happens at all is enough to insight anger. “I don’t
mind them [immigrants] coming here, I guess. I know most of them want to work and contribute.
Problem is, they send money back to their families in Mexico or wherever. They don’t contribute
to our economy—the ones who took them in the first place.” This kind of in-group prioritization
and loyalty crosses quickly into the realm of nationalism—a common product of conservative
ideology and identity that will be addressed further in the discussion of political attitudes, values,
and priorities that reflect it. Regardless, conservatives in my sample seemed to highly value their
communities, but preferred the idea of individual responsibility to contribute to a collective
rather than the combined responsibility of multiple groups unlike liberals who seemed to better
understand their place in the larger contributive system of both smaller in-groups and larger
society.
Attitudes Toward Elites and Media
Characteristics of rural identity are intricately intertwined in many ways. For example,
themes of valuing one’s community appear in rural conservative attitudes toward elites and
media. Specifically following the idea of communities being conceptualized as in-groups, elites
were seen as illustrative of a problematic out-group. In alignment with rurality literature, my
sample of conservatives were largely mistrusting of “elites” in particular, academics and
politicians. Perhaps part of the reason academia was othered so fervently was because, by a large
margin, my liberal sample had far higher educational attainment than their conservative
counterparts. While some of my liberal interviewees did not have education exceeding high
school, none of the conservatives with whom I spoke had education exceeding a bachelor’s
degree, and most of them had only a high school diploma. Some had a General Education
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Development (GED) certificate and a couple had no official education credentials at all. By and
large, academia was seen as an out-of-touch institution which pushes liberal agendas, which
were never actually defined with elaboration that surpassed cultural hot-button issues like
religious deconstruction, “socialist” (also never accurately defined) ideology, and environmental
junk science. It was a common belief among my conservative interviewees that academic
institutions were, first and foremost, indoctrinators of worrisome liberal ideologies that denigrate
American values, encourage entitlement, and soften the work ethic of younger generations.
Rural identity encompasses largely senses of stark individualism and vigorous work
ethics that translate to notions of the American Dream. At its conceptualization, the American
Dream painted a picture of the average person’s ability to earn their wealth and comforts with
adequate hard work (Cornuelle 1965). Conversely, this idea pins the plight of financial hardship
solely on oneself rather than contributing circumstances that are, many times, outside of one’s
control (Cornuelle 1965). This mentality regurgitates ideas of meritocracy, wherein some folks
are deserving of their lots in life, and some are not. It is widely understood, though, throughout
the social sciences that social inequities are products of systemic issues larger than any one
person. And being so well understood, academia as an institution has taken to studying
mechanisms for systemic inequality while the conservatives sampled in rural Pennsylvania still
largely reject the fact that such mechanisms even exist. It is not difficult to imagine, then, that an
institution dedicated to studying one’s denied reality would not rank highly on their trusted
sources. But conveying these realities is not as simple as presenting the material; no matter how
reputable the source, the acknowledgement of these social realities would challenge the core
individualistic value of American conservative identity found so prominently within rural areas.
Therefore, academic elites remain among the least trusted in my conservative sample.
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Academics are also mistrusted within the rural conservative sample because, by extension
of the challenging of the conservative worldview, academic elites were often thought of as anticonservative or anti-rural; not only is the academy pushing the liberal agenda, it is thought to be
pushing anti-conservativism. Among rural central Pennsylvanians, conservatives in my sample
viewed academics as either overpaid liberal puppets or young, naïve underlings whose financial
misfortune is the product of their poor decision to invest in useless liberal arts education. Many
of my conservative interviewees thought that business or STEM degrees were the only ones
worth pursuing because they produced the highest income, and they saw the study of other fields
as a confusing waste of time and money. My conservative interviewees also viewed those in
academia as snobbish individuals representing the height of rural conservative discrimination;
academics use their undeserved privilege to exploit young, vulnerable minds and phase out the
conservative American way of life by forcing its antithesis on students who have no choice but to
adhere to it for their grade. Academics were seen as out-of-touch and assertive of ethical
judgement over a lifestyle about which they knew nothing, or at least, very little. Commonly
brought up by my conservative participants was disdain for academics and politicians who never
make the effort to visit rural places or speak with rural people before they make claims about
their lives or enact policies that affect them.
Vic and Cory were not shy about their feelings regarding academics. According to them,
people come out of academia thinking they know better than everyone else and try to impose
their views on rural people and places. For example, it was a popular understanding among my
conservative sample that climate scientists and officials at the Center for Disease Control are
elites who impose policies over honest, hardworking people for the sake of benefiting some
liberal agenda to phase out rural conservatives. Sitting unmasked in Burger King, I asked Vic
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and Cory their thoughts on the state of the COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting mandated
closures in 2020. “The pandemic?” said Vic, “honestly I think it’s bullshit.” Cory nodded her
head and said, “yeah, I’m only vaccinated because we had to get it [the vaccine] for work, which
was also bullshit. We were told either get vaccinated or take leave—as if anyone could afford to
do that right now.” Cory works for one of the major hospitals in the area as a certified nursing
assistant (CNA) and Vic for an elder care high rise facility downtown. “I’ll never get
vaccinated,” he said. “Why should I? I’ve had the flu before. It isn’t any worse than that. All the
hospital numbers coming out are just to inflate their profits and scare everyone into getting the
vaccine anyway. I won’t be a part of that.” Despite working for the hospital, Cory agreed once
more. “I think this whole thing [the pandemic] is being blown so far out of proportion just to
make Trump look bad…so they [Democrats] could run him out of office,” said Vic. He and Cory
were not the only ones who felt this way.
Also convinced the pandemic was invented or exaggerated to threaten Donald Trump’s
reputation was Andrew—independent owner of a mechanic service twenty minutes outside the
nearest town. Upon first meeting Andrew, he was very hesitant to speak with me; he asked me
many questions about my intentions, what exactly I studied, and what my personal political
views were. Even after answering his questions, he still assumed I wanted to speak with him and
his wife in order to teach them something; only after a fourth explicit assurance that this was not
the case at all was he willing to meet with me. On our agreed-upon date, I met him at his house
just up the hill from his shop after winding around miles of wooded, unmarked dirt roads. Piled
high with tires and spare auto parts, Andrew’s property housed his business and his family. Upon
my arrival, he wiped grease from his hands and forehead before leading me up the hill to his
front porch and inside the house where his wife Caroline met us with glasses of water. The three
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of us sat at their fold-out dining table with a box fan on high blast to combat the late June heat.
The pandemic was among the first things brought up in our discussion about his community’s
willingness to help each other. “They [those in the local community] really came through for me
these last few months,” he lamented. “With all these businesses closing because of COVID, lots
of people are having to permanently close their doors. But not me! I haven’t even seen so much
as a slow in business this past year. I guess people will always need working cars,” he laughed.
“But yeah, it’s a real shame, these closures. [Pennsylvania Governor Tom] Wolf really screwed
everyone over, here. See how that works out for him.” Caroline quietly agreed and Andrew
continued, “it’s all shit anyway; I don’t even know how real it even is. Like, obviously it’s ‘real,’
but it’s being blown way out of proportion. Like, why are we still on this? Trump’s out of office.
You [Democrats] got what you wanted! You ran him out with the witch hunt [referring to
allegations of Trump’s tax fraud and criticism of his handling of the pandemic].” Andrew was
very passionate about the things he said, and his train of thought became difficult to follow at
times because of it. “So how do—” I was cut off. He continued, “and you can’t trust the media,
either. They’re all owned by liberal politicians and the liberal elites anyway. The only news I
trust is Fox, because they’re the only ones that tell the truth.”
“And how do we know what’s true?” I questioned. I never got a straight answer. Without
missing a beat, he replied, “because they’re the ones telling the truth, I don’t know. They’re not
the ones telling lies about Trump just to make him look bad. They’re the only ones who were
saying what was really going on with the inflated numbers and duplicate cases while the liberal
news media was just saying whatever they needed to [do] to get him [Trump] impeached.”
Andrew was greeted then by his two neighbors who walked in the front door—Kurt and Sydney.
Upon hearing the last few words of Andrew’s sentence, noticing his tone, and seeing a stranger
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with a voice recorder sitting at the table, he hesitantly asked what we were discussing. “You
don’t wanna know,” said Andrew spiritedly. I jumped in with, “politics—the media and the
pandemic. What do y’all think?” Kurt and Sydney laughed and after a few exchanges of playful
banter, the two of them sat down and joined our conversation. “I hate politics,” Kurt said rather
sternly. I smiled, threw my hands in the air, and said, “me too! That’s why I’m here!” Everyone
laughed and Kurt cracked open two cold beers for him and his wife.
While we continued our conversation on political attitudes and personal values, it became
clear that, just like liberal folks, the conservatives in my sample trusted the media sources that
validated their personal views. When this happens, subjective ethics can get confused for
observed and tested truths. As more isolated news consumers with less reliable access to the
Internet and fewer fact checking skills, rural conservatives in my sample often fell victim to
media bubbles and political echo chambers riddled with misinformation. The matter of which
media or institutions to trust ends up being less about receiving the most accurate information
and more about differentiating between moral right and wrong. This becomes particularly
problematic when drawing partisan lines; this notion of ethical news contributes to the prominent
“us versus them” mentality that fuels disdain for outsiders and translates into harmful political
behavior. In the case of this conservative sample, ideas of “one’s own” and selective community
translate to more hostile conceptualizations of “us” and “them” that encompass partisan ethics as
well as other indicators of likeness within rural conservativism. “Us versus them” exceeds the
notion of geographic, attitudinal, or other less significant identifiers and graduates to stark ethical
divides that become far more personal in the realm of political decisions. Distrust of certain
media outlets and political figureheads came across less as distrusting and more as outright
hostile while the notion of being “anti-media” emerged as a cornerstone of rural Pennsylvania
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conservativism as their few trusted sources reaffirm that more mainstream media sources cannot
be trusted. And it is worth noting that this distrust surpasses the concern of misinformation;
rather, mainstream media was seen by those in my sample as institutions whose goals, values,
and output were the direct antithesis of their conservative values as rural Americans. This
conceptualization tapped into a fear of change for my conservative sample—a fear of being
stripped of their lifestyles, their comfortable worldviews, and their triumphs among rural
adversity. In this vein, distrust for media and elites becomes an agent of protection against these
feared changes, and therefore is very personal for many folks and felt as an integral part of rural
conservative identity.
Political Attitudes, Values, and Priorities
Political attitudes, values, and priorities among sampled rural conservatives, while
characterized by complex interactions and nuances, can be traced back to two main ideas—stark
individualism and robust work ethics. And while these ideologies were observed in all my
conservative-identifying participants, none so clearly represented their mobilization than the
folks of Patriots for Freedom.
One of the hottest nights on record in central Pennsylvania, I drove up to a gravel lot
neighboring a small horse barn. One by one, vehicles touting American and Confederate flags,
bumper stickers, and window clings proclaiming things like, “gun control means using both
hands,” “God. Guns. Trump.,” and “Black Rifles Matter” filed into the lot, all here for the same
reason—their biweekly organizational meeting. Wearing jeans, sneakers, a t-shirt, a baseball cap,
and no face mask, I found my way inside and sat on the bleachers amongst a sea of nearly 200
people, mostly middle-age or older and all appearing white. The barn was noisy with friendly
chatter and the shuffling of pre-meeting logistics like microphone stands and squeaking of
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markers on white boards. Just inside the doors sat tables filled with lawn signs, hats, bumper
stickers, and more, all for sale and benefitting the organization.
People for Freedom is a political-interest group based out of a local community in central
Pennsylvania. They describe themselves as, “Proud Americans making a BOLD statement that
we will NOT stand for abuse of power.” They are comprised of radical right-leaners and hold
Christian nationalism—the belief that the American nation is defined by Christianity, and that
the US government should take active steps to keep it that way (Miller 2021)—as central to their
agenda and beliefs. As a group, they meet to discuss objectives for community preparation of a
potential doomsday and political civil war; for all intents and purposes, this group is an
independently organized militia.
The meeting began with prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance toward a tattered American
flag hanging from the rafters of the performance arena. Before the discussion of action items, the
first speaker on the agenda, Dale, ushered a distinct and pointed warning to any outsiders (me)
attending with intentions to record the meeting or cause any disruption: “…and to any of you out
there who came here to cause trouble, to record us… just get up and leave now.” This was met
with cheers and encouraging hollers. “…Because we will find you, we will find out who you are,
and we’ll deal with you our way.” Here, Dale scanned the crowd and pantomimed cocking and
firing a shotgun. More cheers erupted.
From here, the meeting saw five speakers, each with a specific agenda to discuss. Their
nine-step action plan, referred to as “battlefronts” and “fronts in the war” included everything
from community protection to educational curriculum restructuring. They discussed and
collected volunteers to explain the United States Constitution to fellow members—an item they
called “protecting and preserving our Constitutional rights.” Additionally, they fleshed out a plan
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to educate “the youth” on second amendment rights, God’s rightful place in American
government, and placing group members on local school boards to combat the “Leftist
indoctrination they’re [the ‘progressive’ board members] trying to shove down our kids’
throats.” The indoctrination in question centered mostly around the implementation of critical
race theory—something largely misrepresented in this meeting—, gender-inclusive school
restrooms and language, and the inclusion of global news in social studies classes. Critical race
theory was described as the Left’s attempt to “demonize whites” and make white children feel
ashamed of their race and background by teaching false historical narratives that paint racial
minorities (specifically Black and brown people) as “martyrs and saviors.” Talk of genderinclusive curriculum and facility changes were rich with aggressive and misleading language
regarding the transgender population—things like slurs, the assertion that transgender folks are
“confused trend followers,” and sex predators whose goals are to assault and violate [our/your,
speaking specifically to the group and further to the ideas of “one’s own” and selective
community] children. Here, and as they moved on, the rural conservative theme of protecting
one’s own became extremely evident. Specifically, they addressed the rising issue of human
trafficking in central Pennsylvania (National Human Trafficking Hotline 2021), and their goals
to “protect our boarders [sic]” by independently combatting local human trafficking and
exposing politicians who promote, fund, or ignore such an issue. Again, the elites could not be
trusted—so much so that this group believed action must be taken into their own, more capable
hands.
Another important action item on the meeting agenda was “rebuilding [our] political
party.” They spoke specifically about putting “patriots” in local government and getting folks to
the polls to vote for conservative candidates in smaller elections. Discussions like this followed a
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theme of stark nationalism in their language and tone; they actively refer to themselves as
“patriots,” “warriors,” and “soldiers” both for God and for the United States—specifically the
conservative United States. As soldiers for conservative Christian values, they also discussed the
agenda item to “overtake” the local media; they put together a lengthy list of volunteers to
bombard the local newspapers with anonymous letters to the editor and opinion pieces, stating
specifically that volunteers are not to name themselves or, at the very least, associate themselves
with the group. This overt display of Christian nationalism demonstrated this group’s dedication
to centralizing God and Christianity in government; they wanted to elevate Christian voices who
would pledge to uphold laws and policies that reflected “God’s intentions” (gender/sex exclusive
policies maintaining that God created only two genders and trans/nonbinary individuals are
“abominations” and “corruptive, anti-abortion policy, implementing religious rhetoric/lessons in
public school, etc.) as well as ensure that hard work is rewarded and laziness is punished. By
calling themselves “soldiers for God” and intentionally remaining anonymous and unaffiliated
with the group, these individuals also demonstrate an understanding that they (conservative
Christian patriots) are among a targeted minority whose responsibility it is to reclaim Christian
America.
The final agenda item on the docket was emergency preparedness. “We need to be
prepared,” one speaker said, “for the inevitable civil war” [against patriots and non-patriots,
patriots and the Left, good and evil]. They discussed their current progress and future plans to
continue stockpiling various weapons and ammunition as well as other resources like food,
water, and even generators. Volunteers—among them, self-proclaimed former military snipers—
signed up to train members of the group how to operate handguns and assault rifles in addition to
making house calls to assess members’ doomsday/war preparedness. Do they have the proper
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accommodations for a bunker? Do they have enough nonperishable food and water to last several
months? What about appropriate electrical hookups for emergency generators and security
equipment like cameras, trips, and fences?
Also amidst these action items was the concerning discourse of hostile language towards
minorities. For example, several jokes were made by speakers about killing Black Lives Matter
protestors and shooting President Obama. Additionally, claims of significant misinformation
were spread by speakers and audience members alike. During allowed time for member
comments, an older man took the microphone passed to him and warned others to be mindful of
what they say on their cellphones and post on the Internet regarding government agendas
(specifically about gun legislature) because he believes the United Nations is currently
implementing a police state and has presence in the Carolinas—“people with guns” will come to
your door, take you away, and throw you in jail if one does not comply with the Left’s proposed
gun laws, which were never specified. Also represented inaccurately was the distribution process
and properties of coronavirus vaccines. The organization’s website and Facebook pages are
littered with unreputable articles and narrative accounts of medical malpractice regarding
vaccine distribution, government tracking initiatives, and aggressive religious rhetoric that leads
readers to a conclusion suggesting fetal mutations, vaccine-induced abortions, and an antiChristian leftist agenda. Supporting this misinformation spread at a later meeting was guest
speaker Dr. Simone Gold—an anti-vaxxer doctor noted for her hydroxychloroquine advocacy
and her role in the January 2021 Capitol insurrection in Washington D.C. Dr. Gold spoke to the
congregation unfoundedly about the dangers of the COVID-19 vaccine, various vaccine
mandates, and human experimentation.
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At a later meeting, United States Representative Lou Barletta attended and spoke to the
organization about the consequences of growing immigration rates in Pennsylvania, transgender
students playing sports in schools (“girls should be playing girls’ sports and boys should be
playing boys’ sports; there is no grey area”), and closest to People for Freedom’s agenda, the
implantation of critical race theory in Pennsylvania public schools. In line with the
organization’s misinformed outbursts regarding such a curricular addition, Barletta affirmed their
resentment by stating that critical race theory only serves to turn children against one another
based on complexion and teaches white children to feel shame regarding their ancestral history
while elevating Black and brown history to a level above their white counterparts. They believe
that such curricular implementation leads to more racism in society and therefore pushes “leftist
agendas” of controlling certain race-based policies in society and systemically disenfranchising
white Americans and the white rural ways of life (see image shared on the community Facebook
page in Appendix 5). Not discussed at these meetings was the actual goal and teachings of
critical race theory, which is the idea of socially constructed racial identities and their
consequences on society and policy throughout American history (Sawchuk 2021). However,
their aversions to such teachings paint a fascinating picture of the rural conservative “us versus
them” mentality that permeates much of the conservative worldview.
This militia group served as a clear example of political values and priorities informed by
stark individualism and the emphasis of strong work ethics, even in the face of clear community
value. This group worked together to create action items and preparedness initiatives for the
benefit of their community and undoubtedly highly valued their in-groups, but the responsibility
to contribute to this collective good was emphasized on individual contributions to the
organization’s goals rather than the group’s ability to contribute to larger society as a whole.
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Echoed throughout other conservative interviews was, again, this value of community when
asked how tax dollars would be ideally spent. Like my liberal sample, the conservatives with
whom I spoke wished for their tax dollars to be invested in local small businesses and
educational overhaul; though conservatives were more concerned with the implementation of
critical race theory and more progressive social teachings like gender inclusivity of which
liberals approved. Specifically, this concern was found in several local school board meetings
which I attended throughout the summer while board members met and volleyed curriculum
addendums for the 2021-2022 academic year. Worries of “child corruption” and race shaming
were common among disagreeable public commentators; one perturbed mother said, “I won’t be
sending my child to a school that teaches him to be ashamed of his whiteness and tells him that
he’s wrong for being a boy.” Of course, these claims were wholly misinformed and inaccurate,
but they were clear responses to perceived threats to the conservative worldview that calls for
pride in one’s roots and ability to overcome hardship on one’s own. Teaching the realities of
systemic racial adversity in the social world paints a picture of hierarchies that places certain
majority-group privileges over others that some perceive as a threat to their triumphant personal
narratives—“just because I’m white doesn’t mean my life has been easy. You have no idea what
I’ve been through.”
Further elaborating on themes of individualism and strong work ethic found within the
militia, self-sustenance, and the ability to climb the class ladder as of result of one’s own choices
echoed throughout my conservative sample’s political attitudes. In other words, the notion of the
American Dream was prevalent in their political motivation. The American Dream is the idea
that socioeconomic opportunity is equally available to all Americans and can be attained through
honest, hard work—in theory, as long as one works diligently and well, their highest dreams and
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aspirations can be achieved. When envisioning the ideal distribution of individual tax dollars,
many sampled conservatives were passionate about stripping the current government-issued
welfare system and reallocating those funds elsewhere, especially emphasizing the welfare
system’s enabling of unfavorable, indolent behavior. By encouraging those in the system to
remain in the system, the possibility of honest, hardworking folks to fulfill the American Dream
is diminished.
In many instances, instead of telling me how they wanted their money spent, they told me
how they did not want it spent. “Don’t get me wrong; there are plenty of people out there that
need it,” said Vic across the booth, leaned over his coffee cup. “But there are plenty out there
that don’t need it, too. Plenty of people who take advantage [of the welfare system] and teach
their kids how to do it, too. They teach them how to live their lives mooching off the government
instead of actually working, even when they’re a hundred percent capable of holding a job.”
Cory pursed her lips and shook her head in disgusted agreement. “Honest working people like us
end up paying for them to sit around on their asses and collect welfare checks. We pay for their
groceries, we pay for their healthcare, and God knows what else,” she said. “All the while, they
have brand new iPhones and cars and gadgets, some of them. Nicer than ours, and we have jobs.
We actually contribute [to society].” While not all acknowledgers of this concern were as
colorful with their phrasing, the issue of undue welfare qualification was a common conversation
among this group. One younger conservative, Ty, used this shared grief as part of his platform
running for local office. Across the table at a crowded coffee shop, unmasked, he said, “It’s
unfortunate that the ones who take advantage [of the welfare system] make all the other
recipients look bad. I know there are people who really do need the help, and I don’t mind
contributing to those people. But unfortunately, they are not in the majority, especially around

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 101

here.” He motioned in the direction of the town’s low-income housing development, which was
referenced also by Andrew even from several miles away. “They just…why do they deserve that,
and I don’t? I’m the one with a business, a job. I’m the one that has to drive to the store in my
piece of shit car that I could barely afford even with my job, and I fix cars for a living! I can’t
just walk to the store. I gotta drive there just to get stuck behind some welfare queen with a litter
of kids and a cart full of garbage and government cheese that my tax dollars are paying for. And
they always have the long nails, the new iPhones, the iPads. They’ll separate transactions so they
can get the max[imum] amount of formula and milk and shit because the [welfare] checks have
certain limitations on them. Why are they buying that much? There’s no way they’re gonna use it
all. Either it goes to waste, or I’m sure they pass it around [the low-income housing units] so it
gets used…which, I guess, is better than wasting it, but still.” Even more blatant was one white
woman’s remark toward a group of local Black Lives Matter protestors; “you live off white
people!” she shouted over protestors’ chants of “we love you.” “You fucking communists…keep
your HIV over there” (Newsweek 2020).
This disdain for funding laziness and welfare abusers calls back to notions of the
“deserving poor” and the “undeserving poor” (Bonilla-Silva 2003). The “deserving poor” are
those whose poverty cannot be blamed directly on them; their misfortune is not due to character
flaws, moral inferiority, or poor behavior. Instead, they are seen as victims of larger systems out
of one’s control—in this instance, the perpetuation of a welfare system that enables the
“undeserving poor” who knowingly abuse government systems meant to help those who actually
need assistance. Intertwined with this conceptualization is that of race-based prejudices within
this rural conservative sample. Although few would likely admit to being outright racist, traces
of racism were littered within conversations about welfare and class-based affirmative action.
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For example, phrases like “welfare queen” and “government cheese” are not vernacular unique
to Andrew; they are Reagan-era derogatory terms ascribed to public aid recipients and often
directed toward Black single mothers (Gillam 1999). Throughout history, understandings of
deserving and undeserving poor have been largely racialized (Bridges 2017). In particular, Black
and brown folks have often been stripped of their deservingness regarding institutional
impoverishment solutions and social programming and are seen as the “undeserving poor,”
deeming them, therefore, less respectable. Conservatives in my sample were no strangers to this
mindset as they saw racial minorities as the primary beneficiaries of class-based government
programs—even Medicaid—that they defined as “government handouts.” For many of my
sampled right-leaners, the low-income housing units scattered throughout their home counties
embodied undeservingness which became synonymized with the racial minorities who live there,
making them the unfortunate scapegoats for a deep-seated resentment toward a government who
overlooks their hard work and grit…or, as Andrew put it, “they get free money while we [the
deserving poor] get the shaft.”
Here again, divisive “us versus them” ideology permeates the conservative sample’s
worldview and informs their political attitudes. By categorizing oneself as deserving and others
as undeserving of certain benefits, there develops a pervasive rift between groups that surpasses
grit and rigor. Particularly within racialized conceptualizations like class-based affirmative
action, it becomes easy for misinformation to saturate understandings of one’s community and,
therefore, one’s place within in. For example, the inference that Black and brown people make
up the majority of welfare recipients in the United States was a common understanding;
however, it is not accurate. According to the US Department of Agriculture (2021), white folks
are the primary recipients of government-issued welfare; with about 37 percent of SNAP
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(Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) recipients reported as non-Hispanic white, 26
percent as African American, and 16 percent as Hispanic/Latinx, racial minorities trail the white
population in benefit recipience (USDA 2021). Proportionally, whites utilize less welfare than
other ethnic groups (USDA 2021), but that is due to various consequences of systemic racial
inequity that places racial minorities in less advantageous socioeconomic positions like
racialized wage gaps and barriers to wealth building—something difficult for my rural
conservative sample to recognize or acknowledge as it poses a threat to the identity narrative of
difficult and earned successes on one’s own.
Also highly treasured among the rural conservative sample were individual rights and
freedoms. Branching further from rural values of individualism was the desire for independence,
especially from the government. While it is not uncommon for people in general to be confident
in their knowledge of their own best self-interest, this became particularly prevalent in
conservatives’ discussion of decision-making elites and policies (recall the resentment toward
academic and scientific elites who assert the needs of rural people despite their removal from
rural spaces). Rural conservatives in my sample highly preferred small government and states’
rights over larger federal intervention, in part because each state may have different needs. “Why
should we trust the clowns in [Washington] D.C. to know what’s best for us up here in PA? How
would they know what’s best for California? Or any other state they don’t live in? Me and my
family know what’s best for us. We don’t need you.” Uttered by an exasperated Kurt over a
second beer, his remark illustrated a shared frustration—that politicians assume they know
everyone’s best interest. One common issue among the sample was gun control policies. “Some
of them [politicians] want to take our guns completely away. Now, I understand wanting
background checks and all that. Permits, fine. But why are we trying to undo open and concealed
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carry? I’m sorry but protecting myself and my family is my God-given right. And I will exercise
that right.” Open and concealed carry laws refer to one’s ability to carry licensed firearms in
public spaces, either hidden from plain sight (typically under clothing) or visible to others
(PAFOA 2022). Regarding an argument for states’ rights, Ty said, “guns are more of an issue in
urban places because there are more people with ill intentions rather than rural people who
mostly have guns to hunt or for sport; people are more familiar with each other in rural areas and
therefore are less inclined to be violent with one another.” This statement, again, stresses the
importance of familiarity in trustworthiness; and with the stark divisive attitudes toward outgroups in this sample of rural conservativism, distrust contributed to a cycle of misinformed
prejudice and hostility reflected in the patriotic values of this group.
Values centering individualism were also found in conservatives’ stark support for
nationalism—support for one’s own nation, especially to the exclusion or detriment of other
nations. Support for the United States as an independent nation guided much of the conservative
worldview found in this sample. Stemming from America’s secession from Europe in the search
of freedom from a despotic government, the conservative worldview finds a great deal of pride in
the notion of independence and even the possibility of heroically overthrowing modern leaders
should circumstances ever require it. Recall the language used in the People for Freedom
meeting; “patriot” was used to describe members as well as any other sharer of their values of
rehauling government and other too-liberal systems like certain school curriculums and
pandemic-related mandates. Language used at this meeting was indicative of self-sustenance and
unwavering devotion to one’s country as well as those who have served it. Each People for
Freedom meeting featured a recognition of veterans in the audience and other conservatives in
my sample wanted more support for veterans rather than aid to troubled citizens in foreign
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countries. “Here we are,” said Andrew, “sending money and food down to Africa or Arab
countries or wherever while people who served this country are homeless. What a slap in the
face.” Veteran support and nationalism echoed throughout the rest of my conservative sample as
well. Many interviewees preferred their tax dollars be allocated to the United States military and
the Department of Defense, and they did not care about the amount of money already being spent
there. “I’m not sure we could ever have enough [defense funding and weaponry], honestly,”
lamented Sydney. “Our military is the strongest in the world, and I’d like to keep it that way. I
don’t want no chances taken, what with China and them over there building God knows what.”
Understandings like this, no matter how ill-informed, reflect a profound fear that lurks
deep within the rural conservative worldview and fans flames of racial and ethnic prejudice that
linger from deeply embedded legacies of racist structures throughout America’s political history.
Likely also blending with fears of being left behind by the liberal swell, feelings of resentment
and hostility toward out-groups (often racialized) find themselves at the center of a battle to
reclaim the ease and familiarity accompanying political favoring of the white majority. These
views largely reflect those of white Evangelicals, whose political behavior has been found to be
highly motivated by appeals to white supremacy (Valentino and Zhirkov 2018) while more
liberal-leaning voters prefer a more multiracial America (Brooks, Manza, and Cohen 2016).
Such leans also contribute to a strong backing of law enforcement, as police are often hailed as
heroic protectors overly scrutinized by a micromanaging team of “politically-correct liberal
yuppies”—especially in the face of the newly-emerging Black Lives Matter movement. Here,
still, themes of white supremacy emerged in the culture war that pitted law enforcement and
Black folks against one another. While not necessarily mutually exclusive, the phrase “Blue
[police] Lives Matter” arose as direct opposition to the message of Black Lives Matter rather
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than in support of police and developed into a zero-sum duality that believes officers put
themselves in danger by pursuing more effective public service to communities of color. “Blue
lives matter because they put themselves at risk all the time; they do that for us. And you know
what? They do it for all the Black Lives Matter people out there who have all day to sit and
scream about how evil they [cops] are. You know, since they don’t have anything better to do.”
This assertion came from Vic, who had voiced his distaste for police not an hour before because
of “their tendency to breathe down my [Vic’s] neck all the time.” Though despite this, he and his
wife empathized with cops because of the public flack they get. “People—we, I guess—look at
cops like they’re these bad people, when in reality, they’re out there doing what’s best for the
community. We kind of relate to them in that way. Bikers get a bad rep[utation] because we’re
big and scary looking. But we’re actually out in the community trying to help out and do what’s
right. I guess we’re both [police and bikers] misunderstood in that way.” This commiseration,
while stemming from a common perception of being wrongfully judged by society, presents a
common instance of cognitive dissonance within the rural conservative sample. Conservative
participants valued stark individualism and independence from government bodies, but strongly
supported surveillance bodies like law enforcement and the military.
Once again, themes of political motivation stemming from white Christian nationalism
emerge as fear of being left behind and overlooked in a society that unjustly rewards the
undeserving and un-American— a fear that, in many instances, clouds rationality and enables
cognitive dissonance. As rural identity places so much weight on one’s hard work and associated
deservingness, too much government interference (at least, operating as it does now) is seen as
too “soft,” disproportionately “rewarding” and “elevating” the lazy and “undeserving” folks
often understood as racial and ethnic minorities. By contributing to social programs they do not
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themselves utilize, white conservatives in this sample felt as though they did not get to reap the
benefits of their labor, therefore throwing a wrench in their individual—and by in-group
association, other hardworking white American patriots’—pursuits. Folks seemed to feel that the
very essence of America is threatened by the government’s willingness to politic
nondenominationally and unjustly redistribute social/economic resources, and therefore, this
sample’s ideal nation is under attack by those who negate such core ethics, and becomes
something to be nobly reclaimed by voting against policy that (disproportionately, as they see it)
aids minorities. However, it is likely that much of the underlying mechanisms of such political
motivation go unrecognized. Few people take pride in association with racist ideals and instead
situate their political views within the scope of taking back the power and individualism stripped
by bigger, more liberal, elitist government bodies covertly synonymized with racial/ethnic
minorities and misdirected out-groups. By placing so many on the outskirts of one’s accepted
ideology, cognitive disagreement becomes nearly inevitable as the dissonant rearrange reality to
fit their ethical inconsistencies. Speculated further at this study’s conclusion, it is also possible
that this cognitive disagreement could be more accurately understood as dissonant explanation,
as respondents seemed to tiptoe around more blatant racism as justification for frictional
ideologies like support for law enforcement despite disliking government interference.
Cognitive Dissonance and Dissonance Avoidance among Rural Conservatives
Aside from the aforementioned dissonance between preferring small government and
diehard support for tools of the state, the most prevalent observation of cognitive dissonance
among the rural conservative sample besides the disagreement between values of small,
unintrusive government and steadfast support for police and military were attitudes on “people
power.” The idea that the responsibility to defend the rights and integrity of average American
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people must fall upon groups of dedicated anti-establishment vigilantes was prominent. Among
criticism of the “snowflakes [overly sensitive liberals who value political correctness]” and
followers of the perceived liberal majority, Vic looked at me intently and asserted confidently
that “it’s time to sedate the sheep and wake up the lions.”
The illustration of blind followers of the establishment as sheep is a metaphor used to
paint a picture of a triumphant group of vigilante freedom fighters who are smart enough to
recognize their oppression and break free. Throughout history, sheep have been used to represent
meekness and gullibility, being easily herded and motivated by fear. In this instance, lions are
seen as their direct antithesis—strong, calculated, independent thinkers. This visual of breaking
away is a symbol of reclamation of rights, freedom, and what is owed—all things threatened by
the wave of outsider liberal ideology and multiculturalism. People for Freedom formed an entire
group of fed-up average folks whose goal is to prepare for the inevitability of a citizens’ mutiny
against a tyrannical government; they believed fervently that when one’s government no longer
works for them, they must take it upon themselves to rise up and reclaim justice. Though again,
not everyone is viewed as victims of governmental injustice, setting up the opportunity to
significantly operationalize cognitive disagreement.
Conceptualizations of the deserving and undeserving poor infiltrate this mindset, carrying
over racially charged understandings of the systemic injustice so vehemently despised. Returning
briefly to conversations with welfare recipients, Andrew said, “they get free money while we
[the deserving poor] get the shaft. And they’re the same ones out there screaming ‘Black Lives
Matter.’ Give me a break.” Though not explicitly said, this remark implies the synonymization of
welfare recipients and Black folks and sympathizing freeloaders. This racial othering acts as a
catalyst for resentment widespread across entire racial groups—especially if the group is vocal
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about the systemic inequity that the conservatives in my sample would not acknowledge.
Throughout the summers of 2020 and 2021, the four sampled counties held numerous nonviolent protests in support of the Black Lives Matter movement—a social movement which
acknowledges systemic oppression of Black people and aims to eradicate systemic white
supremacy through grassroots local mobilization (BlackLivesMatter 2022). As a participating
observer of several protests, I saw firsthand examples of the hostility resulting from challenging
the conservative worldview on systemic racial inequality. As properly permitted groups of
roughly 15-100 racial justice advocates lined public parks, streets, and parking lots with signs
and chants demanding police accountability and policy reform, plenty of passersby presented
stark displays of opposition and hostility. From gestures like thumbs down and middle fingers to
spitting and screaming, the presence of Black Lives Matter antagonism did not go undetected. In
fact, antagonism often turned outright volatile as conservative counter-protestors issued violent
threats and posted up with weapons (Appendix 6). Violent opposition was also observed on
various locally based conservative social media groups and individual posts (Appendix 7) as well
as the posts’ positive reactions. Among these counter-protests were comments like, “get a job,”
and “all/white lives matter,” which further illustrate the conservative conceptualization of the
deserving and undeserving poor (poor, in this case, also encompassing Black and brown victims
of police brutality). The assertion, “get a job,” implied the assumption that those protesting were
either unemployed or at least not employed to the standard necessary to access ranks of the
“deserving.” It exemplified frustration with protestors who had enough time to protest during
conventional working hours while the passersby perhaps did not. The declaration “all lives
matter” or “white lives matter” acted as direct opposition to the phrase “Black lives matter” by
undermining the systemic injustices faced by Black Americans. By acknowledging specifically
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the plight of Black and brown Americans in a system that also hurts white rural conservatives,
these agitators felt left out—particularly since the reality of “white privilege” is largely contested
and jeered in this group; recall the angry mother’s quote, “just because I’m white doesn’t mean
my life has been easy. You have no idea what I’ve been through.” Even though Black and brown
Americans face economic and social adversity disproportionately to white Americans, they are
often “othered” as elites privileged by unjust social and economic redistribution like welfare and
Medicaid. This sample of white rural conservatives saw themselves as the American standard—
average, regular folks morally superior to these elites yet unfairly economically disadvantaged
by comparison. These feelings of abandonment and unfairness likely resonated with the anger of
feeling overlooked by a too-large, unjust government, which is often the inspiration for a
people’s uprising. In this case, the desire for citizen victims to advocate for and reclaim justice
from an oppressive government is at war with the refusal to acknowledge systemic racism while
they, the white majority, are still suffering. Power to the people—not those people.
The dissonance regarding people power is so momentous due its affiliation with a
fundamental misunderstanding of the United States’ capitalist economic system. Finding my
conservative sample’s attitudes toward individual opportunity and government programs
reflected in a national attitudinal survey conducted by Pew Research Center, I speculate that
Pew’s findings echo similar phenomena happening in rural and small-town central Pennsylvania.
According to the Pew Research Center (2019), 65 percent of Americans reported positive views
of capitalism. Conjunctly, 55 percent viewed socialism negatively, associating it with weaker
work ethic and excessive government intervention/reliance—both in direct opposition to major
pillars of rural conservative identity that informed my sample’s political attitudes. However,
accounts from Pew Research Center’s (2019) survey indicate inaccurate and/or incomplete
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understandings of capitalism as an economic system. Among the top responses for positive views
on capitalism were “essential to America,” (PRC 2019) which illustrates no real understanding of
its operationalization. While negative views on capitalism were better articulated (unequal
wealth distribution, exploitative, and democratic undermining) (PRC 2019), capitalism’s positive
views were less than vague regurgitations of general favorability peppered with misguided
accreditation toward socioeconomic victories that belong less to the system’s opportunistic
nature and more to its ability to elevate certain groups over others. Feeble work ethic and
government intervention were seen as threats to the American Dream by my conservative
sample; this is particularly upsetting, as such a dream is so central to the process by which they
passed judgement on themselves and others. Accepting handouts from the government belittles
the more honest efforts of those willing to put in hard work for socioeconomic success; for the
undeserving poor (and all its affiliates), government help is seen as cheating. Therefore, qualms
with people power become more about peer morality—the cheaters and the non-cheaters, the
weak and the tough, the sheep and the lions—than about citizen-electorate relations.
But despite the rough nature and convoluted roots of political attitudes and values of this
conservative sample, the core values remain similar to that of the liberal sample—community
betterment, safety, prosperity, and personal liberty. The main differences lie in the worldviews
informing opinions on how best to pursue these goals and maintain these values. And while
many of these fear-driven attitudes likely festered for decades beneath the sometimesmonumental task of simply surviving for many folks, it was noticed and nurtured with the arrival
of fresh presidential candidates following Barack Obama’s second term in office. Someone
finally emerged who would validate the fears, concerns, and frustrations of my rural conservative
sample, as well as affirm and share widespread philosophies of how to best lead the United
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States in the direction they wanted. Because of this freshness, this candidate gained popularity
rather quickly and encouraged a resurgence of rural conservativism previously squashed by an
evolving political system.
Donald Trump and What he Represented
In June of 2015, former reality television host Donald Trump formally announced his
candidacy for the 2016 presidential race from Trump Tower in New York City. Running under
the slogan “Make America Great Again” called to the nostalgia and angst for an America “lost”
to the cultural evolution that left rural conservatives and Christianity behind. The implication of
Trump’s campaign motto was that America had been, at some point and by someone, stripped of
its “greatness”—something widely understood among the rural conservative population yet
unspoken due to its sensitive and politically incorrect nature. Trump’s goal of returning America
to its greatness awarded the assumption that there were people and things to blame for its fall.
Trump conjured messages appealing to the neglected rural citizen that effectively launched him
through the political conservative ranks. He also centralized Christianity and Christian nationalist
ideology by advocating for prayer in public school, denouncing a cultural “war on Christmas,”
choice-based vaccination combatting mandates and closures that were seen to violate religious
freedom, and spreading Islamophobic rhetoric—something that gained him widespread
popularity among evangelical Protestants (Pew Research Center 2021). Promises like the
resurrection of coal usage spoke to those in “coal country” who have seen the socioeconomic
consequences of the switch to more solar and electric energy dependence largely perceived by
the conservative sample as liberally charged along with climate activism. Those in the coal
industry—particularly poor miners—faced economic despair as its diminishing eliminated jobs
and left laborers with no means of employment and few transferrable skills. Over the years, the
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consequences of dying coal contributed to a cycle of poverty in coal regions; in areas of isolation
and unique adversity, those in coal country began to stagnate in place while other, more affluent
folks led lives evolving with progressive society. Especially in Appalachia and northeastern
Pennsylvania (Appendix 8), resentment for progressive groups flourished among the broken
legacy of coal country and developed into the discourse as it exists today.
But those disenfranchised by the abandonment of coal were only some of the large fan
bases curated by Donald Trump’s platform. With his messages of no-nonsense politics and
straightforward approaches to returning America to its reminiscent greatness, those disgusted
with previous governmental direction were drawn to promises of “draining the swamp”—ousting
the problematic individuals with misaligned agendas and priorities from office—and reclaiming
the power of average Americans. In this way, Donald Trump excited rural America, as his
emotionally charged messages and blatant disregard for prior professional customs of someone
in his position resonated with a group of conservative folks who felt left behind by the liberal
wave of “political correctness” and the drive to challenge out-of-touch traditional viewpoints on
topics such as race, gender, sexuality, and capitalism. Trump also appealed to rural conservatives
because his message of “making America great again” implied for many the resurgence of the
American Dream. As previously mentioned, the idea of the American Dream remains important
for this rural conservative sample because the belief that hard work pays off, even in the midst of
social and economic hardship, is more easily digestible than the reality that climbing the
socioeconomic ladder and escaping generational poverty is highly unlikely regardless of one’s
personal work ethic. Similarly, when people do fail, this mindset allows them to look outward—
blaming and “othering” of immigrants, local people of color, the liberal-driven economy, and
other people and systems perceived as threatening to their worldview and, consequently, ways of
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life. Opposing the evolving wave of political correctness that discouraged openness about this
hostility, Trump publicly affirmed these frustrations and blatantly “sided” with the beholders of
this mindset. Feeling more seen, understood, and valued than with any other candidate, rural
conservatives flocked to his side, regarding his campaign as more of a movement and a
resurgence of America’s lost greatness. “He’s the only one that’s ever actually had our best
interest at heart, and that’s why they [his opposers; Republicans in office and political
opponents] hated him. He threatened them and the system they rigged against us,” said Kurt,
shaking his head. “He believes in us,” followed Andrew, “and we believe in him! He’ll be back,
don’t you worry. Trump 2024, baby! No more bullshit!”
For many rural Americans, Donald Trump represents the pieces of themselves previously
suffocated by the liberal elite. He does not take great care to present himself with much
professionalism and often criticizes “political correctness,” claiming that liberal elites police
such expression, attempting to infringe upon one’s constitutional right to free speech in the
interest of pushing an anti-conservatist agenda. Today, many Americans are “demanding to be
heard by a remote power in Washington that seems to ignore [their] wishes as it thwarts the will
of the people with Obamacare, private-sector industry takeovers, a lack of law enforcement on
our porous borders, deficit spending, and debt accumulation” (Larson, Sarfatti, and Porpora
2011:771). Trump’s candidacy energized white working-class voters in rural areas and small
towns in part because of his proclaimed loyalty to those like them. He, like them, boasted nonpolitician status. He presented himself as a businessman, first and foremost, and champion of the
people because he, too, was an average person sick of out-of-touch career politicians. Their
heightened political mobilization helped tip the Electoral College vote in his favor, securing
Trump the first term of his presidency. That election cycle, Americans simultaneously secured a
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Republican majority in both chambers of the United States Congress. The election results
awarded the Republican party the opportunity to pursue the policy goals it has long articulated,
including repeal of the Affordable Care Act (which had expanded the ranks of those with health
coverage by 20 million), restructuring and choking Medicare and Medicaid, privatizing Social
Security, and placing greater restrictions on the use of welfare benefits—all reflections of
stripping the “undeserving poor” of their “handouts” and a leveling of a playing field perceived
as grossly unequal.
In this vein, Trump was utilized as a pervasive symbol at central Pennsylvania Black
Lives Matter counter-protests. As a response to chants like, “Black lives matter,” “no good cops
in racist system,” and “say his/her name,” agitators flew Trump’s campaign flags and chanted
things like, “drain the swamp”—a phrase popularized by Trump during his politicking. One
house in Northumberland County even caught the attention of local news as passersby noticed a
fence freshly spray painted to say “wighte [white] lives matter” in a lawn fanned with Trump
flags (Appendix 9). Whether the painter’s intention was to spell “white” or to exercise snark
(since “wight” is its own word) is speculated throughout the local and online community; either
way, its purpose to negate the message that Black lives matter was clear. So, even though the
racial justice protests had nothing to do with Trump specifically, his messages and resonance
with rural conservatives painted him as the antithesis to advocacy for a fairer, more diverse
future in America.
Another major role played by Donald Trump was that of an advocate for oneself; for a
population that feels silenced, misrepresented, and underestimated, Trump’s unapologetic nature
acts still as a pillar of permission—a beacon to be oneself and to take pride in oneself, even and
especially in the face of political reckoning. For many, he was a safe space—ironically a phrase
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often mocked among Trump supporters—for white, rural conservative discontentment and its
political incorrectness. “He was the only candidate I’ve ever seen who said he didn’t care what
other people thought, and actually meant it,” said Vic. “I’ve always admired his ability to say
exactly what he means without apologizing or trying to be politically correct. He doesn’t care
about people’s feelings. He’s all about the facts… a businessman. He wants to fight for us, and
he did. And if he runs [for office] again, I’ll vote for him in a heartbeat.” While displays of
political affiliation and personal branding were not uncommon before Trump’s political
presence, exhibitions of conservative pride arose majorly in rural areas and remains even after
his 2021 loss. While there were some liberal-leaning demonstrations found throughout the
sampled counties, most political displays not only reflected the conservative majority, but
illustrated the steadfast Trumpian loyalty even following his leave. From bumper stickers and
clothing to yard signs and billboards, Donald Trump and his message remains prominent in rural
conservative America as those disappointed by his loss continue to showcase proud antiliberalism (Appendix 10) as they maneuver through another Democratic presidency—this time,
armed with more cohesion throughout the conservative community and a mobilized base of fedup average folks. Now, Trump supporters stand out among the Republican party and differentiate
themselves from the more centrist Republicans that have, in their eyes, “bowed down” (Andrew)
to the liberal agenda—all thanks to Donald Trump and the faith and confidence he restored.
Having this renewed sense of vigilantism, more candidates are beginning to emerge as the 2024
presidential race takes its first breaths. Appearing in a remarkably Trumpian campaign sits
television personality and new Pennsylvania Senate hopeful Dr. Oz, who touts regurgitated
buzzwords and phrases like, “reignite our divine spark,” “bravely fight for freedom,” and “tell it
like it is” (doctoroz.com), appealing to the same successful rhetoric used by Trump as he rallied
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groups of underdogs. Similar also to Trump, Dr. Oz uses his non-politician status as his finest
and most noteworthy credential; “In our time of need, we want to be surrounded by people of
action more than armchair intellectuals, because a great surgeon never censors ideas and never
shuts off the light that shines on our wounds…” (doctoroz.com 2022). While Dr. Oz’s senate
campaign only begins to unfold, he is appealing to Trump’s agitated base and is already seen by
several media outlets (CNN, MSN, and KTVZ, for example) as a rising “Fox primary”—a
candidate popular with conservative media outlet Fox News—as Donald Trumps did six years
ago.
Looking Forward: Hopes and Expectations for America’s Political Future
Overall, this sample of rural Pennsylvania conservatives believe that the United States
has a very long way to go before its greatness is fully restored. Especially following Joe Biden’s
victorious run for the 2020 presidency, conservative participants were concerned for America’s
political future as myths of election fraud and dishonest polling tactics permeate their attitudes
toward mainstream media and duplicitous politicians whose best interest lies with elites and
other rural enemies. As a group who felt grossly unrepresented in the current political system
outside of Trump’s presence, these folks exhibited an uneasy confidence that the country may be
headed toward a second civil war wherein the corrupt government will be overthrown by
average, fed-up folks—the patriots, the warriors, the lions, the people. While no conservative
interviewees expressed much faith in the current administration, many hold out hope that Donald
Trump will return to the political sphere and reclaim his rightful position as America’s leader.
They believed he is best for the job of leading them in a direction of stronger local
communities—a prominent value among these conservatives—and, therefore, a stronger nation.
Important to this group moving forward is the creation of jobs and putting Americans back to
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work to continue strengthening an economy that diminished reliance on government programs.
Regardless of their visions on how exactly to achieve such goals, this sample of rural and smalltown Pennsylvania conservatives want what everyone else wants—their version of America’s
best interest.
Rural Pennsylvania Liberals and Conservatives: The Common Ground They Share
Two of the most prominent aspects of rural identity are the expectation of self-sufficiency
and the responsibility to “take care of your own.” While rural Pennsylvania liberals and
conservatives differ in their ideological approaches, the care for one’s community shows up at
the crossroads of these major facets of the rural experience and mindset.
Despite the wide range of demographics in the sample obtained from Northumberland,
Union, Snyder, and Columbia Counties, one major theme emerged: care for and connection to
one’s local community. While this may seem obvious—everyone wants what is best for their
community, right? —the explosive nature of bipartisan politics often paints opposing sides as
wanting just the opposite. Having positive opinions on certain policies and/or candidates rarely
leaves room for the idea that anyone holding opposing views finds just as much meaning,
purpose, and hope in their views as you do in yours. As a result, opposing political views are not
only seen as incorrect or less than, but also as a detriment to the progression of one’s peers (or
one’s own—locally, nationally, or internationally). To oppose specific policies or candidates in
favor of others is to actively work against a community, country, and people while those being
challenged are fighting for the betterment of their opposition. Mindsets like this feed into the
cycle of cultural explosivity that further divides political parties; enemies are made this way, and
it becomes easier to act defensively and deflect blame for unfavorable politics and conditions on
those that appear to fight against one’s values and lifestyle. However, this research finds a
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prominent common ground of wanting the best for one’s community (whether community and
ownness are defined more locally, as Pennsylvanians, or as Americans) across all political
affiliations interviewed.
Partisan approach aside, every participant of this research expressed the desire to see
meaningful and tangible positive changes in their local communities. One particularly strong
desire was for more small business investment. Northumberland, Union, Snyder, and Columbia
Counties are all flush with small, independently owned businesses; everyone knows at least one
person who runs one and depends on its profits for their most basic necessities and livelihoods.
Care for one’s community and one’s own has deep roots in small businesses in these rural areas
because of this—small businesses act as the backbone of these communities, and everyone feels
the effects of their suffering. Especially exacerbated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
closures, many people and their loved ones were impacted firsthand by even a few days of slow
business traffic and have since doubled down on their prioritization of supporting locally owned
establishments and services. For example, once the Pennsylvania government allowed for the
gradual reopening of businesses and resumption of services as usual, several business owners
reported elevated numbers. “It was incredible, the way our community showed out for us,” said
the owner of a local pizza and sandwich shop. “All the sudden, our orders were tripled—
sometimes more than that! We were busier than ever before. After weeks of worrying about how
our shop would even survive after this [the pandemic], we felt like we might be okay after all.
Evident even in those who do not own their own business was the joy seeing the positive effects
of the community’s support during this time; Fern, of political liberal affiliation, said, “I always
try to order and shop local when I can. I like knowing that my money supports my neighbors and
the town I live in.”
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However, despite this outpouring of community support, some small businesses did
suffer to the point of foreclosure. Since the COVID-19 pandemic only further exacerbated the
inequalities faced by the rural United States (Parsons 2020), it is inevitable that not every
business would survive. Many folks got laid off from work, took temporary pay cuts, and
households were forced to dip into financial savings reserves or even take out loans from friends
and family to get by. Considering this, members of these communities were able to pitch in some
extra support for businesses that require smaller initial investments—takeout, coffee, bars, auto
repair shops, and the like. However, businesses requiring more substantial immediate
investments were put on the backburner as people were forced to prioritize being in survival
mode. Things like home remodeling, catering, and other hospitality industries took a significant
hit as their services require more upfront deposits and bigger financial commitments overall.
Interviewees spoke of at least seven businesses forced into shutdown within the four counties
explored, four of which were from Northumberland County alone. “It’s such a shame, but what
are we supposed to do?” said one woman whose husband’s home remodeling business closed in
June of 2020, not four months after the United States Center for Disease Control recognized the
coronavirus pandemic as a significant enough public threat to warrant the halting of all
unnecessary business ventures at the states’ discretions. On March 19th, 2020, Pennsylvania
governor Tom Wolf ordered the closure of all non-life sustaining businesses essentially until
further notice as the mandate’s length became longer and longer with each passing week. “We
can’t exactly lower our prices, and even if we could, deposits for jobs can be thousands of
dollars. We need the deposits to secure the job and to get all the materials and stuff...what were
we supposed to do? And it’s not like we could go into people’s houses at that time anyway—
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what with all the mandates and everything. It became inevitable that we would have to close up
and look for work somewhere else.” And that’s what they did.
Of course, closures like these rocked certain members of the community harder than
others. But regardless, its effects were noticed by all. In addition to the desire to support small
businesses, both liberals and conservatives expressed the need for community-based funding
from the government that would support things like the community centers, after school
programs, and charitable initiatives that focused on local food insecurity and keeping drugs out
of circulation in schools. “I see so many kids walking around so long after school hours and it’s
like…I worry where they’re going, some of them. More after school programs would be nice
because then kids wouldn’t have so much reason to wander around and get into trouble. But our
schools barely have enough money for teachers as it is.” A mother and a supporter of a
furloughed support staff union, Dina uttered this with an air of melancholic concern.
This particular quote brings up another interesting bridge between liberals and
conservatives. Many people conceptualized local schools as part of their community and
reported desire for better educational support funding. One contentious event that demonstrated
this was a striking of support staff for a local school district. In May and June, a discussion
among this school board and its support staff (office administration, aids to children with
behavioral and learning disorders, janitorial staff, and librarians) came to a crossroads amidst a
decision to outsource these jobs to an out-of-state temporary employment agency. In response to
this years-long discussion, a labor union of support staff had taken to meetings, bargaining deals
with the school board, and eventually, to the streets with picket signs and megaphones.
Demonstrated by the variety of political bumper stickers among protestors’ cars and the
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inconsistency of mask presence in the confined spaces, it was clear the union had community
members of different political attitudes and affiliations beside them.
As this effort gained momentum in the local community, I noticed the outpouring of
support from liberals and conservatives alike. While there was certainly pushback as well, the
union opposers seemed to fall by the wayside as local residents overwhelmingly came together in
support of the staff that supports the children and community they love. Intrigued by this
crossover, I decided to attend some meetings—both for the union itself, the school board meeting
where a decision was met and publicized, and to several union strikes. The strike events were
first on my list, as I decided they would provide insight into the attitudes of those in attendance
as well as offer me the opportunity to connect more personally with those on the picket line. As
we stood outside the school administration office on the side of the road that connected two
major residential and commercial areas (and therefore awarded much thru traffic), neon signs
emerged from parked cars. Some signs read “We love your kids! Love us back!”, “Kids are not
business negotiations,” and “I’ve seen better [school] boards at Lowe’s.” Chants boomed through
the neighborhood with honks of support from passersby in their cars at the request of other signs
asking for horns to be blown—between the hours of 9am and noon, the strikers effectively
provided significant disruption for the school’s board and administrative staff inside the building
they surrounded. Here, I met with the union president and other members who thanked me for
my support and happily invited me to a few meetings. The meetings were quite well organized
and down to businesses right away; agendas were quick but powerful with items relating to
negotiations with the school board, plans of action moving forward with the strike, what their
legal rights were, and how to volley negotiations from the board should they be fortunate enough
to receive any willingness to cooperate. Despite being friends, some of which were lifelong, the
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union meetings were all business. Still, on the way out, there existed an air of commiseration and
support for one another as the heavy reality of the situation at hand set in week after week.
Finally, the school board meeting on everyone’s mind came to the high school cafeteria.
There were over 50 people in attendance of this highly anticipated meeting—more than
double the usual crowd. The school board members filed in, checked off the housekeeping items
on their agenda, and opened the meeting for public comment. From here, 13 community
members made their way from the crowd to a microphoned podium; more were denied comment
later because they had not added themselves to their official agenda online preceding the
meeting. Over and over again, local liberals and conservatives alike took their place at the
podium and told stories highlighting the positive effects of the support staff on their lives and
questioning the integrity and goals of the school board. Many declared their political affiliation
at the beginning of their comment and followed up with how democracy is lost among this
board. Some expressed discontent with the board members they voted for—“I voted for you
because I thought you wanted what’s best for my children; after this, I’ll have to consider ever
voting Republican again on this board.” To counter the board’s concern for raising local taxes—
something that would normally be popular with conservative voters—folks expressed concern of
sending local taxpayer money away from the community by outsourcing these jobs and bringing
outsiders into their community without having familiarized them with the area or the students
and their unique needs. “Why should we trust some random lawyer from the city to come in here
and make decisions for our kids? What faith would we have in that? He comes in here, sees
nothing, talks to no one, and tells us what’s right for our kids. He’s not in our classrooms day to
day, and neither are you.” This comment was made by a father whose son goes to school in the
district, in response to the school board hiring a Philadelphia-based attorney to negotiate legal
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terms with the support staff union. While public funding allocation proves to be a major point of
contention between liberals and conservatives, local commentators of both affiliations expressed
discontent for the valuing of a budget over the quality of their children’s educational experience.
Themes of contempt for outsiders and the betrayal that comes along with such values in this
instance brought Democrats and Republicans to public forum to express their dissatisfaction with
the way their elected officials were prioritizing their fates. Perhaps a microcosm of a greater
unifier that is apprehension and contempt toward outsiders, this display illustrates an interesting
dichotomy of “othering” one another unless a bigger, more common enemy is recognized. This
introduction of a mutual threat suddenly re-unified a hostile divide and redefined, however
briefly, the concept of one’s community.
Another theme found within the comments at this meeting was the shared desire for more
pellucidity from elected officials. People felt like they were too late to really make a difference
with their actions because they “never know what the hell’s going on until it’s too late and
doesn’t damn matter anymore.” Several comments were made both at the meeting and on the
union support’s community Facebook page regarding the school board’s poor use of public
outreach and their “piss poor” attempts at keeping the public in the loop; “we elected you—you
work for us. Tell us what’s being discussed.” This sentiment is illustrative of another major
theme found within both rural Pennsylvania liberals and conservatives—transparency in the
government.
While liberals and conservatives approached their media consumption a bit differently,
one theme emerged clearly: regardless of what one is looking at, it is difficult to know who to
trust because of conflicting information and various agendas at war with one another. Liberals
tended to prefer more widely acceptable accredited sources than far right conservatives who
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preferred known misleaders, but this challenge of proper source vetting no doubt contributes to
the issue of misinformation consumption on both sides of the political aisle. Sources popularly
cited by rural liberals included more centrist outlets like National Public Radio, the Wall Street
Journal, and USA Today; however, also common were stations like CNN, MSNBC, the New
York Times, Washington Post, and Politico—known left-of-center leaners (Atkinson and Berg
2012; Faris et al 2017). It is important to note that both parties fall victim to and actively
participate in confirmation bias that contributes to the rural fundamental mistrust of elites.
Confirmation bias, or the act of choosing news that reinforces existing beliefs, contributes to a
larger problem of opening oneself up to a variety of worldviews in order to piece together wellinformed judgements on other cultures, lifestyles, and policies that later are put in the hands of
these (often) one-dimensional stances. In the days of modern technology which boasts maximum
adaptability and personalization capabilities, this sought out consumption creates a customized
algorithm that learns what viewers like to consume (Mager 2021; Just and Latzer 2016), finds
more, and delivers it to users in constantly updating newsfeeds, “for you pages,” and “discover”
feeds. Found primarily in social media, these tools create an efficient and interesting user
experience; however, this can also happen when folks surround themselves with likeminded
individuals and groups (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Hudson et al 2017). But
unfortunately, in the world of politics, this process can also create dangerous filter bubbles and
echo chambers that reinforce existing worldviews and biases, therefore strengthening faith in and
conviction for certain sources and stances.
In simpler terms, people like to feel correct in their beliefs. Confirmation bias allows
them to continue feeling, not only right, but comfortable in the views that dictate their ethical
compasses, political behaviors, and life choices. And when people feel validated in their moral
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high ground, they feel as though they have leverage against those who oppose them. Examples of
this were found on both sides; “People throwing fits about vaccines and mask mandates—as if
you and your high school education know better than medical professionals who studied for
years? Give me a break.” This line came from a woman, Brenda, who identifies as a Democrat.
She reported getting the majority of her pandemic news from posts shared on social media as
well as NPR’s daily morning podcast, The Daily. Expressing frustration at the discourse on
social media regarding mask mandates in local schools and businesses, she then followed up
with, “You think masks do nothing? Do you simpletons know how walls work?”—a prime
example of how validation from media consumption fuels judgement that surpasses simple
disagreement. The second comment illustrates contempt that comes from feeling as though one
moral compass is far superior to another due to outlying principles such as education and class.
This woman preferred CNN and NPR as her primary sources for pandemic news, had a
bachelor’s degree, and reportedly lived well within the margins of the American middle-class;
the line was delivered, after all, over marble countertops, wood paneled flooring, and glasses of
pricey wine in a kitchen decorated with display cases of crystal and bottles of collectible spirits.
But this elitism was not unique to this demographic. This phenomenon arose similarly for
everyone—a trusted source verified and reinforced a held belief, and in turn, delegitimized
others. The problem is that some trusted sources are more credible than others. In the same topic
of COVID-19 vaccination and mask mandates, one conservative interviewee said, “I just can’t
wait till the cases start coming out about enlarged hearts and deformities and
[government/privacy] hacking; won’t they [vaccine advocates/receivers] be sorry then. It’s too
rushed. It’s too convenient. Doesn’t anyone find it a little suspicious that the biggest pushers of
this thing [the vaccine] are people who did everything in their power to make President Trump
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look bad any chance they got?” This person, a conservative, reported their most trustworthy
pandemic news sources were Fox News and the New York Post—widely regarded as a
conservative tabloid. But, despite any empathy or acknowledgement of legitimacy of the other
side’s concerns, the mindset was largely the same—my tribe and I are right, opposers are wrong,
and they are too stupid to understand what is best for them.
All this understood, it is not difficult to connect the role of selective media consumption
and their resulting cyclical and divisive mindsets to the growing sociopolitical gaps in modern
American politics. But the root issue remains the same; regardless of political affiliation,
education, or background, people found themselves wondering who to trust and leaving their
faith up to mechanisms like emotional response, affirmation, and good-enough understandings of
information presented. Politician and media agendas were evident to all interviewed parties and
made for difficult source vetting. Also evident was sources’ efforts to actively delegitimize other
viewpoints while advocating for their own; agendas at war proved a significant barrier to
widespread trustworthy sources and were concerning to most everyone. But at the end of the day,
folks trusted the sources that reinforced their own personal agendas and were suspicious of those
that challenged them, further reinforcing, also, a discordant “us versus them” mindset prevalent
in rural identity that spanned all demographics as well.
Ubiquitous in the understanding of rural identity and rural political attitudes is a mindset
that prioritizes “one’s own,” however it is conceptualized, over other groups; oftentimes, these
“othered” groups are not only deprioritized, they are actively disliked and ostracized. And while
this instinct is fairly common among many different groups, it has particularly jarring effects in
the realm of rural politics and, therefore, the current sociopolitical system in the United States.
This mindset was found in both rural liberals and conservatives; and while there were distinct
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and important differences between the two, it is most important to note that a certain essence
arose that proves imperative when noting commonalities and postulating political impact. While
liberals exhibited more positive (or at the very least, neutral) attitudes toward othered groups
such as racial minorities, immigrants, various religious identities, and LGBTQ+ folks than
conservatives did, both groups ostracized each other. But even more so, they expressed distaste
for a common enemy— “the elite.” The major problem with this is that “the elite” is
conceptualized differently past a certain point; but up until then, themes emerged between
liberals and conservatives of a general dislike for the mega-rich while almost always favoring
“the little guy” or average American citizens. Recalling from the previous chapters’ analysis, it is
important to remember that “the little guy” is only advocated for when they fit one’s description
of an “us”/insider group. But since these differences of opinion stem from a fundamental
misunderstanding of the capitalist systems currently in place, it would be remiss not to mention
how deeply rooted the “us versus them” mentality reaches into rural identity and political
attitudes.
Even among some significant cognitive dissonance, both liberals and conservatives
expressed passionately that, if given the opportunity to pay the same amount in taxes but have
total delegation in how their money was distributed, they would want the majority of their money
to go toward their communities, the American working-class, and the public school system. Both
groups exhibited anti-rich attitudes on the grounds that some people get (and even take) more
than their fair share; commonly cited examples of this were career politicians (those
representatives who remain in the government sector until retirement), celebrities, CEOs and
companies who publicly exploit the working-class, and even local figureheads who have been
known to draw inflated salaries at the expense of their employees. “There’s no reason anyone
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should have that much money [billions of dollars]; it sickens me that he [Jeff Bezos, CEO of
Amazon Inc. and currently the world’s richest person with an approximate $107B net worth
according to Forbes Billionaires 2021] chooses every day to let billions of people struggle when
he has every opportunity to help and still be richer than anyone else ever could be,” a liberal
school teacher offered when asked about what leads her to support policies increasing taxes on
those in certain income brackets rather than incrementally raising taxes for everyone. Similarly, a
conservative automotive repair shop owner said, “[Nancy] Pelosi (US Democratic House leader
since 2003) draws some huge paycheck every year to do far less, I’m sure, than me and my
neighbors who are happy enough to barely scrape by.” While discrepancies between wealth are
severe in this case (a net worth of several hundred thousand dollars versus hundreds of billions),
the notion of deserved and undeserved wealth lie at the center of these sentiments and, in turn,
affect political attitudes and voting behaviors. Learned from this important thematic
commonality is that, at their core, both liberal and conservative interviewees value fairness and
want unmerited wealth to be redistributed to those who deserve more.
In a similar vein, both liberals and conservatives expressed the same process and
principles in deciding which politicians and media they can trust. Findings show that rural people
value consistency and intention (more importantly for, their perception of someone’s intention);
whether assessing those running for office, media sources, or particularly political policies,
constancy and predictability reigned supreme in the process of building and maintaining trust. As
discussed, people tend to support people and media that echo their existing views; an important
part of this is one’s perception of a politician’s or media’s intention and their transparency. For
example, multiple people reiterated this statement from a Democrat running for local office in
Northumberland County: “Media’s purpose should always be to provide information. Not
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gaining ‘clicks,’ (by touting outlandish headlines to catch attention and draw digital traffic to
their pages), not blindly supporting any one candidate, not convincing anyone of anything. Just
report the objective information.” This same individual went on to explain how his perception of
an outlet’s intention is the most important part of how he decides where to get his news. “If it’s
obvious to me that a website or [television] channel’s main goal is to push an agenda or gain
profit by reporting on crazy or really contentious things in a way that would rile people up, that’s
usually a red flag to me. I like to know that my news sources are just that—news. Not
entertainment, and not a campaign.” Similarly, both liberals and conservatives approached
trusting politicians this way. Gretchen, a conservative leaning high school teacher said, “You can
usually tell when politicians are lying to get votes…making huge promises everyone knows they
can’t keep. Why lie? Everyone knows the parties get in each other’s way. Everyone knows
things get held up in the House and Senate. Just say you’ll do your best! That’s enough for most
people. That’s enough for me. When politicians pander to their audiences by changing their
stances on things and making promises, I know I probably can’t trust them.” Additionally,
people on both sides of the political aisle reported searching for politicians’ track records when
deciding who they should support; specifically, they looked for politicians’ stances on their
biggest and most important personal/political values and how much these stances have changed
throughout the politicians’ political career. This demonstrates reliability that a candidate will
continue to uphold what is important to their supporters and signals to voters that they can be
confident in their vote and support. While seemingly obvious, it is vital for social and political
scientists to remember the commonalities in this process; while values differ, the method of
choice is largely the same.
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Finally, rural Pennsylvania liberals and conservatives both feel as though something big
is on the verge for United States politics. While liberals reported sensing significant progressive
and systemic changes, conservatives took a darker approach at the anticipation of a civil war of
sorts. Either way, both predictions stem from the idea of a people’s revolution against an unjust
government and a system that works primarily for the untouchable elites and enthusiastically
marginalizes people who are consistently shorted what they are owed. Again, themes of valuing
one’s own and the “little guy” emerge here.
All in all, while liberals and conservatives in rural Pennsylvania differ quite a lot in their
political attitudes and the operationalization of their rural identities, they also reconvene in
several notable ways. Negative attitudes toward the group of elites that delegate some of the
most major sociopolitical processes, the process of trust and support for political candidates and
media sources, and a sense of responsibility to protect and advocate for “one’s own” are all
major factors that deploy the most intrinsic parts of a rural identity and influence political
attitudes. Also noteworthy is the shared notion that Americans have had enough; they have
grown tired of being exploited, ignored, and neglected by those in power who are sworn to serve
the general public but often serve themselves instead. Despite the slight variation in their
approaches to revolution, both liberals and conservatives displayed an aura of unnerved
anticipation for some significant systemic rehaul—something also important to remember
moving forward in the social sciences and political initiatives as the academic and political elite
continue to strive for relatability and informative contextual nuance.
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this study explores the interaction between mechanisms of rural identity and
the formation of political attitudes in rural and small-town central Pennsylvania. Guided by
understandings of American rurality and its particular adversities, this research utilizes
ethnographic observational data and in-depth participant interviews to better understand political
attitudes and expectations of rural Pennsylvanians as well as how these are influenced by and
connected to one’s identity as a rural American. By sampling four counties in Appalachian
Pennsylvania, this study gains a unique insight into a population undoubtedly affected by its
diverse surrounding geography; sandwiched between two major cities and neighboring other
non-Appalachian rural areas, folks from these counties are valuable subjects on their own as well
as in context with larger-scale sociopolitical pictures. Especially considering the tendency of
sociopolitical research to overlook rural folks, this study adds to the existing literature by
centering rural narratives in social, personal, and political exploration. By focusing specifically
on the attitudes and mechanisms of rural politics, this study aims to provide a clearer picture of
what is expected from policy geared toward rural areas. Even in successful urban-rural policy
where each relies on and benefits from the other, this study serves to illuminate more clearly
what affected rural folks need from such policies in order to feel more seen, heard, and
represented by their elected officials. Important not only for scholarship and effective governing,
politicians may also benefit from research such as this; by better understanding the wants and
needs of rural Pennsylvanians (and perhaps, by extension, rural Americans), political hopefuls
can adjust their communicated agendas and campaign reaches to more effectively serve their
electorate and foster trust that this study largely finds fractured.
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While notable differences were found among rural liberals and rural conservatives in the
sampled four Pennsylvania counties, there were also several commonalities found between the
two groups that appear to be products of mechanisms informing rural identity. While rural
identity seems to influence the political attitudes of these groups in different ways, its traces can
be found throughout each group’s values, ethical guidelines, political and peer expectations, and
hopes for America’s political future. Nevertheless, this study finds that some aspects of rural
identity, however influential, may also contribute to the cyclical adversity and habitual response
to such hardship (suggested by Berger and Luckmann 1996) experienced by rural pockets of the
United States and underwrite the tones and sentiments expressed in political conjecture by those
that live and die there. Such a powerful process calls for deeper, more holistic understandings for
those that dictate or inform public policy that impacts these areas. This study begins a small part
of this process by exploring one area worthy of research in its own right as the heart of important
political factors like coal production, agricultural yield, manufacturing industry, and more are
found sandwiched between two major cities in a set of “microstates” home to diverse economies,
geography, and politics. Known irreverently as “Pennsyltucky” and “the Alabama in between
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia” (by political strategist James Carville), rural and small-town
Pennsylvania offer unique insight into the under-extolled parts of a persuasive swing state. Even
amongst a perpetually urbanizing society, rurality and rural identity remain significant elements
of the American essence and must be paid due attention to best govern and serve the nation as a
whole.
Findings
While aspects of rurality and rural identity seemed to inform some political attitudes and
values of sampled rural liberals, right-leaning ideology seemed more strongly influenced. For
example, rural Pennsylvania liberals in this study highly valued their communities by supporting
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local businesses and wanting more funding for community infrastructure. This sample of liberals
regarded their communities as worthy of government aid and worth fighting for; they believed
multiple areas could benefit from addiction rehabilitation centers, programs geared toward youth
engagement, and felt generally like the area was a nice place to live that did not deserve the
stigma often bestowed upon rural areas or the slander brought on by certain individuals that did
not represent the rest of county residents (namely, the “wighte lives matter” fence painter).
Exhibiting Cramer’s (2016) idea of rural consciousness, rural Pennsylvania liberals had an
understanding that they were lumped in with negative perceptions of rural people and spaces—
backwards, uneducated, derelict, and prejudiced. “It’s a shame because we aren’t all like that.
This area has its good parts and its bad parts, just like everywhere else. Once you get to the
outskirts a little bit, this place is actually a really nice place to live. Even in town isn’t bad; it’s
just not for me, personally.” This popular perspective came from Hilda, a liberal high school
teacher and progressive political advocate. “I wouldn’t want to live anywhere else and I’m proud
to be from here. [Her school district] made me who I am today, which is something I’m proud
of.”
Similarly, sampled rural conservatives also felt pride associated with their rural roots
despite the knowledge of negative perception. “I guess they [liberals, urban folks, etc.] think
we’re [rural conservatives] just a group a backwoods hillbillies. And maybe we are; I don’t
know. I’m proud to be a redneck, and fuck anyone who has a problem with that. Me and my
own, we’re doing just fine.” Andrew kicked back in his kitchen chair and clinked bottles with his
buddy who smiled and nodded, content with their identities’ associations and their championship
within such stigma and adversity—a prideful reclamation. A distinct difference between liberal
and conservative rural pride, however, was the ferocity with which it was displayed. While
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liberal displays were certainly present, they were less prominent and aggressive than
conservative ones. As demonstrated by Andrew’s and Hilda’s quotes, conservatives’ pride often
held notes of hostility—likely a mechanism of defense against their perceived negative
stereotypes. Displays of conservativism showcased not only confidence and pride in certain held
ideologies including strong Christian nationalism, but an apparent eagerness to anger liberals and
provoke discomfort among opposers. For example, popular conservative displays featured
sayings like “make liberals cry again,” “don’t blame me, I voted for Trump,” and “patriotic
Christian Republican female—how else can I piss you off?” Popular liberal displays remarked
things like, “we believe Black lives matter; love is love; feminism is for everyone; no human
being is illegal; science is real; be kind to all,” “no matter where you are from, we’re glad you’re
our neighbor,” and “hate has no home here.” In general, sampled rural Pennsylvania liberals
showed more remorse that the area and people they love were perceived so distastefully and
made efforts to separate themselves from the archetypes conservatives enthusiastically
embraced.
Additionally, rural conservatives in this sample latched onto ideals of stark individualism
and independence far stronger than the liberal sample. Conservatives saw these items as
characteristics of freedom and their religious liberty (despite these characteristics not having
much, if any, inherent religious undertones), therefore scorning anyone or anything they
perceived as threats to that liberty. While liberals also liked the ability to exercise independence,
they placed higher value on collective contributions to a common good that conservatives saw as
suffocating to their own personal potentials. Liberals were happier to contribute tax dollars to
government programs and to make personal sacrifices in the name of a common best interest; for
example, liberals showed more favorable views toward things like welfare, gun control policy,
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Medicaid, and pandemic-driven mask mandates while conservatives viewed such policies as
stifling, unfair, and even downright asinine as masks were, sometimes, equated to muzzles. Both
groups exhibited reflections of rural identity in these ways, valuing both community and
individualism. Conservatives in this example, however, exhibit illustrations of paradoxical
thinking in ways that liberals did not.
By valuing more individual contributions to one’s community but being unwilling to
contribute to larger-scale initiatives that would positively affect it, conservatives in this sample
further illustrate the value of in-groups and personal networks in the deployment and influence of
rural identity on political attitudes. To reiterate, in-groups and community within this sample of
conservatives seemed to be synonymized with the idea of “one’s own” (further illustrating
Berger’s [1996] theory of familiarity/habit and identity formation) and pockets of the
“deserving” which excludes large groups of people and, often, entire enclaves in one’s locale.
Liberals in this sample seemed to include larger networks of people within their definition of
“community,” while conservatives’ definitions changed depending on their willingness to
contribute to its best interest. For example, conservatives in this sample were enthusiastic about
helping certain people under certain conditions; during these conversations, these people were
considered their community. Whether this meant supporting small business by buying local,
donating time and/or money to those deemed worthy of assistance, or contributing tax dollars to
the military and law enforcement, those benefiting from these efforts were considered part of an
in-group or community to which conservatives felt connected in some way. But there were other,
closer network connections that did not make this “community” cut and were considered by the
conservative sample to be outsiders separate from the communities in which they take pride—
neighbors and town residents on welfare, non-patriots, liberals, or other oppositional identities
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that were often inadvertently racialized. This also showcases pervasive Christian nationalism
with the rural conservative sample, as the idea that the United States should be a God honoring
nation (Whitehead 2018, 2020) in all social and legal ways permeated ideas of one’s
deservingness of legal aid and social acceptability. The desire for a government who prioritizes
in-groups that characterize a laborious white Christian conservative America (Perry and
Whitehead 2021) translates to understandings of desirables and undesirables, deservingness and
undeservingness, and true Americans and new wave enemies from whom America and its roots
must rightfully be reclaimed. And these enemies, while broad and nuanced, translated often into
the idea of liberals and liberal ideology. Liberals in this study “othered” conservatives as well,
but mostly in ideological and associative ways; they wished not to be associated with the
negative stigmas brought to rural areas by conservatives that also live there, as they saw radical
conservatives as contaminants of an otherwise excellent place. When speaking of a community,
liberals in this sample did not exclude groups deemed undeserving of their support in the way
that conservatives did. In general, they were more willing to view their roles in collective
societal contributions more favorably than conservatives, who did not appreciate the expectation
or mandate to contribute their resources to causes believed unworthy. Conservatives preferred to
keep their resources as close as possible, contributing only to people and causes considered
familiar enough to be an in-group.
While it is possible that some of the out-group othering coming from this group of
conservatives can be attributed to dissonance in beliefs, it may also be that observed dissonance
is so because of a contradiction of explanation attributed to social desirability bias—
underreporting of socially undesirable actions or attitudes to avoid social judgement (Tappin,
Van der Leer, and McKay 2017). Due to the highly racialized associations with anti-rurality (i.e.,
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government aid recipience, laziness, conformity, elitism, privilege, non-Christian beliefs, etc.), it
could be the case that contradictory beliefs about when government intervention is or is not okay
lie more in the understanding of who exactly benefits from such intervention—another important
part of Cramer’s (2016) rural consciousness. Such a significant piece of rural political attitudes is
another example of the value of reflective literature in this field; these mindsets, habitual identity
indicators, and ideological/behavior responses may be observed less empirically and more
reflectively as such unfavorable attitudes are difficult to scientifically capture due to social
desirability bias and a general aversion to label oneself as prejudiced. Put more simply, perhaps
government is less highly favored when its actions are perceived to aid racial minorities who are,
by association, intrinsically anti-rural and therefore, unethical in many important ways;
oppositely, then, government intervention would be viewed more favorably when its actions are
perceived to harm these groups. This can be observed both with reflective and empirical
observation through the dissonance regarding disdain for “big government” and fierce trust and
support of larger surveillance bodies like the police and military—particularly since the
conservative “blue [police] lives matter” mantra arose solely as a response to the Black Lives
Matter movement’s mission to address systemic racism primarily in law enforcement and the
judicial sphere. Even with such staunch military support, such looming surveillance is seen as
protection from and controlling of foreign, ethnic outsiders like those from Middle Eastern and
Asian countries. This sample seemed to synonymize these groups not only with strangeness, but
also with danger, anti-American agendas, and even poor hygiene (referring specifically to the
wet markets in Asia once hypothesized to be the source of the coronavirus and other diseases
foreign to the US). Though, of course, few people would be enthusiastic to admit to a stranger, or
even to themselves, that their principles are racist; so, a myriad of convoluted justifications for
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such a deeply rooted mentality become evident in the form of disjointed, dissonant explanations
for when “big government” is acceptable or preferred. However, further research should be
conducted to better understand this conjecture with more empirical means rather than the
regional reflections that currently serve as the primary source of such observed discourse.
Also worth noting is the difference in how the liberal and conservative samples viewed
media and elites. Again, conservatives in the sample exhibited clearer influences of rural identity
on attitudes toward academics, scientists, and politicians. These types were considered “elites”
by the conservative sample and were viewed unfavorably, in line with parts of rural identity that
deem these groups untrustworthy, out of touch, narcissists who wrongfully place rural folks far
down on the social pyramid. Many believed also that these elites controlled the mainstream
media, making media as an institution as untrustworthy and agenda ridden as those of higher
education. This translated to an understanding of media and academic distrust as a key
component of the rural conservative identity. Instead, trusted sources were those who outrightly
denounce or “expose” mainstream media/academy in the name of spreading real truth instead of,
what is believed by this group to be, liberal agendas—those like Fox News, Breitbart, The Blaze,
Dr. Simone Gold, and more recently, Dr. Mehmet Oz. Conservatives in this sample liked the idea
of the “anti-politician” for the same reasons they liked ideas of “anti-media” and “antiscience/academia.” These elites are viewed by this sample as inherently anti-rural and anticonservative; therefore, a declaration of “anti-“ institution is also a proclamation of “pro-“ them,
“pro-“ their loved ones, and “pro-“ America. Unsurprisingly, this led conservatives in my sample
to a great deal of misinformation as they turned to social media, peer narratives, and sources that
rejected empirical science. This inevitably led to misinformed attitudes that translated (and likely
will continue in the future) to political behavior that contributes to the cyclical adversity faced by
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rural areas in the United States. Liberals in this sample, on the other hand, had far more trust in
institutions like academia and science, and tended to prefer media outlets that referenced
accredited sources they trusted like the Center for Disease Control, the World Health
Organization, and specialized experts. However, that is not to say that liberals did not also fall
victim to misinformation as they, like the conservative sample, found legitimacy and comfort in
narratives that did not call their existing beliefs and ethics into question. Spending time in
political and cultural echo chambers like social media and like-minded groups reproduced
misinformation (Tappin et al 2017) which cycled through individuals and encouraged even more
polarization among those with differing conceptualizations of reality and news (Ribeiro et al
2017); for both groups, differences in opinion became bitter ethical battles as morals and
measures of intelligence became the most defining difference between partisan groups. Each
group, regardless of empathic displays, saw the other as uninformed, naïve, immoral, and
incorrect— detriments to the kind of society in which they most want to live.
However, despite these notable differences, what was expected is clear; liberals and
conservatives in rural and small-town Pennsylvania largely want the same things. Both groups
want the best for their communities, the best for their country, and the best for themselves. But
this is deceptively simple when we remember that visions of what is “best” are not always
agreed-upon, nor are the paths by which we achieve it. While sampled rural liberals exhibited
traces of rural identity, the conservative sample seemed to more strongly emanate its stout
reflections in their political attitudes. Perhaps, in this way, conservatives in the sampled counties
are more “uniquely rural” than liberals were, which could be explained by differences in
educational attainment and/or more diverse cultural exposure in some way. Regardless,
sociopolitical sciences must continue to conduct community-based research in areas like these
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(and in other geographic-specific regions) to better understand these differences and their
political implications. In-depth community research allows those with power to inform or make
political decisions that affect large groups of people to better understand the people whose lives
they are changing.
Understanding Rural Partisanship
Exploring rural partisanship is imperative to accurate understandings of virtually any part
of the United States or American politics. Even though the majority of the US population is
concentrated in more urban and suburban areas (USDA), nearly three quarters of American land
is considered rural (USDA). Although less crowded, these areas are not desolate or unimportant;
rural America is vital to the maintenance of the United States as it provides safe and affordable
food, drinking water, sustainable energy, and outdoor recreation. Since rural areas are less
densely populated, attention in research, public outreach, and politics has been largely paid to
places like big cities and their outskirts. Because of this, rural America and its citizens have
fallen by the wayside and the unique needs of their communities are dimly understood and
continue to suffer at the hands of a disconnected political elite and a system that often does not
work well for them. Rural folks see this disfunction; they feel it every day. The unique adversity
shoved on rural America acts cyclically as rural folks, particularly conservatives, fall into
patterns of bitter hostility toward their elected officials and those whom they perceive to unjustly
reap some of the benefits to which they should also be entitled. Feelings of resentment and
volatility fester over decades of generational burnout, poverty, health disparity, and other
disenfranchisement as the knowledge of who to trust, who not to trust, and one’s place in the
world is inherited from those whose truth this has always been.
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Not only do scientists and politicians do Americans a grave disservice by neglecting rural
people, they do a disservice to their missions and careers as public servants. Rural areas, though
home to fewer people, are home to groups who tend to be fairly politically engaged—probably
due to their distrustful outlook toward politicians. Rural Americans seem to be more clued into
local politics and smaller-scale elections than those in urban concentrations, likely because the
rural demographic is primarily white non-Hispanic and older generations—two of the biggest
voter turnout groups (Population Reference Bureau). In this case, people particularly unsatisfied
with the current political system may be particularly motivated to exercise their role in its
modification, however minute that role may seem. Additionally, neglecting these perspectives
may present danger to the pursuit of ethno-racial equity in the US as perpetuation of Christian
and white nationalism appear to be significant drivers of rural conservativism. All this being
said, rural Americans turned out in big numbers during the 2016 presidential election, effectively
propelling Donald Trump into office in the hopes that his uniquely unpolitical status and visions
would be the answer to a pervasive, ongoing problem in US politics. He was their voice that had
been silenced, their perspective that had been overlooked, and their insider representative among
blockades of untrustworthy liberal and political bureaucrats who never had their best interest in
mind.
Of course, Donald Trump’s presidency sat equally unwell with other groups, and he was
unseated in 2020 as Democrat Joe Biden took over. Rural conservatives took this loss with great
heaviness as they mourned the glimmer of hope seen in such an unconventional leader.
Allegations of election fraud ran rampant throughout conservative media and echo chambers as a
means to cope with the reality of, this time, being outnumbered by the very groups that
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effectively threaten their ideal America and, by extension, their opportunity to successfully
pursue the potential it promised.
While it has been speculated by many, including this author, that a great deal of
understandings informing rural conservativism are fundamentally erroneous, their effects on
American politics and socioeconomics are real and apparent. As said by sociological theorists
Dorothy and William Thomas (1928), “if men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences.” In other words, human behavior is less dependent on objective reality and more
on our subjective interpretations of it. This sentiment is reflected time and time again in rural
voting behaviors, as persistent conservativism and its keystones regurgitate perpetuations of the
same problematic candidates and harmful systemic policy—a problem that can only be fully
understood by deeply exploring the mechanisms of rural partisanship.
Of course, this exploration has its own challenges. Like any other area, rurality has
nuance and variety; there is no unified “rural voice” that speaks for all those feeling
unrepresented and unsatisfied. In order to best understand the mechanisms of rural partisanship
and the needs and expectations of rural areas, administrators must approach rural studies with
smaller scopes aimed at piecing together a much larger picture. This research takes a small, yet
important, piece of this gargantuan process by studying perhaps a microcosm of larger rural
America—rural and small-town Pennsylvania. Although Pennsylvania itself is worthy of its own
study due to its unique geography, industry, and demographic, its encompassment of many labels
may prove useful in understanding other similar areas throughout the US. Rural and small-town
Pennsylvania are home to all kinds of folks—from exurbanites and townies to more isolated
Appalachian residences, studying Pennsylvania encompasses a look into a wide variety of
perspectives potentially lying elsewhere throughout the less urban United States. So, while this
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study only reaches four Pennsylvania counties, it includes those closer to more metropolitan
areas like Harrisburg and Philadelphia as well as those in the deep rolling hills of this partly
Appalachian state and provides a rich insight into the diverse perspectives that live here. In this
way, this study serves as a blueprint for future studies with abilities to reach further throughout
the rural state and others like it.
Limitations
As with the majority of studies, the design of this current study is subject to limitations.
Among them is the sample size; this study drew from four counties in rural Pennsylvania,
producing twenty interviews. While this may provide a useful foundation for similarly conducted
research, future research would benefit both from a larger sample of individuals and drawing
participants from more counties in a given area. Also beneficial would be additional time for data
collection and rapport building. As found in this study, rural conservatives (who make up the
majority of this sample) show low levels of trust for academics and researchers; so, while many
were willing to participate in the study, many were not. Allotting more time for rapport building
and the development of familiarity between researcher and subject may be advantageous for
future work centering rural and/or conservative folks. Additionally, as every researcher holds
their own biases despite efforts to remain nonpartisan and neutral, it may benefit future work to
compare data analysis from researchers with diverse ethical convictions so as to minimize the
potential for unintentional bias.
Another interesting addition to this research would be the comparison of Appalachian and
non-Appalachian rural political attitudes as well as rural and urban/suburban political attitudes.
Integrating a comparative study would allow further insight into political influence most unique
to different kinds of rurality and mechanisms of a rural identity by identifying influential aspects

THE HEART OF EVERYTHING 145

of other geographic identities on residents’ political values, attitudes, and expectations. Studies
like these may provide clarification on any notable differences between Appalachia and nonAppalachian rurality in addition to how rural Pennsylvania or rural America compares to more
densely populated areas. In this same vein, it may be beneficial to conduct a more empirical
study collaborating with multiple social science fields (namely sociology and psychology) to
further explore the speculation of rural conservatives’ dissonant beliefs and explanations fueled
by racial bias and social desirability that, so far, are largely captured by reflective analyses.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to include an in-depth analysis of religion in rural areas and
religious influence on identity, ethics, and political attitudes. This sample of rural
Pennsylvanians found a curious amount of religious rhetoric and rampant Christian nationalism
in political and ethical discussions that are worthy of their own separate study, as I suspect a
notable influence of white nationalist Christian ideology on the formation of rural identity and
political attitudes—particularly within conservativism—that transcends just religious affiliation.
Field Implications
The findings in this study showcase part of a larger phenomenon at hand—paradoxical
political behaviors among rural conservatives influenced by deeply rooted identity mechanisms
and cyclical adversity. Even among those interviewed, many participants were skeptical of the
research and investigator as parts of a distrusted academy. Illustrating also the portion of
Cramer’s (2016) rural consciousness wherein people are aware of how they are perceived by
others, many of my conservative participants took defensive tones and shared wary glances
between one another as they associated me with liberalism despite my proclaimed neutrality.
While this behavior demonstrates the distrust expected from this group, it also demonstrates an
expectation of being judged, even by someone whose communicated goals were to give space for
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their voices and stories. Not only doubt and hesitation, but suspicion drove the conversations
with many conservative participants, at least for a little while. This air is almost unfortunate—it
communicates an expectation of being taken advantage of by those whose duty is to seek
understanding and work toward societal benefit. Findings of this research further illustrate the
fractures between rural conservativism and “elitist” institutions like academia and politics.
Findings also show stark variance between rural conservatives and rural liberals. While liberals
in this sample showed traces of textbook rural identity in their political attitudes, such identity
was not so crucially centered in their political processes the way it was for conservatives. In this
way, it seemed that rural liberals had somehow “transcended” the parts of rural identity that
influence detrimental political behaviors; some even saw it this way themselves, viewing their
conservative peers as devolved and imprudent. This very idea, of course, further funnels into the
perceptions in rural consciousness; “they” think “we” are stupid, and therefore, “we” will behave
appropriately—defensively and aggressively proud as a challenge to this wrongful and hurtful
narrative (recall the difference in conservative and liberal attitudinal displays). Additionally, the
idea that rural liberals have “surpassed” rural conservatives ideologically further illustrates the
pathways to general liberal elitism in the eyes of right leaners. Their rural consciousness tells
them that liberals think they are morally superior, even despite the many commonalities shared
between both groups. This may serve to explain why the “elite” is not exclusively conceptualized
as non-rurals, academics, or politicians, but also as liberalism—and its affiliates, often
racialized—in general. Removing themselves from the more strongly rurally informed
conservatives, liberals in this sample did not present quite as uniquely “rural,” but rather more as
liberal folks who prefer to live in rural areas. This distinction begs further research into rural
partisanship, as it seems that such an idea may apply more directly to conservatives specifically.
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Regardless, findings from this study build upon literature centering rural identity and political
attitudes by examining partisanship of both rural liberals and conservatives, even if the call to
separate the groups for further investigation appears valuable.
This study highlights aspects of American politics not often centered in sociopolitical
research. Adding to the literature on rural and political sociology, this study offers insight into
how both fields may interact with one another as well as possible interactions with other aspects
of policy work such as geography and regional history. Such aspects play crucial roles in the
formation of residents’ identities, and therefore also in the formation of their political attitudes.
As such a monumental and complex interaction of factors, the process of effective politicking is
unlikely to be wholly tackled in any one study. Studies like this help to break down such a
process into more digestible pieces, allowing for closer inspection of important informative
political mechanisms. That way, research determining policy that reaches and affects large
groups of people may work toward being as informed as possible.
This research also draws attention to the importance of identifying deeply rooted
systemic influences on political trends. While this study’s ultimate goal is to examine the role of
rural identity in political attitude formation, it and others like it may serve to highlight the
influential systemic mechanisms at work. There is a complex dialect between the political elite
and the rest of the country which can result in the detriment of certain groups—specifically rural
conservatives. For example, rural Pennsylvania conservatives in this study have negative
opinions and expectations of their elected officials that are informed by their identities as rural
folks; yet understandings of one’s rural identity stem largely from politics’ effects on rural areas.
In a cyclical regurgitation of animosity toward government and politicians, rural people are
understood to lean in more conservative directions due to emotional appeals toward explosive
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cultural issues (Frank 2005) that speak to the core of their rural identity. “Liberal” politics, like
government programs and public safety operations, oppose certain ethical keystones that often
lead rural conservatives to vote against their own self-interests as potential beneficiaries of said
programs.
Future Directions
If this phenomenon of paradoxical voting among rural conservatives is regarded as a
cyclical and systemic problem to be fixed, we must first understand the mechanisms that inform
the problem itself; otherwise, any solution will deliver only partially— remedying inconsistently
and offering no real resolution as issues’ roots lie festering unaddressed. But perhaps it is less
appropriate to view rural partisanship as a problem to be fixed and more, instead, as an
opportunity of undoing and unlearning. Rather than labeling such a large group as broken and
requiring management, sociopolitical researchers should view the various phenomena of rural
partisanship as indicators of their roles and presence (or lack thereof) in big-picture American
politics as well as an opportunity to improve public service on grander, more sustainable scales.
And since a key informer of rural politics is the notion of being “left behind” and disregarded by
politicians and academic elites, it is especially important to elevate rural voices in said
sociopolitical research. As former Senior Policy Analyst in the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy Russell Neuman says, “it is easy for the power junkies close to the
citadel in Washington to forget that the rest of the country is out there” (Neuman 1986). As the
American partisan divide grows, it is especially important to bridge this gap with the
transparency, intention, care, and determination of public research that informs political policy.
By conducting exploratory research in rural areas like those of this sample, disdained elites may
begin to slowly build trust and credibility with populations who largely doubt and scorn them for
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their lack in rural engagement. Likewise, academics and politicians have a lot to learn from rural
folks; after all, America cannot progress in any direction without working knowledge of,
cooperation with, and support from rural people.
Meaningful integration of rural partisanship in public policy research may look like
deployment of multiple teams throughout the US with intentions of consulting a variety of
communities and areas on issues of interest. For a thorough research effort, rural liberals,
conservatives, and other political identities should be studied and consulted on like issues
separately as well as examined as whole rural “units.” This may prove valuable in assessing
whether rural areas are more influenced by some expansive idea of rural politics or, as this study
speculates, plain conservativism which ideologically dominates rural areas. In other words, such
a study may further explore the effects of rural identity not on rural partisanship as a whole, but
rather on rural liberalism and rural conservativism separately. In terms of policy-based research,
however, it may be beneficial to include analyses where these separate examinations are further
investigated by intentionally blending the groups together in dialogue to discuss what is
perceived necessary and beneficial for a common community/geography. That way, researchers
can better contextualize participant responses and interactions as well as guide conversation to a
productive and meaningful direction as different partisan groups act as one informative unit—
something more or less unavoidable when working toward effective large-scale policy. By better
understanding the mechanisms behind certain partisanships and attitudes, researchers can not
only adjust methodology and language to more effectively reach their participants, they can help
engage and involve participants in giving rurality more of a voice in American politics. For even
though rural areas are surely considered in policy efforts, many rural folks in this sample—
regardless of political affiliation—felt either misrepresented or unrepresented in the current
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political system. Further research into rural consciousness and rural partisanship could help
clarify the needs and expectations of rural Americans that feel left out of research and policy
efforts that center urbanity as the places with the most people. Including more ethnographic
research in rural areas may quell feelings of neglect from people in rural areas, potentially
encouraging less political cynicism and less paradoxical voting by extension that would begin to
address cyclical root issues.
Understanding and respecting American rurality is imperative in the pursuit for equitable
public policy. As it is now, urban and rural areas depend on one another in a myriad of ways as
their production and expenditure dually influence each other (Davis et al 2002). To completely
separate rural areas from urbanity in any social and political sense would deliver an incomplete
understanding of their functionalities and roles in the American sociopolitical ecosystem.
However, much public policy both state and federal still rely too heavily on impacts and attitudes
in urban areas (Howard 2013). Instead of implementing blanket policies that work only for
certain pockets of the country or urban-rural linkage policies where half of this relationship is
under-consulted, more regionally based research focused on centering rurality and the rural
narrative could inspire better-informed interwoven policies, thereby more efficiently distributing
the benefits of such policies throughout society.
By further exploring nuances and mechanisms with rural identity and partisanship, rural
sociopolitical ecosystems can be enhanced and nurtured more sustainably through public policy
that addresses the needs and expectations of those who actually live there. In turn, this would
serve to advance national development as urban-rural linkages work together to lay groundwork
for a stronger, more collaborative government. While certainly imperfect, as all public service is,
this approach may serve to better address certain systemic inequalities that contribute to
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misdirected exasperation in any identity-based political perspective—not just rural—and bridge
partisan divides that currently fracture the American experiment. It is my hope that this research
can serve as a spark of inspiration for similarly conducted studies informing public policy and
sociopolitical work by including sidelined rural perspectives in more collaborative policy-based
research.
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